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The United States now has an extensive, publicly controlled, and  
bureaucratic system of election regulation. Until roughly a century ago,  
however, elections were viewed as private party contests subject to  
minimal state regulation. We examine how this changed, considering in  
particular the role played by the courts, given that for much of the  
nineteenth century they viewed the parties as private, constitutionally  
protected associations. We consider how and why the libertarian argument  
concerning free speech came to prominence in the campaign debate, and  
find that at first neither the reformers nor the courts at any level  
viewed this as a fundamental obstacle to—or even an issue to be  
considered in—the regulation of money in politics. This shift from a  
private to a public electoral system had a significant impact on  
American democracy that has not often been examined. To understand 
these changes, we examine the arguments put forth by advocates of cam-
paign finance reform from the nineteenth to the latter part of the twentieth 
centuries. We focus on how the proponents justified these laws and how 
state and federal courts responded to these arguments, paying particular 
attention to court rulings on the constitutionality of these  
unprecedented statutes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth  
centuries and to the evolution of their jurisprudence in this regard  
during the twentieth century.  
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11 Introduction
In 1890, Senate president pro-tempore John Ingalls (R-KS) re-
marked: “The purification of politics is an iridescent dream. Government
is force. Politics is a battle for supremacy. Parties are the armies. The
Decalogue and the Golden Rule have no place in a political campaign.
The object is success . . . The commander who lost the battle through the
activity of his moral nature would be the derision and jest of history. This
modern cant about the corruption of politics is fatiguing in the extreme.
It proceeds from tea-custard and syllabub dilettantism and frivolous
sentimentalism.”1 For Ingalls, politics represented a contest for power in
which it was perfectly lawful for the opposing parties to use whatever
methods were available, from hiring “mercenaries” to deceiving the en-
emy, to achieve their objective of taking or retaining control of the gov-
ernment.2
For many both in the past and today, nothing has been more re-
sponsible for the corruption of politics than the use of money in elec-
tions. Yet, there have been extraordinarily few efforts to study the long
and complex debate over the propriety of money in politics that has ex-
isted in the United States since at least the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Most histories of campaign finance tend to be what Ken Kersch
calls Whiggish narratives. They generally portray the emergence of a par-
ticular right or doctrine as a linear process in which the forces of pro-
gress struggled against and eventually overcame the forces of reaction to
                                                
1 John James Ingalls, A Collection of the Writings of John James Ingalls, ed. William
Elsey Connelley (Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co, 1902), 393.
2 Ingalls, 393.
2enshrine their vision of the Constitution into law through the courts.
These narratives, he further argues, are an integral part of the effort of
the reformers to provide a new constitutional understanding to justify
the policy initiatives of the powerful administrative state that displaced
the nineteenth century state of courts and parties that was grounded
upon the Constitution.3
The traditional Whiggish account of efforts to control the use of
money in elections tends to ignore or to neglect regulatory efforts under-
taken in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In its view,
the true struggle to control campaign funds began when the Watergate
scandal revealed the inherent dangers to the democratic process of a sys-
tem of privately financed elections, and arguably remains unresolved. On
one side of this battle are the reformers, the forces of progress, who
champion greater government intervention in the electoral process to
equalize the resources available to citizens, and hence their relative po-
litical power, to guarantee their fundamental right to participate in the
electoral process. Such radical measures are constitutionally justified in
their view by the necessity of ensuring that the government truly repre-
sents the interests of the people, and not those of the wealthy or special
interests. While on the other side are the libertarians, the forces of reac-
tion, who seek to stymie the attempt to preserve the American republic
by creating a more fair and egalitarian electoral process through their
belief that only a private, unrestricted system of electoral financing is
                                                
3 Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 1-4, 9-10, 12-16, 21-22, 338-340, 360.
3compatible with the rights to freedom of speech, of the press, and of as-
sociation enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
A few attempts have been made to break out of this traditional un-
derstanding of the history of campaign finance reform through an exami-
nation of the pre-Watergate reforms. Although these studies provide
much valuable information, they have three critical flaws. First, there is
a tendency to interject modern issues, such as the libertarian conception
of the right to freedom of speech, into their studies of the past. Second,
these works almost exclusively focus on the federal level even though the
states were responsible for the passage of most campaign finance regu-
lations until at least the mid-twentieth century. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, they do not adequately capture the magnitude of the
changes wrought by campaign finance regulations on the American po-
litical system, and how this transformation was made possible through
shifting understandings of the role of government and of the meaning of
particular rights.4
How did the United States acquire its extensive, publicly con-
trolled, bureaucratic system of election regulation given that until
roughly a century ago elections were viewed as private party contests
subject to minimal state regulation? What role did the courts play in this
                                                
4 Kersch, 8, 12, 18. For previous historical studies of campaign finance see especially
Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts (New York: Praeger, 1988); Kurt
Hohenstein, Coining Corruption (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007); John
Samples, The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2006); and Adam Winkler, “Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs: Early Political
Party Regulation in the State Courts, 1886-1915,” 100 Columbia Law Review 873 (April
2000). The recent book by Brian K. Pinaire, The Constitution of Electoral Speech Law:
The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression in Campaigns and Elections (Stanford:
Stanford Law Books, 2008) is also a historical work, but focuses more on the post-
Buckley development of constitutional law in regard to electoral speech.
4transformation, especially given that they viewed the parties as private,
constitutionally protected associations for much of the nineteenth cen-
tury? How and why did the libertarian argument concerning free speech
come to prominence in the campaign debate given that neither the re-
formers nor the courts at any level viewed this as a fundamental obstacle
to—or even an issue to be considered in—the regulation of money in
politics until the mid-twentieth century? And what effect has this shift
from a private to a public electoral system had on American democracy?
It is these questions that this work, An Iridescent Dream: Money, Politics,
and the American Republic, 1865-1976, hopes to begin to answer through
an investigation of the arguments put forth by advocates of campaign fi-
nance reform from the nineteenth to the latter part of the twentieth cen-
turies to justify these laws. And how the state and federal courts re-
sponded to these arguments, paying particular attention to rulings on
the constitutionality of these unprecedented statutes in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, and to the evolution of their juris-
prudence in this regard during the twentieth century.
Liberalism and the Constitutional Order
In his book The Lincoln Persuasion, J. David Greenstone challenged
Louis Hartz’s contention that American liberalism has consisted of an
unusually coherent and stable set of beliefs and practices. Pointing to
events such as the Civil War which clearly represented a challenge to the
liberal consensus thesis put forth by Hartz, Greenstone argued for a
more nuanced understanding of liberalism in the United States that
would more accurately describe the sources of the nation’s agreements
5and disagreements about how best to shape and to guide the develop-
ment of the polity. He suggests that three kinds of liberalism have mani-
fested themselves over the course of American history. The first is what
he refers to as republican, genus, or consensus liberalism, which con-
sists of the traditional beliefs in private property, individual rights, and
government by consent that are accepted by virtually everyone. Its pur-
pose is to set the fundamental rules by which the governmental system
will operate by defining political relations between individuals and the
state, and within the government itself.5
What it leaves unanswered, and hence has been the primary
source of conflict among Americans about the purposes of their polity,
are the broader social and philosophical questions about what consti-
tutes a good society and the nature of human beings. In seeking to ad-
dress these questions, the other two kinds of liberalism, neither of which
has ever been completely dominate, each interpret the fundamental
principles espoused in republican liberalism in particular ways that have
informed the solutions individuals or groups advocated to problems or is-
sues in the United States. Humanist, or what this work will refer to as
pluralist, liberalism, according to Greenstone, is concerned with “
‘equitably satisfying individual desires and preferences’ and on achieving
‘the welfare of each human being as she or he defines it.’ Pluralist lib-
eralism values negative liberty that is ‘the freedom of individuals to de-
termine their goals and to consider how best to achieve those goals with
a minimum of external constraint.’ ”6 Thus in its view, the good society
                                                
5 J. David Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993), xix-xx, xxii, 35-36, 36-37 footnote 1, 37-40, 45-46, 51-53.
6 Greenstone, 36 footnote 1.
6will be one in which the government adopts policies and strategies that
freely allow individuals to set and to meet whatever goals they desire. The
only restraint placed on them are rules of conduct that ensure they re-
spect the right of others to do likewise.7
In contrast, what Greenstone refers to as reform liberalism believes
that the satisfaction of individual preferences must be subordinated to
the achievement of socially defined goals or standards. “Reform liberals
value positive liberty and insist on ‘the obligation, not just the option,’ of
individuals ‘to cultivate and develop their physical, intellectual, and es-
thetic, and moral faculties,’ as well as to help others to do so in order ‘to
achieve mastery . . . in activities of importance to one’s community.’ ”8
For them, the ideal policy is one in which the government promotes poli-
cies or practices that encourage individuals to improve themselves, and
consequently contribute to the excellence of their neighbors and their
community, by cultivating their faculties and shaping their behavior or
conduct according to certain communal moral or ethical precepts.9
These distinctions in American liberalism that Greenstone ob-
served are used in this study as a framework through which to under-
stand how various conceptions of government and rights have implicitly
influenced the debate over whether the state should regulate the use of
money in elections, and if so to what extent. The first of these is that of
the founders who established the basic principles of republican liberal-
ism through the process of creating and adopting the Constitution. As is
well-known, the central question they grappled with was how to limit and
                                                
7 Greenstone, xxii, xxiv-xxvii, 6, 33, 35-36, 48-50, 53-55, 58-59.
8 Greenstone, 36-37 footnote 1.
9 Greenstone, xxii, xxiv-xxvii, xxxii, 6, 33, 35-36, 59-64.
7to control governmental power to preserve the liberties of the citizens,
while at the same time leaving the government sufficient authority to
fulfill its essential responsibilities to the nation. The solution to this
problem put forth by Madison and Hamilton in The Federalist Papers was
the intricate structure of the central government proposed by the Consti-
tution, and in particular three features. First, it was to be a large com-
mercial republic which would make it difficult for any faction to become a
majority and use the power of the government in a tyrannical manner;
provide opportunities for ambitious men to turn their energies to private
pursuits; and increase the chance that worthy men would be selected to
serve as the people’s representatives. Second, the government was to be
one of limited and enumerated powers, which left the people free to ex-
ercise the vast number of freedoms and privileges that comprised their
natural rights, and the states primary responsibility for regulating most
aspects of people’s lives. And third, the power granted to the central gov-
ernment was to be checked both by the states who would zealously
guard their authority against any intrusions, and by an internal system
of checks and balances that gave each branch the ability and motive to
resist encroachments by the others.10
Although a Bill of Rights was eventually added to the Constitution
as a further restraint upon the powers of the national government, nei-
                                                
10 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed.
Clinton Rossiter (New York: Mentor, 1961),  3-4, 10-13, 17-18, 27-28, 37-39, 45-52, 67,
81-86, 120-121, 124-125, 156, 208-214, 223-224, 288-293; Herbert Storing, The
Complete Anti-Federalist, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 41-47;
Howard Gillman, “Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and
the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence,” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 47,
no. 3 (Sept. 1994): 626-627; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution, enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1992), 77-79.
8ther Hamilton nor Madison initially believed that such a document was
an appropriate check on its authority as the anti-federalists did. In fact,
they argued that it would actually be a menace to the liberties of the
people as it would imply that the central government had powers beyond
those enumerated in the Constitution, although it is unclear if their real
reason for opposing the Bill of Rights was its potential to weaken the na-
tional government.11
Over the course of the 1790s, the efforts of Hamilton and other
Federalists to develop a strong central government led Madison and other
individuals who became known as Democratic-Republicans to elaborate
upon and modify the theory of government put forth in The Federalist. Of
particular interest for the purposes of this study are their writings during
the debate over the Sedition Act at the close of the eighteenth century.
This law was passed by the Federalist Party to silence criticism of its of-
ficials and polices by granting the government the power to prosecute for
libel any individual who printed false, misleading, or otherwise offensive
information about them. Proponents of the statute argued that it did not
violate the First Amendment as it followed the understanding of freedom
of the press found in British common law which had been operative in
the United States since colonial times. According to the foremost exposi-
tor of that law, William Blackstone, this meant that the government
could place no prior restraints on the right of the citizens to print what-
ever they choose. However, it could hold individuals responsible for the
abuse of this liberty by punishing writings that had a bad tendency, es-
pecially those that made false, scandalous, or critical statements about
                                                
11 Madison et al., 478-483; Storing, 64-71; Gillman, 626-627.
9the conduct of officials, or in short libeled them, as this diminished the
public esteem for the government and made the enforcement of the laws
more difficult.12
For Madison and others, this understanding of the First Amend-
ment contravened the view that the Constitution had created a govern-
ment of limited and enumerated powers. If British common law was ap-
plicable to the United States, he and others argued that the power of the
federal government would be vastly increased. Judges would have legisla-
tive-like discretion in ruling on cases; the residual sovereignty of the
states would be destroyed as the common law would be paramount to
the state constitutions and law; and the supreme power to make and
modify laws would be invested in Congress, which would not be re-
strained by the Constitution. Thus, they rejected this view on the ground
that it nullified, and hence was incompatible, with the objectives of those
who had written the Constitution. And as that document gave Congress
no grant of authority whatsoever to regulate the press, the Sedition Act
had to be unconstitutional they concluded.13
However, Madison and other opponents of the law did not merely
rest their argument on The Federalist’s theory that the design of the go-
vernment, especially its limited and enumerated powers, prohibited the
                                                
12 “The House Debates the Sedition Act,” in Freedom of the Press from Zenger to
Jefferson, ed. Leonard W. Levy (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1996), 171-176,
180, 182-183.
13 “The House Debates,” 178-179, 181-185; “George Hay Upholds Freedom of the Press
as an Absolute,” in Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson, ed. Leonard W. Levy
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1996), 189-191, 196-197; “James Madison Argues
for Freedom of the Press,” in Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson, ed. Leonard
W. Levy (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1996), 198-212, 214, 217-219, 226-227;
“The American Blackstone Disavows Blackstone," in Freedom of the Press from Zenger to
Jefferson, ed. Leonard W. Levy (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1996), 318, 322-
324.
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passage of the statute. Rather, they also placed a strong emphasis on the
fact that the law violated the natural right of individuals to inquire about
any subject of concern to them as embodied in the federal Bill of Rights’
guarantees of freedom of speech, of the press, and of association. They
argued that as the people in a republican government constituted the
sovereign power, it was absolutely essential that they exercise these
rights to ensure that they would be adequately, and to the extent possi-
ble truthfully, informed about the conduct of their government and rep-
resentatives. Only with such knowledge disseminated through speeches
and writing could they properly perform their duty of electing all parts of
the government.
Let it be recollected lastly that the right of electing the members of the
government constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and re-
sponsible government. The value and efficacy of this right depends on
the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates
for public trust and on the equal freedom consequently of examining and
discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively.14
Especially important to the ability of the people to properly select their
officials were the kinds of writings targeted by the Sedition Act: those
that triggered hatred or contempt for the government among the citizens
by criticizing its conduct. Only the arousal of such feelings could trigger
change if it was needed as positive feelings would merely serve to main-
tain the people’s confidence in the current administration. Hence, to al-
low the government to control what opinions were expressed by indi-
viduals they believed would become a means by which the current rulers
would perpetuate their authority indefinitely and destroy the republic.
And it was precisely this danger in their view that the First Amendment
                                                
14 “James Madison Argues,” 225.
11
had been designed to combat by making explicit the inability of the state
to interfere with the right of the people to evaluate and to express their
approval or disapproval to the conduct of their government and represen-
tatives.15
Thus, the founders sought to create a political system character-
ized by a system of restraints and negative rights that protected the lib-
erties and the freedom of the people through the creation of a govern-
ment of limited powers and responsibilities. For Madison and others, the
actions of the Federalists in the 1790s transgressed what they probably
perceived to be the boundaries within which the Constitution and repub-
lican liberalism had sought to contain governmental power. Echoing
strains of both republican and pluralist liberalism, they argued that the
best government was the one that allowed the people to act on their own
preferences with minimal constraints, particularly in the electoral proc-
ess. The latter was especially important in their view as it was the pri-
mary opportunity the people had to gather information about their repre-
sentatives and their government, and to express their judgment of their
conduct. The First Amendment was designed to safeguard this freedom
by ensuring that they would be allowed to use their natural and consti-
tutional rights to “freely” give their consent or their disapproval of the ac-
tions taken by those they had previously entrusted with power.
                                                
15 “The House Debates,” 177-180; “George Hay Upholds,” 194-196; “James Madison
Argues,” 198, 214-216, 220-226; “The New Libertarianism Produces a Political
Theorist,” in Freedom of the Press from Zenger to Jefferson, ed. Leonard W. Levy
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1996), 231-243, 245-253, 258-259, 263, 266-270,
273; “John Thomson Urges Unfettered Freedom for All Human Opinions,” in Freedom of
the Press from Zenger to Jefferson, ed. Leonard W. Levy (Durham: Carolina Academic
Press, 1996), 290-294, 297-298, 310; “American Blackstone,” 318-321.
12
The other conceptions of liberalism that have influenced the cam-
paign finance debate over the past century and a half fall within the re-
form liberalism tradition. The most important of these in the late nine-
teenth century was arguably that of the Progressives who successfully
built upon the groundwork laid by earlier reform movements, most no-
tably the Populist and Mugwumps discussed in chapter two, to success-
fully pass the first campaign finance laws.
For the diverse group of individuals who comprised the Progressive
movement at the turn of the twentieth century, the primary issue was
how to redefine the role of government and of rights to address the issues
that had arisen in a modern industrialized society as seen in the works of
John Dewey and Herbert Croly. In his Ethics, Dewey criticized the consti-
tutional order established by the founders based upon natural rights,
equality before the law, and a suspicion of governmental power for sti-
fling the moral and intellectual development of the citizens and society by
granting individuals a formal and empty freedom that merely served to
perpetuate inequalities in wealth and power. If democracy was to provide
citizens with effective freedom and liberties, he argued that it had to be
conceived of as more than simply an instrument by which to rule society.
“Externally viewed, democracy is a piece of machinery, to be maintained
or thrown away, like any other piece of machinery, on the basis of its
economy and efficiency of working. Morally, it is the effective embodiment
of the moral idea of a good which consists in the development of all the
social capacities of every individual member.”16 And it was the duty of
                                                
16 John Dewey and James H. Tuft, Ethics in John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-
1924, vol. 5: 1908, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
13
the state, according to Dewey, to make possible the fulfillment of this
democratic moral ideal, however it was defined, by providing the citizens
with the optimal environment and resources required for them to exer-
cise their distinctive and unique potentialities, and in the process both
contribute to their own individual growth and the common good.17
Dewey further argued that it was the responsibility of every gen-
eration to reevaluate the existing customs, institutions, and laws in light
of changing circumstances to determine what measures were required to
continue the advancement of society and individuals toward the demo-
cratic moral ideal. Crucial to this process for him was freedom of speech,
which allowed the citizens to debate and exchange ideas about how best
to address the challenges confronting them at a particular moment.
However, for Dewey, only constructive criticisms of the regime were ad-
missible, and not dissent that questioned the validity of the democratic
ideal itself or disrupted the consensus and harmony of the community.18
In his major works, The Promise of American Life and Progressive
Democracy, Herbert Croly argued that the constitutional regime estab-
lished by the founders could no longer sustain the nation’s historic
commitment to the gradual advance of democratic values and the im-
                                                                                                                                                
Press, 1978), 424. The chapters examined in The Ethics are those known to have been
written exclusively by Dewey.
17 John Dewey and James H. Tuft, Ethics (vol. 5: 1908), 385-386, 388-390, 392-395,
404, 418-419, 422, 424-426, 428, 430-433; John Dewey and James H. Tuft, Ethics in
John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953, vol. 7: 1932, ed. Jo Ann Boydston
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 315-319, 327, 331-338, 340-
350, 354-358; David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 219-222, 228-230; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of
Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 4-5.
18 John Dewey and James H. Tuft, Ethics (vol. 5: 1908), 399-401, 433; John Dewey
and James H. Tuft, Ethics (vol. 7: 1932), 315-316, 329-331, 338, 358-366; Rabban,
218, 223-228, 336-341.
14
provement of social and economic circumstances or what he called the
American promise. For too long, he believed that the nation had been
gripped by a fatal optimism that the American promise would be auto-
matically fulfilled through the exploitation of the country’s unlimited ma-
terial resources and the exercise of individual rights unhindered by gov-
ernmental action. In reality, however, Croly argued that this path had
become a threat to the very existence of the promise as the concentration
of power and wealth in the hands of a few men and corporations had re-
sulted in political corruption and social inequalities that divided the in-
terests of the community and created class contempt. He feared that the
continuation of these trends would not only destroy the vitality of Ameri-
can democracy, but also cause the disintegration of society itself.19
To preserve the American promise, it was necessary in Croly’s
opinion for the citizens to come to view it as a constructive social and
moral democratic ideal that each generation was to strive to fulfill in light
of changing circumstances and the experiences of their predecessors.
Central to this effort would be an expanded and activist central governm-
ent that through its laws and institutions would not only seek to amelio-
rate social and economic discrepancies by controlling the exercise of in-
dividual rights, but more importantly strive to improve and ultimately
perfect human nature. “Democracy must stand or fall on a platform of
possible human perfectibility. If human nature cannot be improved by
                                                
19 Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1993), 5, 10-18, 20-24, 33-36, 49-50, 116-117, 139, 148-149, 186, 189,
204-206, 424; Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1998), 51, 58-61, 98-103, 108; Wilfred M. McClay, “Croly’s Progressive
America,” The Public Interest, no. 137 (Fall 1999), 57-60, 63; Rabban, 232, 234, 237-
241.
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institutions, democracy is at best a more than usually safe form of politi-
cal organization; and the only interesting inquiry about its future would
be: How long will it continue to work?”20 This transformation of human
nature would be made possible by an education that taught the citizens
to suppress their selfish desires, and instead base their actions and de-
cisions upon disinterested motives that allowed them to contribute first
and foremost to the broader goals of the nation and then to their own
individual development. And as the people strove to perfect themselves
and society, the social ideal would become incorporated into what Croly
called a civil religion of brotherhood. This religion would sustain the na-
tion and the genuine democratic community it sought to create by pro-
moting loving-kindness towards one’s fellow citizens, reinforcing the obli-
gations and responsibilities of citizens to the nation, and supporting
them in the difficult task of maintaining the democratic ideal.21
Whereas the liberalism of the founders was concerned with limiting
government and controlling the effects of human nature by channeling
the ambitions and interests of men into private and public pursuits that
would benefit the republic, the Progressives developed an understanding
of liberalism that essentially transformed democracy into a religion. For
them, it was the duty of the government, which they viewed as a benevo-
lent force, to assist in the redemption and perfection of the citizens and
society by constantly seeking to remove all economic, social, and political
impediments to the achievement of their vaguely defined goal known as
                                                
20 Croly, Promise, 400.
21 Croly, Promise, 5, 17, 22, 24, 139-140, 152, 189-190, 195-198, 207-208, 214, 270-
279, 380-382, 399-400, 403, 407-421, 439, 452-454; Croly, Progressive Democracy,
114-116, 119-125, 149, 170-171, 174, 177, 183, 190-191, 199-200, 211-212, 215-217,
238-239, 241, 244, 271-272, 283, 378-379, 396, 408, 423-427; McClay, 62-66, 69.
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the democratic moral ideal. And furthermore, to teach them how to live
morally and to act from rational and public-spirited motives to enable
them to assume the growing responsibilities that accompanied the grad-
ual perfection of the state. Rights in this progressive democracy were
positive ones, or more accurately duties and obligations, that the citizens
and the government had to each other to ensure that the state’s purpose
of enriching the moral and intellectual lives of the citizens and society
was fulfilled.22 All of these features of Progressive thought, as the next
chapter will discuss, had a significant influence upon their understand-
ing of how the electoral system should operate, and their standards for
evaluating if it was functioning properly or not.
Another conception of reform liberalism that manifests itself in the
debate over campaign finance is best characterized by the work of John
Rawls, which reflects the central concern of modern liberals, one they
arguably share with the Populists of the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury as chapter four will discuss, with the growing inequality that they
perceive to be developing in the polity, especially in regard to those who
wield political power. Rawls sought to address this issue in his various
works by proposing the development of a democratic constitutional order
based upon what he called a system of social cooperation in which citi-
zens were free and equal not only in theory, but also in practice. The
achievement of this goal required the establishment of a well-ordered so-
                                                
22 McClay, 65, 69; Hofstadter, 4-5, 9, 11, 15-16, 152, 203-204; Stephen Skowronek,
Building a New American Administrative State (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1982), 24-29, 35, 42; Wilson Carey McWilliams, “Standing at Armageddon: Morality
and Religion in Progressive Social Thought,” in Progressivism and the New Democracy,
edited by Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1999), 103-106, 109-110, 115; Rabban, 3-4, 17, 215-216.
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ciety in which all citizens agreed upon certain principles of justice, and
used them to make decisions in their daily lives and more fundamentally
to determine the governing arrangements for their society.23
Rawls argues that these principles of justice must be adopted in
what he calls the “original position,” the time before the social contract is
adopted to establish political society and government. Individuals in the
“original position” make their decision about what the principles of jus-
tice will be behind a veil of ignorance, which prevents anyone from being
aware of his social status, his natural talents, or anything else about
himself in relation to other citizens. This ensures that no one can choose
principles of justice that will be to their advantage and potentially to the
disadvantage of others, and that the resulting principles are fair because
they are produced in a situation where everyone is equal. In deciding
upon the principles, individuals are solely guided by their sense of jus-
tice; their rational desire to maximize their conception of the good by in-
creasing to the greatest extent possible their share of primary social
goods, such as income and authority, and a desire to protect their liber-
ties. According to Rawls, the two principles of justice that individuals
would eventually agree upon are:
1. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liber-
ties for all.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are
to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equal-
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ity of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society.24
Rawls further argues that the first principle of justice must be fulfilled
before the second in order to ensure that citizens are not tempted to ex-
change their basic liberties for the social and economic advantages
promised by the second principle. These basic liberties are: freedom of
thought and liberty of conscience, political liberties, freedom of associa-
tion, freedoms specified by the integrity of the person, and the rights and
liberties provided by the rule of law. The second principle, which will not
be the focus of the following discussion, is meant to establish what in-
equalities are permissible in society.25
Having established the principles of justice, the members of society
must then turn to the task of developing a constitutional democracy that
fulfills them. One of the central problems that must be overcome in cre-
ating a government is how to preserve the fair value of the basic liberties
promised by the first principle of justice. By fair value, Rawls means that
“the worth of the political liberties to all citizens, whatever their social or
economic position, must be approximately equal, or at least sufficiently
equal, in the sense that everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public
office and to influence the outcome of political decisions.”26 According to
him, one of the primary means of preserving the fair value of the basic
liberties in a society such as the United States that nonetheless allows
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private ownership of the means of production, property, and wealth is to
finance campaigns with public funds as well as to impose additional re-
strictions as needed (Rawls does not specify what those restrictions
might be). This regulation of political speech is justified, according to
Rawls, on the grounds that it will ensure just political institutions that
take into consideration all viewpoints by allowing everyone to have equal
power and representation in the political process as if they were in the
original position. And thus prevents the government from being influ-
enced solely by the more advantaged social and economic interests.27
Thus, both Progressivism and modern liberalism are variants of
the reform tradition discussed by Greenstone, and based their solutions
to the dilemmas confronting the nation in these different eras on the use
of governmental authority to establish standards of behavior, i.e. the
democratic moral ideal and the principles of justice respectively, to guide
the actions of the citizens and society. What differentiates them is that
the Progressives sought to turn democracy into a moral force to direct
the development of individuals and society; while Rawls and modern
liberals are focused upon the necessity of preventing the disproportionate
exercise of power, whether it be economic or political, by the wealthy as it
distorts the actions taken by those elected by the citizens. Its objective in
part is to reshape the political system in such a manner as to be able to
provide an egalitarian distribution of resources among the citizens to en-
sure they can equally participate and influence their legislators who are
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supposed to be responsive to their interests and needs, not those of their
rich campaign contributors.
Preview of the Work
Greenstone argued that major political events can best be under-
stood by seeking to “account for the solutions in terms of the situations
the individuals found themselves in.”28 Following this advice, this study
relies extensively upon original sources, such as books, popular maga-
zines, law reviews, newspapers, and scholarly journals, to study why
elites and movements founded by them sought at different times to
regulate the use of money in politics during the past century and a half.
The work focuses upon elites as campaign finance has been predomi-
nantly a policy area that draws little attention from the public except in
rare moments when massive scandals temporarily heighten its interest in
this issue. It then turns to looking at state and federal court opinions,
and to a very limited extent briefs filed by the parties in these cases, to
examine the role of the courts in ratifying or challenging these changes.
There are many sources that remain unexplored due to constraints
imposed by funding, such as the opinions of legislators, especially those
at the state levels, and the briefs for the various court cases. It is hoped
that these can be examined in the future. This work and its conclusions
therefore represent an introductory and modest effort to begin to under-
stand how elites and the courts over the past century and a half have re-
shaped our political and electoral system by altering accepted constitu-
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tional interpretations and understandings about parties, candidates, citi-
zens, money in politics, and more generally democracy.
The next chapter examines the period from 1865, when some of
the earliest agitation for electoral reforms began to emerge, to 1920 when
most states and the federal government had adopted statutes of various
kinds to regulate the use of money in elections. It begins by examining
the unregulated electoral system that existed for much of the nineteenth
century before turning to the question of who the various groups of re-
form liberals were, and what prompted each of them to desire to expand
the authority of the state over elections. Lastly, the chapter describes the
objectives that the Progressive reformers sought to achieve through the
first great wave of campaign finance legislation that was passed in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the impact of these
new electoral laws on the liberties and rights of the citizens and others,
especially in the South.
The third chapter examines the role of the state courts in redefin-
ing the prevailing understanding of the electoral and political systems
from the mid-nineteenth century until the 1960s. As there is substan-
tially little difference between the constitutional principles relied upon by
the various courts in ruling upon these statutes in this era, the discus-
sion of their opinions that follows is framed thematically around their
rulings pertaining to specific kinds of campaign finance laws. In looking
at the courts’ decisions, this study especially seeks to understand the
extent to which the state judges shared the concerns of the reformers
about money in politics; how they justified the passage of these unprece-
dented laws; and how they resolved the conflicts that arose between the
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statutes and the rights of the citizens, parties, and other participants in
the electoral process.
The fourth chapter discusses how the state legislatures and courts
declined in importance as the federal courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, became the primary guardians of the people’s liberties in the lat-
ter part of the twentieth century. In particular, it seeks to understand
how the Court’s concerns in the electoral process shifted from questions
related to federalism and race to those pertaining to free speech and
campaign activities. The chapter first considers who the reformers of the
second part of the twentieth century were, and whether their attitudes
toward the use of money in elections differed from those of the previous
reformers and hence potentially influenced the views of the courts. It
then investigates the possibility that the constitutional revolution of 1937
had a significant impact upon how the Court perceived statutes that
regulated the electoral process. It concludes by showing the effect of the
new judicial or legal context upon the second great wave of campaign fi-
nance laws that were passed in the wake of the Watergate scandal.
The final chapter seeks to evaluate the merits of the arguments put
forth by the reform liberals, and more importantly the implications and
consequences that their efforts to regulate the use of money in politics
and to transform the electoral system from a private to a public institu-
tion have had for American democracy. It argues that the efforts to
regulate campaign finance over the past century and a half have been
more harmful than helpful, since they have allowed extensive govern-
mental interference with rights that are at the core of the democratic
process and hence vital to sustaining the republican constitutional order.
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2 Commercialism, Politics, and Vice! Oh My!
As the United States was transformed from a predominantly rural
community into an industrialized and urbanized polity in the latter half
of the nineteenth century, reform liberals began to believe that freely al-
lowing individuals to pursue their own desires or preferences, a feature
of the pluralist liberalism that was arguably prevalent at this time, was
inappropriate in this new context. What was necessary in their view to
preserve the republic were community imposed standards that would re-
store the values associated with the nation’s agrarian past, and at the
same time deal with the problems that had arisen as a consequence of
the profound change in the character of the polity and the people. How-
ever, there was much debate among reform liberals as to what form these
new ethical or moral precepts would take, and in how they interpreted
the principles of republican liberalism, particularly its requirement that
government be formed by the consent of the people.
Beginning with the Populists in the 1870s, one of the central con-
cerns of reform liberals became with what they perceived to be the de-
basement of politics and government by the party bosses and the corpo-
rations. It was not until the rise of the Progressive movement in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, that a widespread
and sustained effort was made to attack what many reformers had come
to believe was the source of the corruption of politics: the enervation of
the civic virtue and political morality of the citizens. An essential part of
the Progressive program to restore the moral character of the people and
the vitality of the republic was the passage of laws to limit and to control
the use of money in elections and the activities of the political parties.
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These statutes were designed to counter the pernicious influence of the
party bosses and corporations by preventing them from using the elec-
toral system to satisfy their selfish interests by imposing clear moral
standards that all were expected to follow in selecting their representa-
tives.
Elections in Mid-Nineteenth Century America
For much of the nineteenth century, the most significant laws pro-
tecting the purity of the ballot were state statutes and constitutional
provisions that sought to prevent bribery, intimidation, fraud, and other
electoral crimes. With the exception of an 1829 New York statute which
prohibited political contributions to be made for any purpose except to
defray the costs of printing and circulating ballots, handbills, and other
papers before an election, there were no laws to control or to limit how
candidates, parties, and their supporters raised and spent money in
elections. What little is known about the financial practices of the parties
in this era suggests that the amounts raised for national campaigns were
probably modest, and that campaign funds were raised largely through
the assessment of civil service workers and gifts from wealthy individu-
als.1
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These laws, however, did not prevent the political parties and their
agents from seeking to manipulate the electoral process by using any
means available to influence the decisions of the citizens. For them, elec-
tions represented a high stakes competition over who would have politi-
cal power and the material interests such power could secure, like party
patronage for workers or lucrative tariffs for corporations. Consequently,
they were fiercely contested not just in the months leading up to election
day, but also at the polling place itself where party agents competed with
each other to win the support of the citizens for their ticket. “The Ameri-
can polling place was thus a kind of sorcerer’s workshop in which the
minions of opposing parties turned money into whiskey and whiskey into
votes. This alchemy transformed the great political interests of the na-
tion, commanded by those with money, into the prevailing currency of
democracy.”2 What made this transformation possible was the fact that
political parties were responsible for running the electoral process. They
did everything from providing ballots to staffing the polling stations. As
each party’s ballot was a distinct color and size, party agents were able to
monitor a voter to ensure that he deposited the appropriate ballot before
rewarding him with liquor, money, or some good that addressed his par-
ticular needs, such as a pair of shoes.3
While today these practices would be considered bribery or im-
properly influencing voters, they were in this era viewed not only as le-
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gitimate but also an important social transaction that formed the basis of
many individuals’ partisan attachments. These citizens came to the polls
to vote for a particular party based upon the expectation developed over
the course of their lives that the party would reward them for their sup-
port. Hence, the citizen’s decision of how to vote, and carry out one of his
fundamental duties to the republic, was not necessarily based upon his
independent judgment formed through a careful evaluation of the issues
and candidates, but rather his personal ambitions and self-interest.4
Although the practice of rewarding individuals for their votes was
probably the most common means of manipulating the election results,
the parties at times relied upon other methods to ensure an outcome fa-
vorable to their candidates. In regions where a party was in the majority,
for example, it was possible to prevent supporters of the minority party
from voting at all by having the crowd in front of the election window
where the ballots were deposited obstruct their path. And even if such
voters did reach the window, they would face hostile questioning regard-
ing their qualifications to cast a ballot from the party challenger posted
outside the window and the election judge who had to determine whether
to accept his ballot or not. Conversely, if a voter was supporting the ma-
jority party, usually indicated by waving the appropriate ballot over his
head, the crowd would let him through and the election officials would
willingly accept his ballot.5
Neither the ineffectiveness of the laws regulating the electoral
process nor the practices engaged in by the political parties to ensure
their victory were new. Rather, they were arguably the continuation of
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the campaign practices that had been developed by the gentlemen candi-
dates of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For example, at
that time it was expected that the candidate would reward his supporters
with food and drink at the polls even though bribery was at the very least
a crime according to the common law.6 The minimal regulation by the
state and federal governments of the campaign practices engaged in by
the parties and the people until at least the mid-nineteenth century
therefore arguably reflected an adherence to the tradition of pluralist lib-
eralism. Government by consent was understood to be allowing indi-
viduals to “freely” act on their personal preferences in selecting their rep-
resentatives subject only to those constraints required to ensure that the
rights of others were respected. Although Madison had hoped that the
people would choose their leaders based on information about their mer-
its and demerits, they increasingly relied upon the material motivations
provided by the parties to vote for or against them.
Reform liberals of the latter part of the nineteenth century, how-
ever, did not view the customary practice of rewarding voters for their
support to draw them to the polls as a legitimate means by which to
make citizens fulfill their civic duties by appealing to their self-interest.
Rather, they increasingly argued, as will be discussed below, that this
was a form of bribery that prevented the true expression of the will of the
people in elections. Some, such as Robert Mutch, have argued that this
growing concern over the use of money and other material goods to influ-
ence voters in the nineteenth century was a consequence of the shift
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from gentlemen candidates to professional politicians who relied on oth-
ers to fund their elections. “Eighteenth century voters could not always
be sure that their elected representatives were honest or intelligent, but
they did know who was making policy. The concern of the industrialized
nineteenth century was that their elected representatives might not be
the real policymakers, that government might be controlled by those who
provided campaign funds.”7 While there is some truth to this assertion, it
must be understood within the broader context of how reform liberals
conceived of republican government to fully explain why campaign prac-
tices that had existed for at least a century lost their legitimacy.
Who Were the Early Reformers?
I. The Populists and the “Money Power”
The reform liberals of the latter part of the nineteenth century
consisted of a variety of individuals and movements that were concerned
with addressing what they perceived to be the threats to the
sustainability of the polity posed by industrialization and urbanization.
Perhaps the earliest of these was the Populist movement that began in
the 1870s with the Greenback, Granger, and anti-monopoly organiza-
tions, and culminated in the formation of the Populist Party in the
1890s. It considered the transformation that had occurred in the nation
since the Civil War to be disastrous as it had allowed the money power,
i.e. the new capitalists and their corporations, to use their immense
wealth to unduly influence the policies of the state and federal govern-
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ments to the detriment of the citizens. “The people versus the interests,
the public versus the plutocrats, the toiling multitude versus the money
power—in various phrases this central antagonism was expressed . . .
The problems that faced the Populists assumed a delusive simplicity: the
victory over injustice, the solution for all social ills, was concentrated in
the crusade against a single, relatively small but immensely strong inter-
est, the money power.”8 As the corporations in essence controlled the
political parties and the policies they enacted through the use of govern-
mental power, one of the central questions for the Populists became how
to restore the people to their rightful place as the rulers of the republic so
the state would serve their interests again.9
For them, the solution to this dilemma was to give the citizens the
power to directly influence their government and even to enact legislation
through measures, such as the initiative and referendum. Government
by consent meant in their view eliminating the distance that existed be-
tween the people and their rulers to allow the former to oversee the ac-
tions of the latter, and even veto them if necessary. However, more than
simply wanting to restore the people to power, the Populists also argu-
ably hoped to at the very least recreate the kind of citizens associated
with the yeoman republic of the early nineteenth century. This was a
time when there was no money power and plenty of opportunity for eve-
ryone. An era when the citizens lived frugally off of their own labor and
shunned luxury for simple and honest lives resulting in a moral, virtu-
ous, and patriotic citizenry that was indebted to no interests, not con-
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sumed with the unrestrained pursuit of wealth and luxury, and readily
able to determine the public interest, to study the great issues of the day
and to hold their representatives accountable for their decisions.10 Thus
the goal of the Populists was in essence to restore republican government
to an earlier state in which there had been fewer discrepancies in relative
political power, and in which political decisions truly reflected the judg-
ment of the citizens as to what was best for themselves and the commu-
nity as a whole.
II. Mugwumps and Spoilsmen
Another reform movement that arose in the second half of the
nineteenth century was that of the Mugwumps. Their central concern
was with the partisanship and corruption that had come to characterize
Gilded Age politics, especially under President Grant. They believed that
the quality of government could only be improved if the best men, such
as themselves, who knew how to practice the art of statecraft were
elected. “Their ideal leader was a well-to-do, well-educated, high-minded
citizen, rich enough to be free from motives of what they often called
‘crass materialism,’ whose family roots were deep not only in American
history but in his local community. Such a person, they thought, would
be just the sort to put the national interest, as well as the interests of
civic improvement, above personal motives or political opportunism.”11
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Led by men such as Carl Schurz, a prominent Republican senator, and
Dorman B. Eaton and Edwin L. Godkin, two prominent journalists of this
era, the Mugwumps attempted from the 1870s to the 1890s to pressure
the Republican Party into accepting their demands for various kinds of
reform measures to clean up government, especially civil service reform,
to allow these ideal or best men to serve again. Their preferred tactic to
express their discontentment with the party was to bolt from it, and sup-
port their own specially nominated candidate or the Democratic presi-
dential candidate.12
Although there had been sporadic efforts since the late 1830s to
eliminate the practice of raising money for political campaigns through
the assessment of civil service workers, Congress did not pass a compre-
hensive reform measure until after the assassination of President Gar-
field in 1881 by a deranged office seeker. Prior to that event, it had re-
sponded to the problem through a series of piecemeal measures. The first
was passed in 1867 as part of a naval appropriations bill, which included
a provision that prohibited the assessment of government employees who
worked in naval shipyards. This was followed by President Grant’s effort
in 1871 to create a civil service commission to establish a merit system
to be used for selecting public servants. It failed in 1874 when Congress
refused to appropriate any additional funds to support its work. Finally,
in 1876 a statute was passed that prohibited government employees not
appointed by the president from assessing other government workers.
President Hayes strengthened this measure by extending the ban to
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cover any electioneering activities by government employees through an
executive order issued in 1877 shortly after he took office. However, none
of these measures proved effective in halting the practice of assessing
civil service workers for campaign funds. It took the passage of the
Pendleton Act in 1883 to begin the slow process of ending this practice.
This law created a merit system to govern the civil service which initially
covered only a small number of offices, prohibited the dismissal of federal
employees for political reasons and the levying of political assessments
on them, and created a Civil Service Commission to oversee the enforce-
ment of the law.13
The constant attention that civil service reform began to receive
from presidents and legislators in the 1870s can be attributed to the ef-
forts of the Mugwumps during that decade to bring to the attention of the
people the defects and dangers of the spoils system. For them, one of the
most serious consequences of allowing the parties to continue assessing
civil service workers was that it allowed those in control of the govern-
ment to subvert the democratic process by using money from the public
treasury to perpetuate their hold on power.
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The truth is, that whenever a party is unable to find enough volunteers
to give time and money to the canvass and organization of the voters,
and the conduct of elections it is a sign that if out of power, it is not en-
titled to it, and if in power that it ought to lose it. The game of politics in
a free country consists, or ought to consist, in the winning or keeping of
the government by the party which brings most enthusiasm to prepara-
tion for elections, and can command the services of the best speakers,
and procure [the] most money from its adherents. In politics, a party
which confesses that it cannot win without using the Government [sic]
officers to do the work of its canvass, and without making their bread
depend on their doing it, confesses that it is unfit to govern. It is the next
thing to the confession of a State [sic] that it can find no soldiers among
its own citizens to defend its independence.14
Not only did this practice deny the people their fundamental right to
chose who their representatives would be, it also in the view of the Mug-
wumps inured them to the corruption that had come to pervade politics
by making such immoral means of raising money seem the norm. Thus,
the citizens, according to the reformers, failed to perceive both that they
were no longer in charge of their own government, and that they were
entrusting political offices to the worst individuals possible.15
The civil service reformers attributed the ability of these aforemen-
tioned individuals to get elected not only to the blindness of the people,
but also the unwillingness of the best men to serve in a government
premised upon the spoils system. The Mugwumps viewed the civil ser-
vants and political leaders that thrived under this system as “mere poli-
ticians” who were motivated by partisanship, greed, and other selfish
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motives as well as a willingness to court favoritism to ensure their con-
tinued success or advancement. In short, they were men with no moral
convictions to restrain their lust for power.
It was the vicious use of money got by plunder, the debauching of the political
conscience, the suppression of the higher sentiment at the elections and the
blinding influence of irresponsible power thus secured which made it possible
for a mere politician like Mr. Conkling [a Republican party boss in New York]—
without popular qualities, without identification with any great public measure,
without doing anything which the next generation will recall with respect—to be
a party despot in a great state . . .16
There was no place for the best men in a government dominated by peo-
ple who turned politics into a commercial, for-profit business to benefit
themselves. As they were honest, morally scrupulous, and concerned
with formulating and guiding the implementation of great policy issues or
principles, the best men could not bring themselves to sully their hands
by serving in such a debased government. It was to restore the values of
merit, duty, and a dedication to the public welfare as the basic qualifica-
tions for serving in government that the Mugwumps advocated the re-
form of the civil service system. Only when these characteristics once
again came to define public servants would the best men, in their view,
be willing to serve, and be able to use a honest and effective administra-
tion to govern in the people’s interests.17
Thus, the Mugwump critique of the electoral and political practices
that had developed under a regime based upon pluralist liberalism was
that it denied the people their fundamental right to choose their leaders
by tricking or forcing them to select the “mere politicians” put forth by
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the parties as their representatives. Furthermore by allowing individuals
to pursue their ambitions and preferences without any restraints, it had
transformed the state into nothing more than a mere instrument to be
used to satisfy the needs of greedy men seeking political and personal
gain, not the welfare of the nation. The Mugwumps believed that restora-
tion of the nation’s republican principles, especially government by con-
sent, was only possible if limited statutory reforms were used to prevent
individuals from acting on their personal interests in politics, and thus
elevate the character of government. Although never explicitly stated,
these reform liberals seem to have assumed that the people had the ca-
pacity to elect the right leaders once they had been freed from their de-
lusion that all was well with the republic.
III. Fat Fryers and Progressives
Neither the Populist nor the Mugwump movements were very influ-
ential as they were supported by only a narrow segment of the popula-
tion. The former was largely a provincial movement whose appeal was
primarily to the agrarian class especially in the Western states; while the
latter was focused in the cities of New York and Boston, and was com-
posed of men who viewed themselves as aristocrats and were deeply
suspicious of popular rule. The proposals for reform and ideas put forth
by these groups, however, did have some influence upon what can argu-
ably be called the most significant reform movement of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries: that of the Progressives. Unlike the
two earlier groups of reformers, they developed a nationwide base of sup-
port among members of the urban middle class, which consisted of doc-
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tors, small merchants, preachers, academics, and lawyers among
others.18
While the individuals who composed this movement were also
critical of the changes wrought in the American polity by industrializa-
tion, the source of their discontentment was not so much with its eco-
nomic effect on their material lives or those of other citizens. Rather, it
was with how their prestige and status within their own communities
and the nation had declined as the wealth and power of the new captains
of industry had grown. They were particularly critical of the increasing
“lack of opportunities of the highest sort for men of the highest stan-
dards” as politics and business were conducted more and more accord-
ing to the vulgar standards of the corporations and party bosses as will
be discussed further.19 Hence, the objective of the Progressives became
to “redeem” the nation by restoring the kinds of economic and political
opportunities that they believed were appropriate for the best men. Those
that relied upon merit, rewards for past service, or other noble incentives
rather than wealth, materialism, personal gain, or other similar crass
motivations.20 In short, their goal was arguably to restore the morality
and civic virtue that had existed in the yeoman republic without forsak-
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ing the technological advances that had occurred in the latter part of the
nineteenth century.
Although the Progressives were, like the Mugwumps, elitists who
believed that an aristocracy of talent or merit should govern the nation,
they differed from them in two important ways. First, they were more
willing to rely upon the assistance of the citizens by giving them some
responsibility for the business of governing rather than having their sole
task be to select their leaders; and second, they were willing to rely upon
state intervention in the economy and the political system to a greater
extent to bring about the changes they desired. As the Progressives were
opposed to the existing governmental arrangements based upon the
courts and the political parties, they worked through what Eldon Eisen-
ach has called parastate institutions to put forth their arguments against
the old political regime and in favor of the new one they advocated. Per-
haps the most important of these parastate institutions were established
journals and the dozens of new mass circulation magazines that were
created at the turn of the twentieth century, which were either edited by
or carried articles by leading Progressives such Joseph B. Bishop,
Benjamin Orange Flower, and David Dudley Field to name a few. They
wrote in magazines such as The North American Review, The Century, The
Outlook, Scribner's, The Nation, and McClure’s among many others.
Through articles written in these periodicals, the Progressives hoped to
make the citizens, who they believed had grown morally lax and had
been negligent in fulfilling their civic duties as they pursued the material
benefits of the new industrial state, aware of the problems that had
arisen in government and society as a consequence of their lack of vigi-
lance. Once the consciences of the people had been aroused, the Pro-
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gressives presumed that they would take action to address these issues
by passing whatever laws were necessary, and restoring the best men to
positions of power to preserve the welfare of the republic.21
Of especial concern to the Progressives became the fundraising
practices that developed in the late nineteenth century when the
Pendleton Act’s ban on the assessment of civil service workers deprived
the political parties of their primary source of campaign funds. To com-
pensate for this loss, the parties, especially the Republicans, began to
develop increasingly elaborate means of raising money from the corpora-
tions and the trusts. In the 1888 presidential campaign, the Republican
National Committee (RNC) used business committees located in cities
across the country to raise money from manufacturers and others by en-
couraging contributors to view their gifts as a security investment in
their future since the Democrats wanted to repeal the tariff that pro-
tected American industry from foreign competition. For example, busi-
nessmen in Pennsylvania were asked, “How much would you pay for in-
surance upon your business? If you were confronted with from one year
to three years of general depression by a change in our revenue and pro-
tective methods affecting our manufacturers and wages and good times,
what would you pay to be insured for a better year?”22 This type of ap-
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peal for campaign funds became known as “frying the fat” out of the cor-
porations and trusts after a remark made by James P. Foster, president
of the National League of Republican Clubs. “. . . I would put the manu-
facturers of Pennsylvania under the fire and fry the fat out of them.”23 It
was designed to motive them to give generously to the Republicans by
promoting the party as favoring the adoption of economic policies that
would bring continued prosperity and political benefits to the business
community. And it was highly successful given that the RNC raised at
least $1 million ($15.6 million in 1996 dollars) for its campaign, probably
an unprecedented amount at this point in American electoral history.24
That record, however, was quickly shattered by the Democratic
success in “frying the fat” out of the corporations in the 1892 election.
William Whitney, the manager of Grover Cleveland’s campaign, held an
informal meeting with a variety of groups in the financial and industrial
sectors at which he promised them continued political benefits, such as
high tariffs or protection from government prosecution, if they contrib-
uted generously to the Democratic warchest. Each group was asked to
make a gift that it believed was equivalent to the value of the benefits it
sought from the national government. Whitney also organized various
finance committees to raise money from specific industries, such as a
bankers committee. It is generally estimated that he raised at least $2
                                                
23 Quoted in Josephson, 425. Ellipses and emphasis in original.
24 Josephson, 398-400, 404-406, 420, 422-426; Herbert Alexander, “Financing
Presidential Campaigns,” in History of American Presidential Elections, 1789-1968, vol.
4, ed. Arthur M. Schlesigner, Jr. et al. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971),
3,878; Welsh, 29-31; Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna (New York: MacMillan
Company, 1912), 142-145; Overacker, 232-235.
41
million ($32.3 million) for Grover Cleveland’s third presidential cam-
paign.25
The “fat-frying” methods used in the past two presidential elections
were refined in the 1896 and 1900 presidential campaigns by Mark
Hanna into a system for assessing the corporations and the trusts based
upon their overall wealth that resembled the post-Civil War system used
to raise money from civil service workers. In the case of the trusts and
the banks, for example, an assessment calculated at the rate of one-
quarter of one percent of their capital was levied. Since they were much
wealthier than any civil service worker, the RNC was able to collect
enormous contributions such as a $250,000 ($4.3 million) gift from the
Standard Oil Company. Overall, the Republicans raised approximately
$3.7 million ($63.8 million) in the 1896 campaign, one of the largest
campaign funds in American history, and about $2.9 million ($48.3 mil-
lion) in 1900 using Hanna’s assessment system.26
By the time of the next presidential election in 1904, Mark Hanna
had died taking his assessment system with him, and the practice of re-
lying upon the business community for campaign funds had begun to be
sharply criticized. Judge Alton Parker, the Democratic presidential can-
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didate in this election, was especially important in bringing this issue to
public attention when in the course of the campaign he accused the Re-
publicans and the business community of corrupting the republic. He
and many others believed that the corporations and the trusts were us-
ing their large, secret gifts to buy control of the party, and through it un-
duly influencing the policies of the federal government.
Many years have passed since my active participation in politics. In the meantime a
startling change has taken place in the method of conducting campaigns—a change not
for the better, but for the worse; a change that has introduced debasing and corrupt
methods, which threaten the integrity of our Government [sic], leaving it perhaps a re-
public in form, but not a republic in substance, no longer a government of the people,
by the people, for the people, but a government whose officers are practically chosen by
a handful of corporate managers, who levy upon the assets of the stockholders, whom
they represent, such sums of money as they deem requisite to place the conduct of the
Government in such hands as they consider best for their private interests.27
For Parker and other critics of these fundraising practices, this belief was
corroborated by the investigation of the New York legislature into the po-
litical activities of the state’s insurance companies following the 1904
presidential election. It revealed that these corporations since at least the
1896 presidential election had been using substantial portions of their
clients’ insurance premiums (the equivalent of a bank giving up part of
its depositors’ money for a political campaign) to make contributions to
improperly influence the party controlling the state or national govern-
ments. “The testimony taken by the Committee [sic] makes it abundantly
clear that the large insurance companies systematically attempted to
control legislation in this and other states which would effect their inter-
ests, directly or indirectly . . . in short, that the use of the contributed
monies in the election of candidates to office would place them under
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more or less an implied obligation not to attack the interests supporting
them”28 The fact that these companies had also gone to extraordinary
lengths to hide their largesse only served to strengthen the suspicion
that they had been engaged in activities that were at the very least im-
moral, if not outright illegal.29
What had allowed the development of these corrupting methods of
conducting elections in the view of the Progressives was not only the
availability of large amounts of money from corporations who sought fa-
vors from the government, but more importantly the deterioration of the
political morality and the civic virtue of the citizens that was required to
sustain the republic. One consequence of this that especially concerned
these reform liberals was the growing indifference of the people toward
their civic duties. It was this that had allowed in their view the develop-
ment of these corrupt fundraising methods by giving control of the politi-
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cal parties and the government to men known as bosses. These indi-
viduals relied upon gifts from corporations and a cadre of loyal party
workers and office-seekers to manipulate the entire electoral process
from the decision of who would run to the final counting of the ballots to
ensure their candidates won control of the government. These were not
the best and most worthy men, statesmen who merited such a public
trust based on their record of unselfish devotion and service to their
country, but rather the worst possible individuals. Professional or practi-
cal politicians who considered government a business into which they
entered with the expectation of making a return on the time and the ef-
fort they invested in getting elected, and who were loyal to the boss and
his backers, especially the corporations, rather than people.30
And even worse in the eyes of the Progressives was the continued
acquiescence of the people in the perversion of the republic by the
bosses, money, and corporations. Rather than carefully considering the
merits of each candidate and using their ballots to reject the clearly un-
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worthy individuals put forth by the parties, they argued that the citizens
would inevitably vote for their party’s candidates due to their supersti-
tious belief that a victory by the opposition party would cause irreparable
harm to the country. The extravagant political campaigns put on by the
bosses and the parties were viewed by them as nothing more than a
means of sustaining and encouraging the people to act on these partisan
loyalties rather than their duty to act in the public interest. “The people
are treated like children. Songs are made for them to sing. Their eyes are
dazzled with banners and processions, and every possible effort is made
to induce them to believe that the candidate is precisely what he is not
and never was—the candidate of the people.”31 While not all citizens
were deceived by these campaigns or motivated by partisanship, they
had no choice in the general election except to select one of the slates of
candidates offered by the political parties knowing full well that both
were equally corrupt. The reformers believed that the lack of choice in
elections led many citizens, especially the best men, who knew the can-
didates were unworthy of public office to abstain from voting, which fur-
ther strengthened the bosses’ control over the electoral process.32
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Perhaps the most incorrigible class of citizens in the opinion of
these reform liberals were those who voted not based on either partisan-
ship or their independent judgment of who the best candidates were, but
rather on how much money a party was willing to pay for their votes.
This practice became a particular concern to them in the latter half of the
nineteenth century as the amount of money available to the parties in-
creased through their reliance on corporate gifts, and hence allowed
them to offer even greater incentives for voters seeking rewards. In the
1888 presidential election, for example, the Republicans were able to of-
fer the thousands of “floaters,” individuals who sold their votes to the
highest bidder, $20 for their vote (about $300 in 1996 dollars) in the
critical state of Indiana instead of the usual rate of $2 to $5 (about $15
to $78) due to their success in “frying the fat” out of the corporations and
trusts. The problem with these practices in the reformers’ opinion was
not only that they corrupted the electoral process, but more fundamen-
tally that citizens, both old and new, became acclimated to them and
considered them to be a normal and acceptable part of politics. “Every
man who sold his vote this time will, if alive and on the poll-list, be look-
ing for a purchaser next time; and with him are pretty sure to be others,
who have seen by his example how easy it is to make a few dollars with-
out work; or the sacrifice of anything tangible . . .”33 And it was these
voters especially that allowed the boss to consolidate his control over the
electoral process, according to the reformers, as it took only a small
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number of bought votes to swing an election since most party members
willingly followed his dictates.34
Thus, what distinguished the era before the Civil War from the pe-
riod after in the view of the Mugwumps, Progressives, and other reform
liberals was that in the former the government had truly been formed by
the consent of the people. Their arguments and descriptions of this era
implicitly suggest that they believed the people were at this time suffi-
ciently moral and virtuous to properly carry out their civic duties even
although the evidence presented above about mid-nineteenth century
campaigns suggests otherwise. In the view of the liberal reformers, the
people’s civic virtue and morality had allowed them to be in control of
their political parties; almost always select the best candidates, true
statesmen, to represent them; prevented large sums of money from being
available to be used for corrupt purposes in elections; and given the best
men of the community an opportunity to influence the decisions of the
citizens and to serve as examples of how they should carry out their civic
duties. The republic, in short, was supported by a yeoman citizenry that
was virtuous and patriotic enough to ensure that the most worthy and
qualified candidates filled the public offices, and used them to promote
the welfare the people and the nation.
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This supposedly golden era of the American republic was brought
to a sudden end in their view as the nation began in the latter half of the
nineteenth century to be transformed into a modern polity. The lack of
restraints on the ability of individuals to pursue their interests combined
with the dazzling new opportunities presented by industrialization and
urbanization led the citizens to give themselves wholeheartedly to the
pursuit of wealth, material goods, and in general the betterment of their
lives.35 It was the citizen’s unfettered and selfish pursuit of their well-
being, in the view of the reform liberals, that allowed politics to become
the business of a select group of professional politicians rather than all
citizens. These men corrupted the republic by turning the government
into a means by which they could satisfy their own interests and those of
their clients to perpetuate their own power, and hence denied the people
the ability to control their own government. Loyalty to an organization,
an individual, or even worse money rather than virtue, morality, and pa-
triotism became the defining motivation of citizens, politicians, and oth-
ers to participate in politics and to serve in public office.
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Restoring the Republic
While the reform liberals generally agreed upon what had led to the
decay of the principles of republican liberalism and the necessity of re-
storing them, they differed significantly, especially the Mugwumps and
Progressives, when it came to the question of how to accomplish this
goal. While the Mugwumps believed that minimal governmental inter-
vention was necessary and that the people should have at most indirect
influence over their representatives as noted above, the Progressives ad-
vocated an extensive array of laws, some first proposed by the Populists,
that were designed to restore the ability of the people to directly influence
their government. And at the same time, they sought to ensure that
these new powers were properly used by restraining the pursuit of indi-
vidual preferences through the establishment of government enforced
community standards to guide the behavior of the citizens. In the elec-
toral process, these took the form of regulations whose purpose was to
dispose men who were “mere” or “practical” politicians from the places of
power by eliminating the resources that allowed them to maintain their
pernicious control over the government and the people by appealing to
the selfish interests of the citizens.
As the control of the bosses and money began at the primaries, the
Progressives viewed these contests as “the place to begin the purification
of our electoral streams and make the waters clear at the source and the
fountain.”36 Although the earliest primary laws were passed in the 1860s
and 1870s, these statutes were not mandatory and simply provided the
parties with the option of conducting these contests under the auspices
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of the state. It was only at the very end of the nineteenth century that
mandatory primary laws were enacted to bring these internal party elec-
tions permanently under the control of the state governments. By the
mid-1920s, every state except for New Mexico had switched from the use
of nominating conventions to direct primary elections to select at least
some of the party’s candidates for the general election.37
The reformers justified these laws by arguing that the right to vote
must now include the right to nominate as the latter had become just as
integral as the general election to the expression of the people’s will and
their ability to control their government. And furthermore, the parties
had demonstrated through the abuses that had developed in the primary
and general elections that they could not be relied on to protect this fun-
damental right through their own private rules. They believed that these
statutes would stimulate citizen involvement in these critical contests by
guaranteeing their right to participate in them by ensuring they knew
when and where the primaries were being held, and providing them with
the opportunity to register as party members beforehand. More impor-
tantly, the reformers believed that the new laws would ensure that the
will of the party members, not boss-selected delegates, would prevail,
and that this would improve the quality of candidates for public office as
the people would only select the best individuals as their nominees, i.e.
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those who merited the positions, had the qualifications to fulfill the du-
ties entrusted to them, and were prepared to serve the interests of the
people.38
The rights of the people and the integrity of the electoral process at
both the primary and the general elections were to be further protected
in part by the adoption of Australian ballot laws which transferred the
responsibility for printing ballots from the parties to the states, and
therefore made it possible for the voter to cast his ballot without disclos-
ing who he supported. Most states adopted these laws between 1889 and
1893 largely in reaction to the blatant use of money by the Republican
Party in the 1888 presidential campaign to buy votes in Indiana and
elsewhere, and in the opinion of many the election itself.39
However, the Progressives believed that these and other existing
laws were insufficient to protect the rights of the voters at elections as
they were designed to eliminate only the grossest forms of bribery. For
them, what was truly needed to protect the integrity of the electoral proc-
ess were statutes designed to prevent money from having any opportu-
nity to corrupt the expression of the will of the voters. In seeking a model
to emulate, they turned to the British Corrupt Practices Act of 1883
(BCPA) which in the eyes of both the Americans and the British had been
highly successful in eliminating the worst abuses in elections. A further
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attraction of the British statute to American reformers probably was that
it represented the culmination of the knowledge that Parliament had
gained about how best to suppress political corruption through its efforts
since the 1850s to reform the electoral process.40
The BCPA was premised on the idea that the use of money in elec-
tions was evil as it inevitability led to the corruption of the electorate.
“They [the authors of the law] evidently regarded extravagant expenditure
as ‘the father of corruption,’ and considered that excessive and unneces-
sary payments became in many cases indistinguishable from bribery,
and even where not in themselves questionable, always tended to make
easy the descent to practices that were eminently pernicious.”41 Among
the key provisions of the BCPA were: 1) classifying as corrupt practices
bribery, treating, undue influence, and personification each of which was
carefully defined; 2) classifying as illegal practices numerous campaign
activities, such as transporting voters to the polls or engaging too many
committee rooms for public meetings; 3) allowing a candidate through
his agent to raise and to spend only as much money as he can “properly
use” exclusive of his own personal expenses; 4) carefully defining what
expenses were permissible, and banning those that were unnecessary or
harmful, such as torches, parades, music and flags; 5) requiring candi-
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dates and their agents to file a detailed public statement at the end of the
election that disclosed who had contributed to the campaign and how the
money was used; and 6) the provision of severe penalties for violation of
the law regardless of whether the infraction was committed by the candi-
date or his agent including voiding of the election, disenfranchisement
and inability to hold office for at least 7 years and potentially for life,
fines, and imprisonment.42
Unlike their British counterparts, American reformers relied on a
variety of laws rather than one statute that governed all aspects of the
electoral process in their effort to purify elections of the evil and corrupt-
ing influence of money. The first, and most common, kind of law that
they advocated were penal statutes called corrupt practices acts that
sought to strictly limit how much money parties and candidates could
use in elections, and that often minutely detailed what were legitimate
and illegitimate expenditures in an effort to prevent candidates from se-
curing votes by improper means. These statutes were also designed to
equalize the resources available to candidates to allow poorer, but worthy
men to run for public office. New York was the first state to enact a cor-
rupt practices act in 1890, followed by Colorado and Michigan in 1891;
Massachusetts in 1892; California, Missouri, and Kansas in 1893; Con-
necticut, North Carolina, Kentucky, Nevada, and Minnesota in 1895;
Ohio in 1896; and Tennessee, Florida, Wisconsin, and Nebraska in 1897.
By the late 1920s, only the states of Illinois, Mississippi, and Rhode Is-
land did not impose some kind of restrictions on the use of money in
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elections aside from the traditional laws prohibiting bribery and other
electoral crimes. The rapid spread of these laws among the states in the
late nineteenth century can probably be attributed to the controversies
about how the Republicans raised and used money in the 1888 and 1896
presidential elections. This led state legislators to seek not only to impose
stricter restrictions on the use of money in elections, but also to force
parties and candidates to disclose their receipts and expenditures.43
These latter provisions of state corrupt practices acts requiring
publicity of campaign funds represented the most significant difference
between them and the British statute. The BCPA merely required candi-
dates to disclose their receipts and expenditures, but made no effort to
require the parties who raised and spent the bulk of the money in elec-
tions to do the same. In contrast, the American states required both par-
ties and candidates to disclose their sources of money and how it was
spent either through disclosure requirements incorporated into corrupt
practices acts or separate statutes commonly known as publicity acts.
The purpose of these laws was twofold. First, they were designed to assist
in the enforcement of the restrictions on the use of money in elections by
making it possible to monitor whether parties and candidates were com-
plying with the law. Second, Progressives hoped that by making the giv-
ing of money in elections a public rather than a private activity, these
statutes would not only ensure the free expression of the will of the peo-
ple but also discourage large gifts altogether. They believed that the peo-
ple would condemn and punish at the polls any party that became too
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indebted to particular interests or was too reliant on large gifts. However,
this hope was never fulfilled as most state publicity laws failed to provide
for pre-election publicity, which was essential to providing the people the
information required to form such a judgment. Hence, at best the public-
ity laws through post-election reporting could prevent parties from acting
upon corrupt deals they had made to get their campaign funds by allow-
ing either the law or the voters to punish them for these bargains.44
At the federal level, a comprehensive publicity law and a corrupt
practices act to regulate the use of money in congressional elections was
not passed until 1910 when Congress enacted the Publicity Act. Crucial
to the enactment of the statute was the lobbying campaign over the first
decade of the twentieth century sponsored by Perry Belmont, a former
Democratic member of the House of Representatives, and his organiza-
tion the National Publicity Bill Organization (NPBO), which was com-
posed of prominent civic and political leaders from both parties, to edu-
cate the public and Congress about the merits of such a law. This statute
seems to have been designed to complement the state efforts to control
money in politics by reaching those committees or candidates that the
states lacked the ability to control, i.e. ones operating in more than one
state or those pertaining to federal candidates. As will be discussed in
chapter four, Congress’ authority to regulate elections was very limited in
this era since this was believed to be a function that the Constitution left
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to the state governments. This statute was amended in 1911 to require
federal candidates to file reports before the election, and to disclose their
primary contest expenses. The latter provision was bitterly opposed by
Southern members of Congress as a new effort by the national govern-
ment to intervene with the rights of their states to control the electoral
process. Although never explicitly stated, probably the fear of the
Southerners was that the federal government would use its new
authority to interfere with their extensive efforts to maintain white
supremacy by preventing blacks and poor whites from voting as dis-
cussed at length below.45
While corrupt practices acts were quickly adopted at the state
level, statutes banning corporate gifts were less common. Prior to the
twentieth century, only four states, Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, and
Florida, had such laws on their books, all of which were passed in 1897
perhaps in response to Hanna’s fundraising methods. Perhaps thinking
that the problem of corporate gifts had been adequately addressed by
corrupt practices acts, neither Congress nor a majority of the states
passed statutes addressing this issue until the New York insurance
scandal revealed the corrupting nature of such contributions to the par-
ties. Earlier efforts to show how corporations had been unduly control-
ling the electoral process had been made, most notably by Sen. William
Chandler (R-NH) who introduced in 1901 a bill in Congress to ban
corporate gifts. This legislative proposal was a reaction to how the rail-
road companies had subverted his campaign for reelection, as well as
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perhaps the will of the people, by using their influence over the state
legislators, i.e. calling upon past gifts and favors, to ensure their candi-
date was elected to the United States Senate. The bill died in committee,
but Chandler saw an opportunity to revive it four years later when in the
wake of the Armstrong Committee revelations he convinced his former
colleague Senator Ben “Pitchfork” Tillman (D-SC) to reintroduce it (no
Republican was willing to sponsor the bill). Tillman presented the bill as
an opportunity for the Senate to demonstrate that its members were not
merely the tools of the corporations. His persistence in keeping the issue
before the Senate in the 1906 election year saw it eventually pass follow-
ing the mid-term Congressional elections in an effort to appease public
opinion.46
For the reformers, these statutes were necessary to not only pre-
vent corporations from gaining undue influence over the people’s repre-
sentatives, but also to protect the rights of the shareholders to support
the political party of their choice. “The property of policy holders and
stockholders in such institutions had been secretly diverted from legiti-
mate channels to political purposes without their knowledge or consent,
and against their own candidates and convictions, if they chanced to be
of different opinions than those of the managers of the corporations.”47 It
was further argued that the elimination of these large gifts would have
the additional benefit of denying the parties the funds required for cor-
rupt practices, and forcing the parties to instead raise smaller amounts
of money for legitimate election expenses from the citizens. Even this,
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however, did not completely remove the possibility of corruption in elec-
tions. The reformers claimed that the only means of ending corruption in
elections and politics was through laws that provided for public funding
of elections and eliminated any need for private money whatsoever. These
kinds of laws were rarely passed in the early twentieth century as they
were radical measures that found little public support.48
With the corrupting influence of money, and consequently of the
bosses and the corporations, eliminated by these laws, the Progressive
reformers believed that the people would have a meaningful opportunity
to participate in elections, and as most citizens were honest, intelligent,
and cared about public affairs, they would seize this opportunity to re-
sume their civic duties and regain control of the republic. Furthermore,
they argued that the citizens, especially the best men, would no longer be
faced with two slates of unworthy candidates presented for their ratifica-
tion by the bosses. Rather, they would through public debate and the
use of their independent judgment select the best candidate to represent
them from among the many worthy and qualified candidates for public
office presented for their consideration by the parties. Thus, the ballot
would once again become a sacred trust to be used to preserve and ele-
vate the moral condition of politics and the republic by making patriot-
ism and disinterestedness the motivations for becoming involved in poli-
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tics and participating in elections rather than selfishness and loyalty to a
party organization or a man or money.49
And even if the citizens desired not to abide by their highest moti-
vations when making electoral and political decisions, the laws would
force them to behave morally and virtuously by preventing them from
using their basest motives to decide how to vote. “In a government of the
people by the people and for the people, whose purpose is to secure the
greatest good to the greatest number, it is necessary that each voter act
not alone with freedom, but that he should be protected from exercising
his own freedom through improper motives. If a voter were permitted to
vote strictly in accordance with his own view of what was best for him,
many thousands of what are called ‘commercial’ voters would decide the
$2.50 paid them by the agent of the boss, or the drink given them on
election day, was best for them.”50 Hence, the reform liberals believed
that these electoral laws would not only deny the worst men the re-
sources required to corruptly control the republic, but also be the new
foundation of the civil virtue and the political morality of the people. They
were designed to ensure that the standards set by the community to gov-
ern the citizens’ decisions in the electoral process would prevail over indi-
vidual preferences, and hence ensure that the right leaders and policies
were selected to guide the future progress of the republic.
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This vision of the citizens as enlightened, moral, and virtuous
enough for republican self-government was almost universally accepted
among the American elites of the latter half of the nineteenth century.51
Those few who continued to adhere to the freedom granted by pluralist
liberalism for individuals to act on their own preferences with few re-
straints believed that these reforms would be utterly ineffective. They ar-
gued that no laws would ever be able to make the citizens moral and vir-
tuous nor would they be able to ensure that the participation of citizens
in elections and politics would be based on their patriotism and disinter-
estedness. Rather, they argued that most voters knew little and cared
even less about politics unless some personal or financial interests of
theirs was directly affected by the election. Therefore, it was essential for
the parties to use money in elections to spread their ideas and communi-
cate with the voters to show how their interests were involved in the po-
litical campaign. “It is not sufficient for any cause, doctrine, or party to
be good in itself. The good qualities must be shown, explained, and
brought before the people, and all this costs money. When one opposing
party explains its good points and advantages to the people the other
side must do likewise, and for this the campaign contribution is needed,
and as such it is lawful, fair, and proper.”52 For the pluralist liberals,
money was given to the parties by corporations and citizens not of a de-
sire to corrupt the electoral process, but rather out of a belief in the
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principles promoted by the party. Nor was the growing size of campaign
funds a sign of corruption, but instead a reflection of the increased size
of the country and the necessity of now paying for political workers. This
is not to say that corruption was not possible. Rather, they argued that
corruption would always exist in elections as some men would invariably
be willing to sell their votes.53
The diametrically opposed views of those advocating the reform
and pluralist liberalism traditions concerning the role of money in elec-
tions arguably derives from their contrasting visions of human nature
and the possibility of creating a moral and virtuous citizenry. The reform
liberals seemed to believe that the citizens were honest, moral, intelli-
gent, and capable of acting out of altruistic motives. While the pluralists
believed that the citizens were inherently self-centered individuals who
cared more about themselves than others, and thus regardless of their
honesty or intelligence were more likely to be motivated to act out of self-
interest. In the latter’s view, the challenge for republican government, as
the founders had argued, was to channel the self-interest of the citizens
toward the service of the republic in part through organizations and indi-
viduals who made politics a profession and used money to stimulate
their interest and participation to maintain republican government.
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Race and Electoral Reform
Since the end of Reconstruction in 1877, Southern Democrats had
attempted to control the political and social destiny of the South by using
fraud, force, intimidation, and other extra-legal methods to prevent
blacks from voting and to discourage support of opposition parties. How-
ever, these techniques were not successful in preventing efforts to de-
velop a competitive party system in the South during the 1880s as the
Republicans and other minor parties were able to draw sufficient support
from blacks and whites, both of whom turned out to vote in large num-
bers, to challenge the Democratic Party’s hold on power. What prevented
them from actually gaining political power was generally the fraudulent
counting of ballots, which led to the Congressional effort to pass the
Lodge Act, or Force Bill, in the early 1890s. Had the law passed, it would
have allowed for federal supervision of registration and elections in the
South upon the request of a certain number of voters, and undoubtedly
strengthened the opposition parties in the region. Despite the failure of
Congress to pass this statute, the Populist Party developed into a major
threat to the Democratic Party in the early to mid-1890s as it drew on
support from Southern Republicans, the discontentment felt by poor
whites and blacks with their plight, and those who sought an alternative
to the Democrats to build a strong base of support among Southern vot-
ers.54
Faced with clear threats to their power, and more generally the
continued preservation of white supremacy, the Southern Democrats in
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the 1890s began to seek a new strategy to contain opposition parties and
their supporters, namely blacks and to a lesser extent poor whites. Ex-
tra-legal methods were no longer a viable option as they tended to attract
attention from Northern politicians in Congress, and led to efforts by the
federal government to interfere with Southern elections. Hence, they
turned to the new electoral laws advocated by the Progressives, which
they believed would provide them with a subtle means of legally and
permanently disenfranchising their opponents. To implement these new
statutes, however, required Southern Democrats to seize complete con-
trol of the state governments, which they did either through legal means,
such as legislative restrictions on voting, or as in the past extra-legal
ones like fraud. Once in power, they proceeded to consolidate their hold
on the political system by passing a host of measures that were designed
to deny those who supported opposition parties, mainly blacks and poor
whites, the opportunity to vote. This strategy was so successful that by
the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the Southern elector-
ate had been reduced to a tiny, homogenous group of men who were
deemed fit to vote: white, middle-class Democrats who were both literate
and owned some property.55
Among the statutes used by the Southern Democrats to disenfran-
chise voters were registration laws that specified where and when a voter
might register, what information was required of him to be able to regis-
ter, and required him to bring his registration certificate to the polling
place. The most important feature of these laws, however, was the broad
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discretion they gave to registrars to determine whether a voter met the
stipulated qualifications. In some states, they virtually had the power to
turn anyone away for any reason they chose to give. A few states adopted
what became known as eight-box laws, which served as a quasi-literacy
test since they required the voter to deposit his ballot into the appropri-
ate boxes for each state and federal candidate if they were to be counted.
Although election judges could read the names on the boxes to the vot-
ers, they did not always truthfully inform citizens about which ballots
belonged in each box. Judges also frequently shifted the positions of the
boxes to prevent illiterate voters from being able to simply memorize
what box was associated with a particular ballot. The Australian secret
ballot law also acted as a literacy test as the state printed ballot required
a voter to be proficient in English. In order to vote, he had to be able to
read through a list of candidates generally organized by office, and
sometimes with no party designation, to select the individuals he wished
to support. Two other measures frequently used were actual literacy tests
that required a voter to read, and occasionally interpret to the satisfac-
tion of the election official, a portion of the state or federal constitution,
and property tests usually in the form of poll taxes. These were cumula-
tive taxes which meant that if a voter failed to pay it one year, he had to
pay two years worth of poll taxes before he could vote. As officials made
no effort to collect these taxes from undesirable voters, i.e. blacks and
poor whites, their taxes grew to such stupendous sums that it was im-
possible for them ever to vote.56
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A final device adopted by Southern Democrats in the early twenti-
eth century to solidify their control over the electoral process was the
white primary election. Its purpose was to prevent intraparty conflicts
from escalating to a level where divisions among white men might lead a
faction to attempt to build a viable alternative party to the Democrats by
appealing to blacks and other disadvantaged citizens as well as to le-
gitimize the party’s nominees for the general election. It accomplished
these tasks by providing a venue within the party for candidates with di-
vergent views, all of whom pledged not to run in the general election if
defeated, to campaign for the support of their fellow members who then
chose who would represent the party. When combined with the disen-
franchisement statutes adopted by the Southern states, the united front
put forth by the Democratic Party in the general election made it virtually
impossible for any opposition to form, let alone win an election.57
Thus, while the intention of the Progressives in passing the elec-
toral reforms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had
been to restore the right of the people to consent to their government,
Southern Democrats ironically used these statutes to subvert the demo-
cratic process by excluding blacks and poor whites from participation in
the political process as well as to crush any opposition parties. Nor was
there any effort by the federal government, despite several Supreme
Court cases pertaining to these disenfranchisement laws, to prevent
Southern states from violating the spirit of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments through these discriminatory statutes. It was left to the
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state courts to protect the rights of the citizens.58 And as the next chap-
ter shows, they made no effort whatsoever to preserve these liberties. So
far as is known, no state court in this era was called upon to adjudicate
an electoral statute based upon a question pertaining to race.
Conclusion
In the constitutional state of courts and parties that existed for
much of the nineteenth century, there was very little regulation of either
the use of money in elections or the activities of the political parties. In
this regime, the parties were essentially private voluntary associations
created by the voters through which they exercised their rights to free-
dom of the press, of speech, and of association by expressing their views
concerning the issues of the day and the actions of the government and
their representatives. The state and federal governments did not interfere
with the conduct of either the parties or the voters except to the extent
that it believed was necessary to ensure an honest and fair electoral
process.
Efforts to more thoroughly regulate the political parties and cam-
paigns began in the mid-nineteenth century as reform liberals became
increasingly concerned that the government was no longer truly based
upon the consent of the people, and was being used to satisfy the per-
sonal greed of politicians. They sought to define what it meant to have an
honest and fair electoral process in the new context of an industrialized
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and urbanized republic. For them, this required an orderly process free
of any and all influences that might tarnish the rational and
disinterested judgment of the voters whether it be money or partisanship
or organizations like interest groups. And furthermore, that ensured the
nomination and election of the best candidates possible to guide the re-
public in the proper direction. To accomplish this objective, they enacted
laws that greatly expanded the power of the state governments over the
electoral process to end the corrupting influence of parties, bosses, and
money in politics.
This effort to transform the elections from in essence a private
function run by the political parties to a public one under the authority
of the state did not go unchallenged however. In the view of many con-
temporaries, the statutes passed to effect this change intruded to an un-
precedented extent upon the constitutional rights of both the parties and
the voters to freedom of speech, of the press, and of association derived
from their natural right to inquire about any subject of concern to them.
Hence, they believed that the citizens were actually being denied the
ability to “freely” express their preferences and give their consent to the
government. These questions about the validity of these new statutes,
their compatibility with republican principles, and their effect on the
rights of the citizens would be addressed by the state courts starting in
the final decades of the nineteenth century.
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3 We Are All Progressives
From the foundation of the republic until approximately the mid-
twentieth century, it was understood that the state legislatures, not state
judges or national level institutions, were the best guardians of the peo-
ple’s liberties. Unlike Congress, they were relatively powerful institutions
that through what was commonly known as the police power of the state
had the authority to pass laws on any conceivable subject unless explic-
itly prohibited by the state constitutions which were designed to limit,
not to enumerate, the responsibilities of the legislatures.
The police of a State in a comprehensive sense, embraces its whole sys-
tem of internal regulation, by which the state seeks not only to preserve
the public order and to prevent offenses against the State, but also to es-
tablish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a con-
flict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his
own so far as is reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by
others.1
It was expected that the state legislatures would use their broad powers
to secure the rights of the people not by enforcing particular provisions of
the state constitution’s Bill of Rights; but rather by translating the
general principles expressed in them and in the state constitutions into
meaningful legal guarantees through the laws they passed. Thus, the
people’s liberties were constantly evolving as legislators and citizens
through the political process debated and came to new understandings of
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how best to implement those liberties that they considered essential to
the maintenance of republican government.2
State judges encouraged this deliberation over the meaning of
rights by rarely using the state bills of rights to overturn legislative
judgments as this would have ended any debate over the meaning of a
particular liberty. Instead, they sought to protect the rights of the citi-
zens, and to contribute their own understanding of them to the debate,
by basing their decisions mainly upon common law rules of construction.
It was left to the legislature or the citizens to act upon the recommenda-
tion of the courts.
The courts are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the State
[sic], except as those rights are secured by some constitutional provision
which comes within the judicial cognizance. The protection against un-
wise or oppressive legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by an ap-
peal to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the people. If
this fail, the people in their sovereign capacity can correct the evil; but
the courts cannot assume their rights. The judiciary can only arrest the
execution of a statute when it conflicts with the constitution. It cannot
run a race of opinions upon points of right, reason, and expediency with
the lawmaking power.3
Those who challenged the new campaign finance laws in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries in the state courts arguably believed
that judges would find that the legislatures had transgressed a limitation
placed upon their authority by the constitution. After all, every state con-
stitution had in its Bill of Rights guarantees designed to preserve the
right of the citizens to freedom of speech, of the press, and of association.
This argument was put forth in numerous cases including Leonard v.
                                                
2 John D. Dinan, Keeping the People’s Liberties (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press,
1998), ix, 2, 6-11, 13, 16, 21, 31, 91, 150.
3 Cooley, 201.
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Commonwealth, Ladd v. Holmes, and Spier v. Baker just to name a few.4
Yet, the courts often chose to ignore or dismiss these constitutional argu-
ments, and instead showed great deference to the judgment of the peo-
ple’s representatives by upholding these statutes usually on the basis of
common law interpretations that reflected the reasoning of the reform
liberals as will be discussed below.
There was some speculation in the contemporary literature as to
why the state judges behaved in such a fashion. One suggestion was that
they considered these laws to be of a political nature, and hence sought
to avoid ruling on their wisdom by upholding them under the doctrine of
the police power. It was left to the people to appeal to their representa-
tives for relief if they believed these statutes were unwise. Another theory
argued that the judicial approval of these laws not only stemmed from
the fact that no property rights were threatened, but also that  “the pres-
sure of public opinion has been strong and steady, and the judges have
been conversant with the facts and philosophy of the party system and
hence have experienced little difficulty in justifying almost every kind of
primary system adopted.”5 Probably the proponent of this view believed
                                                
4 Cooley, 104-106, 192-193, 197, 200-212, 217-219, 706-707, 757-758; Ernst Freund,
The Police Power (Chicago: Callaghan & Co, 1904), 3-12, 61-62; Howard Gillman,
“Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern
Civil Liberties Jurisprudence,” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 3 (Sept. 1994):
624-632, 640; Leonard v. Commonwealth, 17 W.N.C. 481, 112 PA. 607, 4 A. 220 (1886),
222; Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370, 52 P. 659 (1898), 372; Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Or. 167,
66 P. 714 (1901), 717-718; Ritter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 P. 444 (1910), 446-447;
State v. Miles, 210 Mo. 127, 109 S. W. 595 (1908), 609-610. See Francis Newton
Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States
of America (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), 7 volumes for copies
of all the state constitutions referred to in this chapter.
5 Charles E. Merriam, Primary Elections, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1909), 115.
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that the fact that most states provided for the election of their judges,
rather than their selection by the legislature or executive, influenced
their decisions.6 A final conjecture was that the new electoral laws and
the opinions of the courts represented the resentment felt by the “better
elements” of American society at their exclusion from positions of leader-
ship in the parties and the government.7
An examination of the courts’ opinions and other evidence reveals
little, if any support, for the last theory put forth to explain the behavior
of state judges. Certainty, it might have had some influence given, as de-
scribed in the last chapter, the belief of elites that they were being un-
justly deprived of their rightful place in politics. However, the more likely
explanation is that the courts were political and legal institutions whose
doctrines were shaped by both the expectations of them as judges, and
the social and political milieu of their time as the first two theories sug-
gest. In this era spanning from the close of the Civil War to the 1960s,
the state courts showed great deference to the judgment of the state
legislatures that the electoral and political process was being corrupted
by money and political parties controlled by bosses in alliance with spe-
cial interests. And of the necessity of restraining those forces not only to
restore the citizen's morality and virtue, but more importantly the repub-
                                                
6 The only states that did not have elected judiciaries by the early twentieth century
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and Tenure of Judges (The National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1944), 100-135 for
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lic itself by allowing the people once more to be able to select their
leaders and control their own government. This was reflected in their
opinions over the next century by their consistent willingness to rule that
the new campaign finance laws were an appropriate and absolutely es-
sential exercise of the legislature’s police power to secure the public in-
terest in the purity and freedom of the ballot. As well as their acceptance
of the arguments of the reform liberals that the state legislatures used to
justify these reforms.
Recreating the Political Parties
The passage of mandatory primary laws starting in the late nine-
teenth century represented an unprecedented attempt to expand the
scope of the state legislature’s power over the political parties in response
to the problems that had developed in the electoral process. With few ex-
ceptions, state courts were willing to accept the determination of the
legislature in regard to whether these statutes were necessary to protect
the rights of the citizens. The small number of judges who chose to chal-
lenge the judgment of the legislature generally grounded their objections
upon the traditional understanding of the parties as private voluntary
associations. They argued that the primary election statutes unconstitu-
tionally deprived citizens of their “natural” and constitutional rights to
assemble and to associate with each other to influence the electoral
process. “The right of the electors to organize and associate themselves
for the purpose of choosing public officers is as absolute and beyond
legislative control as their right to associate for the purpose of business
or social intercourse or recreation. The legislature may, doubtless, forbid
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fraud, corruption, intimidation or other crimes in political organizations,
but beyond this it cannot go.”8 These judges feared that upholding these
laws would result in the state legislatures rather than the citizens who
composed the parties being responsible for determining the rules and
principles that would govern their internal and external conduct. This
would not only prevent the people from forming new parties without the
consent of the legislature in their view, but also deny the current parties
the right to preserve their own existence by, for example, expelling dis-
loyal members or setting strict standards as to who could be a party
member. In short, these judges believed that giving approval to the pri-
mary laws would mean that the “life and death of political parties are
held in the hollow of the hand by a state legislature.”9 This defense of the
citizens’ right of association and the right of the parties to ensure their
self-preservation through self-governance was never influential. It was
generally expressed in only a few dissenting opinions, and had faded into
obscurity by the early twentieth century.10
Like the opponents of electoral regulation discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, these judges, whose reasoning drew at least in part from the
pluralist liberalism tradition, believed that the citizens could only “freely”
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consent to their government or express their views if they were not sub-
ject to extensive governmental restraints like those found in the new
statutes. Instead of restoring the right of the people to control their lead-
ers, they believed that these laws would become the very means by which
this fundamental liberty would be denied as they would prevent them
from being able to act upon their own political preferences.
The predominant view, however, among the state courts in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regarding the primary election
laws was that they were an appropriate exercise of the state legislatures’
police power to address the growing problem of corruption in elections,
especially in the nominating process.11 “It [the law] defines and punishes
offenses of the gravest character, the existence of which has been known
to every intelligent person . . . and which, more than anything else, has
undermined and weakened our whole system of government. To say that
the legislature may not lay its hand upon a public evil of such vast pro-
portion is to say that our government is too weak to preserve its own
life.”12 Such statutes, the courts further argued, were justified not only
by the moral necessity of protecting the integrity of the ballot and the
                                                
11 These laws generally required some or all of the party’s nominations for state and
local offices, and in a few cases federal ones, to be selected through direct primaries
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republic, but also the state constitutions themselves. They noted that
these documents contained no prohibitions that could be construed to
prevent the regulation of such contests or in some cases even had spe-
cific mandates requiring the legislature to ensure the fairness and integ-
rity of the electoral process.13 Thus for most judges, the primary election
statutes represented an effort by the state legislatures to fulfill their im-
plicit or explicit duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens to
vote and to freely express their will through the electoral process rather
than depriving them of the ability to influence the conduct of the govern-
ment and their representatives.14
                                                
13 The most common provision found in the state constitutions, usually in the bill of
rights, was the requirement that all elections shall be free and equal. Among the states
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566-569; People v. Board of Election Com’rs of Chicago, 221 Ill. 9, 77 N.E. 321 (1906),
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351; Winkler, 874-875, 882-884; Nicholas, 261-262, 264-265; James S. Fay, “The Legal
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Some courts even argued that these laws not only were designed to
guarantee the right of the citizens to vote, but also their ability to govern
their political parties. They did so by eliminating the corrupt influence of
the bosses over the affairs of the party, which restored the ability of the
citizens to control these organizations, and use them as a meaningful
way of associating with others who shared their opinions. This view was
perhaps best expressed by the New York court of appeals in the case of
People v. Democratic General Committee (1900) in which it denied the gen-
eral party committee the power to remove a member duly elected by the
people even if he acted contrary to the interests of the party.
The dominant idea pervading the entire statute is the absolute assurance
to the citizen that his wish as to the conduct of the affairs of his party
may be expressed through his ballot and thus given effect, whether in
accord with the wishes of the leaders of his party or not, and that thus
shall be put in effective operation, in the primaries, the underlying prin-
ciple of democracy, which makes the will of an unfettered majority con-
trolling. In other words, the scheme is to permit the voters to construct
the organization from the bottom upwards, instead of permitting leaders
to construct it from the top downwards.15
In the view of these judges, the state legislature had chosen to permit the
lesser evil of forcing party members to associate with a hostile colleague
to deal with the greater one of the people’s will being ignored by their
leaders. One of the central purposes of the primary election laws in their
view was to give party members, the citizens, a veto over the actions of
their leaders. Should the latter make an improper decision or nominate
unworthy candidates, the people would have the opportunity to freely
exercise their will and reject them in the primary contest. Thus, the
                                                                                                                                                
Regulation of Political Parties,” 9 Journal of Legislation 263 (1982): 265-266; Merriam,
Primary Elections (1909), 95-96, 100-104, 115-116.
15 People v. Democratic Gen. Comm., 341-342.
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knowledge that the citizens would be independently evaluating and
judging their decisions would encourage party leaders and representa-
tives to be loyal to the people’s interests, and pick candidates worthy of
their suffrages.16
The only other rationale used in the early twentieth century by a
few state judges to justify the intrusion of the state into the internal af-
fairs of the parties was based upon the Australian ballot laws. They ar-
gued that these statutes gave the legislatures the power to set reasonable
conditions, such as regulations concerning their nominating process,
that the parties had to accept in exchange for the valuable privilege of
having the names of their candidates printed on the official ballot at
public expense. Although the parties had the option of rejecting these
terms, it was unlikely they would do so given that their chance of elec-
toral success was heavily dependent upon having the names of their
candidates appear on the official ballot.17
Although the state courts endorsed the principles underlying the
new primary laws by upholding them as valid legislative enactments,
there was less consensus among them concerning whether the state con-
stitutions placed any limitations upon how the legislature could use its
police power to regulate the nominating process. The answer to this
question depended largely on whether they viewed primaries as constitu-
                                                
16 Leonard v. Commonwealth, 225; People v. Democratic Gen. Comm., 338-346, 351;
State v. Miles, 600-605; Ladd v. Holmes, 721-722; People v. Board of Election Com’rs of
Chicago, 18-19; Rouse v. Thompson, 548; Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 16 N. D. 363,
113 N. W. 1071 (1907), 1073-1076; People v. Strassheim, 240 Ill. 279, 88 N.E. 821
(1909), 292; Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 1043; Ritter v. Douglass, 450-453, 458; State v. Miller,
82; Mechem, 367-368; Winkler, 880-882; Nicholas, 265-267.
17 Commonwealth v. Rogers 181 Mass. 184, 63 N.E. 421 (1902), 186-187; People v.
Board of Election Com’rs of Chicago, 16-18; Freund, 519-521.
78
tional state elections or not. Nowhere in their opinions as far as is known
did state judges consider this question in relation to the federal constitu-
tion, particularly the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Their deci-
sions relied solely upon the provisions found within the state constitu-
tions related to the electoral process or common law doctrines.
The prevalent view among the state courts until the early twentieth
century seems to have been that primaries were elections within the
meaning of the state constitutions. In Maryland, the state court reached
this conclusion by simply reasoning that if a state appropriated funds to
pay for a primary election, then it must be a constitutional election or the
use of public funds would be illegal. While in Oregon, the judges found
that primaries were elections authorized by law as the state was respon-
sible for financing them, and overseeing that they were properly con-
ducted. Therefore, the legislature had to obey the constitutional provi-
sions requiring that all elections be free and equal, and that stipulated
who could vote in non-constitutional elections.18
Other courts, such as those in Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana,
California, and North Dakota, reasoned that the primary and general
elections had come to form one coherent process through which the
people selected their representatives. Thus, to allow corruption at any
stage of the process, would sanction interference with the right of the
people to freely express their will at the ballot box. “Primary elections and
nominating conventions have now become part of our great political sys-
tem and are welded and riveted into it so firmly as to be difficult of sepa-
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ration . . . It is as much an election law when it strikes at the fraud in
the primary election as when it arrests the fraudulent ballot just as it is
ready to drop into the box at the general election.”19 Regardless of how
they reached their conclusions, the implication of the position taken by
the courts in these cases was that all state constitutional provisions and
laws that protected the rights of the voters were therefore applicable to
both elections.20 Thus, state judges sought to contribute to the efforts of
the legislatures to protect the electoral rights of the citizens by expan-
sively, or broadly, interpreting the primary election statutes to provide
the people with the full protection of the state constitutions.
The alternative view, that primaries were not elections within the
meaning of the constitution, began to emerge among the state courts
during the first decade of the twentieth century. These judges argued
that primaries were merely internal party contests for the purpose of
nominating candidates and consequently not elections within the mean-
ing of the constitution. “A primary election is not an election to public
office. It is merely the selection of candidates for office by the members of
a political party in a manner having the form of an election.”21 This
meant that the constitutional provisions and laws pertaining to the rights
of the voters in elections were applicable only to the general election. And
hence the legislature had very broad authority, though not unlimited as
discussed below, to make any reasonable regulations it chose to safe-
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guard the process of selecting party nominees and the liberties of the
citizens.22 Although by the start of the second decade of the twentieth
century there no longer was any consensus among the state courts re-
garding whether a primary was a constitutional election or a party con-
test subject to state regulation, all state judges agreed that these statutes
were an essential means by which the legislature sought to protect the
ability of the citizens to use their most basic freedoms to “freely” choose
their government.
The only other limitation placed upon the police power of the state
legislatures to regulate primary elections by the courts, regardless of
whether they considered them to be elections or not, was the require-
ment that the statutes conform to the provisions of the state constitu-
tions specifying how legislation should be drafted. Of particular impor-
tance was the prohibition against local and special legislation; the man-
date that all laws be of uniform and general application; and the re-
quirement that all laws clearly state their subject and purpose in their
title. The courts never struck down a primary election law for violating a
provision of the federal constitution in this era. In fact, the only time that
document was used to challenge such statutes was in cases where it was
argued that the classification of political parties by the state legislatures
for some purpose, such as determining who could hold primaries, vio-
lated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. State judges always rejected these arguments, and took the posi-
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tion that such classifications were constitutional as along as they were
reasonable and applied equally to all who were in similar circum-
stances.23
Overall, the rulings of the state courts in regard to the validity of
the primary election laws represented a revolutionary departure from
their belief earlier in the nineteenth century that parties were private
voluntary associations whose conduct and internal affairs neither they
nor the state legislatures had any right to intervene in beyond what was
absolutely necessary to prevent bribery, fraud, and other electoral
crimes. Their willingness to grant the state legislatures such broad
authority over the parties, and in essence transform them into quasi-
public organizations, can be largely attributed to their willingness to ac-
cept the arguments advanced by the state legislators and the reform
liberals to justify the new statutes. Like them, state judges viewed the
primary election statutes as one of the central means by which the
bosses could be denied the resources and the power to corrupt the elec-
toral process, and hence the ability to elect their candidates and use the
power of the state for their own selfish purposes. In short, they under-
stood these statutes as meant to make the state and national govern-
ments once again of the people, by the people, and for the people.24
Another influence upon the reasoning of the state courts in regard
to these statutes might have been the Supreme Court’s decision in Munn
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v. Illinois (1877), one of the Granger cases, in which Chief Justice Waite
upheld the regulation of grain elevator operators as a valid exercise of the
state police power. Such a law, he argued, did not represent a depriva-
tion of property under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment since the public had a vested interest in how these private
companies carried out their business.25 “Property does become clothed
with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public conse-
quence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes
his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect,
grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be con-
trolled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he
has created.”26 Although as far as is known there is no state court case
that refers to this decision explicitly, it is possible that its reasoning
helped to alter how state judges conceived of political parties. They were,
after all, private organizations in which the public had a very clear and
significant interest in how they conducted their activities, since they were
the primary institutions representing the views of the citizens both in the
electoral and the political process. Their failure to act in the public inter-
est, like the grain elevator operators, justified therefore the use of legis-
lative power to correct the abuses of their authority that had corrupted
the electoral process.
Regardless of what led state judges’ to reconsider their under-
standing of parties, their rulings in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries were instrumental in revising how key clauses of the state
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constitutions, especially those pertaining to the electoral process, were
interpreted to provide broader protection for the rights of the citizens.
Perhaps the most important transformation concerned the provisions re-
quiring all elections to be free and equal or that the legislature preserve
the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the electoral fran-
chise. In the past, the courts seem to have understood these clauses as
referring to the necessity of preventing traditional election crimes, such
as bribery. This was consistent with the pluralist liberalism tradition that
called for only those governmental restraints that were necessary to en-
suring everyone had the equal opportunity to express their preferences.
In this particular case, these laws were designed to control those who
pursued their electoral interests too aggressively, and hence denied other
citizens the ability to act on their own preferences in deciding which
candidate or party to support.
However, starting in the late nineteenth century, the state courts
redefined these constitutional mandates to also encompass efforts to
control the use of money in elections, and to eliminate as far as possible
appeals that encouraged citizens to act upon their selfish interests. In
sum for reform liberals including most state judges, corruption came to
refer to anything that prevented the citizens from having a meaningful
opportunity to influence the affairs of his party and those of the republic
based upon their rational judgment. The primary election statutes were
understood as contributing to this purpose by establishing norms of be-
havior in party elections that would allow citizens to once again be able
to “freely” express their preferences and give their consent to the gov-
ernment.
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Citizens and Candidates
Unlike with the primary election statutes, challenges to the corrupt
practices acts arose sporadically between 1843, when a suit was brought
concerning the application of the 1829 New York corrupt practices act
described in the last chapter, and 1953, when some provisions of Flor-
ida’s then new statute restricting the use of money in elections were
challenged as violating the citizens’ rights to freedom of speech and of the
press. Although over a century separates these two decisions, the rulings
of the state courts in regard to these types of laws remained consistent
over this period of time.
Perhaps what is most unexpected about the rulings of the state
courts concerning corrupt practices acts in this era, especially given their
general hostility to legislative regulations that interfered with property or
private power, was the lack of discussion concerning whether the re-
strictions placed upon the use of money in elections by these statutes
constituted a deprivation of property without due process. In fact, the
only known instance in which a court was called upon to address this
question was in the 1916 Michigan case of People v. Gansley. Seeking to
overturn his conviction for violating the state law prohibiting corporate
funds from being used to make political gifts, Jacob Gansley through his
lawyers argued in part that corporations were persons within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. Hence, to
deny them the right to make contributions to political contributions rep-
resented a deprivation of property without due process. This argument
was based upon his expansive understanding of what constituted prop-
erty. “[It] does not consist of the mere ownership of it, but includes the
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right to make proper and legitimate use of it, and to defend, not only the
ownership, but also the use and enjoyment of it.”27 Thus, in his view,
corporations had the right to use their property, i.e. money in this in-
stance, to defend their broader business and property interests from be-
ing harmed, or taken away, by the proposed initiative to prohibit the
manufacture and sale of alcohol.28
Largely adopting the reasoning of the state’s brief, the court re-
jected both the contention that corporations were persons within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the law adversely af-
fected its property rights.
The instant case, in our opinion, does not present an instance of depri-
vation of property, not of fanciful or unjust classification for purposes of
regulation. The expenditure of the money of the Lansing Brewing Com-
pany for election purposes cannot be deemed to be a property right
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. We are not dealing
with a measure that deprives a corporation of any of its property, or
that impairs the value of that property . . . The Lansing Brewing Com-
pany was created under our statute, for the purpose of manufacturing
beer. The privilege was not conferred upon it of using its funds for the
purpose of influencing public sentiment in connection with any elec-
tion.29
Both the court and the state argued that corporations were artificial en-
tities that had been created by the state legislature for specific purposes.
They could only claim that a statute threatened their property rights
when it directly affected their legally designated activities as occurred in
a case where a railroad company challenged a state law regulating rail-
road freight rates. The court further noted that only the legislature had
                                                
27 Additional Brief for Appellant in the case of People v. Gansley 191 Mich. 357, 158 N.
W. 195 (1916), 4.
28 Brief for Appellant in the case of People v. Gansley 191 Mich. 357, 158 N. W. 195
(1916), 5, 7-10; Additional Brief, 4-5.
29 People v. Gansley (opinion of the court), 375-376.
86
the authority to expand the corporation’s charter to allow it to engage in
other activities, such as participating in elections. In this case, the legis-
lature had actually decided to restrict its ability to engage in such prac-
tices based upon the well-established fact that such participation led to
the corruption of the ballot.30
The line of reasoning adopted by the court in this case, of course,
is inapplicable to the question of whether natural persons, or individual
citizens, were deprived of their property without due process by limita-
tions placed upon the use of money in elections. Unfortunately, there is
no known state court that addressed this question nor was it possible to
examine the briefs relating to the various cases to know if the issue was
ever raised. What is clear from the evidence available is that the argu-
ment that money is property was not at all influential during this era as
it either was never presented to the courts, or if it was advanced the
judges perhaps considered it so ridiculous that they chose not to address
it.
The opinions of the state courts in Gansley and other cases per-
taining to corrupt practices acts suggest that instead of viewing these
laws as efforts by the legislatures to control property in the form of
money, they considered them to be statutes designed to regulate the elec-
toral and political process. And these laws, the judges further argued,
were an appropriate and essential exercise by the state legislatures of
their police power to prevent the excessive use of money in elections from
debauching republican government, and preventing the people from be-
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ing able to properly select their representatives. Perhaps the best ex-
pression of this argument, albeit perhaps an extreme version of it, comes
from the comments made by  the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v.
Kohler (1930), a case dealing with the application of the state’s corrupt
practices act to the governor-elect’s misuse of money in the primary
election.
It has been said so many times it scarcely needs to be said again, that
the realization of the democratic ideal of self-government rests upon an
intelligent informed, and vigilant electorate . . . All efforts to educate and
awaken the electorate amount to nothing if corrupt appeals made to its
prejudices or its cupidity, lead it to cast a ballot otherwise than in accor-
dance with its convictions, uninfluenced by anything save considerations
of public policy. A democratic state must therefore have the power to
protect itself against the consequences of ignorance, indifference and ve-
nality and prevent all those practices which tend to subvert the elector-
ate and substitute a government of the people, by the people and for the
people, a government guided in the interest of those who seek to pervert
it.31
And later in the same opinion, the court added:
It is a matter of common knowledge that men of limited financial re-
sources aspire to public office. It is equally well known that successful
candidacy often requires them to put themselves under obligation to
those who contribute financial support . . . The evident purpose of the
act is to free the candidate from the temptation to accept support on
such terms and to place candidates during this period upon a basis of
equality so far as their personal ambitions are concerned, permitting
them, however, to make an appeal on behalf of the principles for which
they stand, so that such support as may voluntarily be tendered to the
candidacy of a person will be a support of principles rather than a per-
sonal claim upon the candidate’s consideration should he be elected.32
As with the judgments pertaining to the validity of the primary election
statutes, the opinion of the Wisconsin state court suggests a willingness
to defer to the judgment of the legislature. In its view, the representatives
of the people had passed the law to not only protect the most basic rights
                                                
31 State v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N. W. 895 (1930), 905.
32 State v. Kohler, 912.
88
of the people in the electoral process, but also to establish certain norms
of behavior for the citizens, candidates, and parties. Of especial impor-
tance were the provisions of the statute that enabled the citizens to make
rational and disinterested decisions based upon the principles and
merits of the candidates by removing all incentives for them to act on
partisan or selfish motives. The law was also designed, according to the
court, to ensure that those candidates who were chosen to represent the
people would be loyal to them rather than to the parties or their financial
backers. Although not all state courts may have been as heavily
influenced by Progressivism as the Wisconsin Supreme Court, they all
generally accepted the argument advanced by the reform liberals in the
state legislatures that the purpose of corrupt practices acts was to
minimize the role of money and other negative influences in elections to
ensure that the majority of the people would be able to express their will
through the ballot and have that will acted upon by their representa-
tives.33
Aside from technical challenges relating to how the corrupt prac-
tices acts had been drafted or were to be applied in practice, probably the
most common charge leveled against them was that they violated the
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constitutional rights of the citizens, parties, and candidates to freedom of
speech and of the press. These arguments were presented at a time when
judges at both the federal and state levels with few exceptions were hos-
tile to any claims concerning these rights, and even at times ignored
such challenges. When they did respond to them, many judges relied
upon Sir William Blackstone’s bad tendency test to determine the validity
of the law in question. As noted in chapter one, it held that while the
right of free speech could not be subject to prior restraints, the state
could punish anyone who abused this liberty in such a manner as to
threaten or to harm the public welfare. Regardless of the approach taken
by the courts in addressing claims pertaining to these liberties, their
opinions were generally characterized by a lack of any effort to explain
how they reached their conclusions or to develop guidelines to determine
what constituted speech and when it was lawful or unlawful.34
The lack of a well-developed jurisprudence pertaining to freedom of
speech and of the press to guide the thinking of the state courts was re-
flected in the diverse, and often ill-explained, conclusions which state
judges in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reached about
whether the corrupt practices acts violated these fundamental rights.
Some courts, like that of Wisconsin in State v. Kohler, upheld the
authority of the legislature to impose restrictions on the use of these lib-
erties.
A full exercise of the right of citizenship includes, not only the right to
vote, but the right to assemble, the right of free speech, the right to pre-
sent one’s views to one’s own fellow citizens, and the right to submit
one’s claims to leadership to the people. These rights are of the very es-
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sence of democracy. When a citizen declares himself to be a candidate
for public office, he does not forfeit these rights. He is in the interest of
the public welfare, however, in the exercise of these rights, subject to re-
straint by reasonable regulation.35
And similarly Judge Siebecker in his dissenting opinion in State v. Pierce
(1916) said:
Where the abuse of the purity of elections begins, through whatever
means it be accomplished, liberty of speech and press must end, for
without such a check this right could be made an effective instrument of
mischief. The Corrupt Practices Act [sic] was framed to guard against
such mischiefs, and the Legislature found its provisions appropriate and
necessary to check existing evils, which threatened the rights and privi-
leges of the elective franchise. In light of the public evils and the perni-
cious influences on voters in elections, which flow from the lavish expen-
diture of money, there is much justice and sound public policy in legisla-
tive restrictions imposed on persons by the Corrupt Practices Act.36
The judges who adopted this point of view seemed to have believed that
the corrupt practice acts served the public interest in preserving the mo-
rality of the citizens by preventing them from acting on improper motives
in making decisions, and the welfare of the republic by preventing the
excessive use of money from debauching the electoral process. Thus,
they ruled these statutes were reasonable regulations that were designed
to stop citizens, candidates, and parties from abusing their liberties, and
did not destroy them as they still left them the freedom to promulgate
their views within the boundaries established by the state legislatures.37
In reaching their conclusions, these judges were perhaps influenced not
only by the reasoning of the reform liberals in regard to the necessity of
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establishing standards of conduct in the electoral process, but also per-
haps the bad tendency test.
Other state courts, however, argued that some provisions of the
corrupt practices acts despite their meritorious purposes were unconsti-
tutional as they destroyed the citizens’ rights of freedom of speech and of
the press. Examples of such rulings include: Louthan v. The Common-
wealth in which the court ruled that a law prohibiting certain kinds of
public servants from participating in elections violated their right to free-
dom of speech, of the press, and of association; Ex parte Harrision in
which the judges struck down a law requiring civil leagues or their mem-
bers to meet stringent requirements before reporting their findings to the
public concerning candidates for office; and State v. Junkin, a case con-
cerning Nebraska’s nonpartisan judiciary act in which the provision that
prohibited political parties or conventions from criticizing judicial and
educational candidates in the primary elections was declared unconsti-
tutional on the grounds that it denied the citizens the opportunity to
jointly exercise their right to freedom of speech.38 In short, in all these
cases state judges found that the legislature had completely silenced the
voice of certain groups of citizens rather than merely regulating their
right to participate by placing reasonable restrictions upon their activi-
ties. Whether the extreme provisions of the corrupt practices acts dis-
cussed in these cases were typical of the statutes of this era or not is un-
clear as it was not possible to conduct an extensive survey of the provi-
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sions of state corrupt practices acts (all the available sources discussed
them in very broad terms).
Perhaps the most egregious example of a legislative effort to silence
citizens in elections was the case of State v. Pierce (1916) that arose in
Wisconsin when a private citizen spent money to investigate political af-
fairs outside of his own county and to communicate those findings to his
fellow voters for the purpose of influencing their opinions on referendum
questions in the upcoming election. This contravened a provision of the
state’s corrupt practices act that prohibited such activities by citizens
unless they conducted them as members of a party or candidate’s cam-
paign committee or as speakers at a public meeting, i.e. an event that did
not involve the expenditure of money.39
In his brief for the state, the attorney general rejected the conten-
tion that this statute violated the right of the citizens’ to freedom of
speech and of the press guaranteed by the state constitution. It was, in
his view, a perfectly valid enactment of the legislature that reflected its
best judgment as to what was required to preserve the purity of the bal-
lot. “A provision of the constitution securing freedom of speech should
not be so construed as to strip the state of the power to protect itself
through its most sacred institution—a pure and undefiled election where
sober, honest judgment shall be recorded uninfluenced by improper
consideration, secret influences, and one-sided presentation.”40 The law
accomplished this latter objective by preventing individuals who ostenta-
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tiously appeared to be exercising their rights to freedom of speech and of
the press, but in reality were the servants of the corporations or other
moneyed interests, from using large, secret slush funds provided by
these organizations and other tactics to corrupt the electoral process in
such a manner as to prevent the selection of worthy representatives. Fur-
thermore, the attorney general believed that the law did not interfere or
prohibit the exercise of the citizens’ rights to freedom of speech and of
the press. It merely stipulated the conditions under which individuals
who wished to express their views in the course of an election could ex-
ercise their fundamental liberty to do so.41
While Pierce’s lawyers agreed with the attorney general that the
state legislature had the power to enact laws to prevent corruption in
elections, they believed that it had exceeded its authority in passing the
provision of the statute in question by criminalizing activities that were
widely recognized as appropriate and essential ones under a republican
form of government.
The trouble with the state’s contention is that it assumes that all acts and
things which influence voting at an election are inherently bad, although it must
be admitted that the most potent influences, those which operate upon intelli-
gence and judgment, are not, and in the nature of things cannot in a govern-
ment like ours, be either wholly bad, or partly bad, for anything which appeals
to reason or judgment, or which increases one’s knowledge of government, the
doings of public servants, the fitness of candidates for office, cannot be bad, and
should not be outlawed, even though occasional instances of abuse may be
found.42
The restrictions imposed on the ability of the citizens to engage in activi-
ties to influence the “intelligence and judgment” of fellow voters were so
broad, according to Pierce’s lawyers, that they encompassed virtually any
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action a person might take to influence political affairs. Even buying a
postage stamp to mail a letter to an individual residing in another county
declaring their political views might cause a citizen to run afoul of the
law! Such an act, they therefore argued, must be unconstitutional. It not
only prevented citizens from using their rights to freedom of speech and
of the press to gather and disseminate the information required for them
to vote appropriately on men and measures, but also prohibited them
from using these liberties to ensure the protection of their other civil and
political liberties.43
In deciding this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took the ex-
traordinarily step of ruling that the provision of the law was void not
based upon principles of common law doctrine, but rather on constitu-
tional ones as it violated the provision of state constitution’s Bill of
Rights guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.
If this is not an abridgment of freedom of speech, it would be difficult to
imagine what would be. Under such a law no pioneer in any reformer
which depends for its success on a change in the law could leave his own
county and communicate his sentiments at his own expense to his fellow
citizens of other counties without committing a crime. Under such laws
no great propaganda for better laws and better political conditions which
has not been formally taken up by a political party can be carried on . . .
Almost every step forward in political and governmental affairs comes as
a result of long agitation and discussion in the press, on the rostrum,
and in the open forum of personal contact . . . for years before the idea is
formally indorsed [sic] by any party.44
And later in the same opinion the court added:
We are by no means unmindful of the high and admirable purpose which
inspired the authors of the Corrupt Practices Act [sic]. There is no mem-
ber of this bench who is not in the fullest sympathy with any legislation
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which will tend to reduce to an absolute minimum the danger of corrup-
tion and coercion during political campaigns, but when such a law goes
beyond regulation, and absolutely prohibits that which the [state] Consti-
tution expressly protects, the court can do nothing but say so.45
These judges contrary to their brethren in other cases believed that the
restrictions the corrupt practices act placed on the liberties of the citi-
zens by the state legislature could not be upheld on the grounds that it
was merely seeking to prevent the abuse of the people’s right to engage in
political discussion. For the court, this statute imposed a total prohibi-
tion rather than a partial one on fundamental freedoms that were not
only essential to democratic government, but also were guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights found in the state constitution. There was no question
for the court that the legislature had transgressed boundaries placed on
its authority by the state constitution, and that the law, or rather a
specific portion of it, was null and void.46
Thus, the state courts seem to have viewed the corrupt practices
acts as political laws, not economic ones, that were designed to correct
abuses in the electoral process that were undermining the republic itself.
As with statutes pertaining to primary elections, the central constitu-
tional question that the courts had to address was the extent of the legis-
lature’s power to regulate the electoral process, or more specifically
whether corrupt practices acts infringed upon the rights of the citizens,
parties, and candidates to freedom of speech and of the press. State
courts with a few exceptions again showed great deference to the judg-
ment of the state legislatures as it was considered their prerogative in
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this era to define how best to protect, or give meaning to, the rights of the
citizens. Campaign finance laws were viewed by the courts as providing
an answer to this question so far as it pertained to the fundamental right
of the citizens to consent to their government. They were designed to
make this possible by ensuring that the liberties of freedom of speech, of
the press, and of association were used properly, and that citizens were
not prevented from using them through corruption or improper campaign
practices.
Political & Educational Activities of Corporations & Labor Unions
Even before the adoption of laws by the state legislatures prohibit-
ing contributions from corporations, a few courts in the early twentieth
century were already using general corporate law to declare such gifts to
be ultra vires, i.e. an activity not authorized by the company charter.
While the courts believed these gifts were illegal and morally repugnant,
they noted that the corporations could not be subjected to criminal
prosecutions as they had violated no state law. However, the companies
had committed a private wrong by depriving the shareholders of their
property without their consent, and this meant according to the judges
that they had the right to initiate private civil actions against the direc-
tors and officers of the company to recover their property.47
Following the passage in the early twentieth century of laws explic-
itly prohibiting corporations to give money to parties and to candidates,
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there were few challenges to these statutes that would have permitted
the state courts to construe their validity and their purposes. Although
there is no discussion in the literature of why corporations chose not to
contest these bans, four reasons suggest themselves. First, they may
have considered these statutes as a means of avoiding a shakedown for
political money by party bosses. Second, they could easily circumvent
the prohibition by having individuals affiliated with them make substan-
tial contributions on behalf of their interests. Third, they might have be-
lieved that such challenges would only intensify the public hostility to-
ward them, which had developed partially in response to allegations that
they were using money to corrupt the electoral and the political process.
And fourth, rulings such as that of the court in Gansley may have dis-
couraged such challenges as they made clear that judges were unwilling
to protect their rights. Later in the twentieth century, labor unions also
rarely challenged state laws restricting the use of their money in political
campaigns probably because not many legislatures chose to enact such
bans. This may have stemmed from the fact that there was less pressure
on them to address this issue than there had been in the early twentieth
century in regard to corporations when evidence emerged of how they
were using money to corrupt the electoral process. Thus, state constitu-
tional law in regard to the rights of corporations and labor unions to
participate in the electoral process was not well-developed in this era.
Generally, state judges were willing as with other kinds of electoral
laws to defer to the state legislatures, and uphold the ban on the use of
corporate, and later labor union, gifts as an appropriate exercise of the
state’s police power to ensure the integrity of the electoral process. “It
was for the Legislature [sic] to say, in the exercise of the police power,
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whether such use of corporate funds opened the door to corruption and
tended to destroy safeguards placed around elections to ‘protect the pu-
rity of the ballot.’ ”48 The courts further argued that these laws affected
only the organization itself, and not the individual members who com-
posed them. As citizens, they retained their rights to speak and to pub-
lish their sentiments on any subject or to make contributions to the par-
ties and the candidates for the purpose of influencing the electoral
process.49
As the twentieth century progressed the central question for the
state courts in regard to these laws became not their propriety, but
rather the extent to which the ban on corporate gifts applied to non-
profit corporations. Generally, the judges held that these laws prohibited
them from making direct contributions to parties and candidates, but al-
lowed them to make expenditures to educate voters or their own mem-
bers about the issues or merits of the candidates. The reasoning behind
this position was perhaps best expressed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court in the case of La Belle v. Hennepin County Bar Association (1939),
which involved the question of whether a bar association could make ex-
penditures in judicial elections to promote particular candidates.
This statute is aimed at the evils of excessive expenditures for campaign
purposes by political parties . . . and seeks to prevent such evils by pro-
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hibiting the acquisition of campaign funds or ‘war chests’ to be so ex-
pended. The words ‘pay’ and ‘contribute’ imply . . . the transfer, giving,
and delivery of money, property, or services. Defendant does not turn
over any money or property nor does it furnish any free service to any
candidate. It expends the money itself in payment of expense incident to
one of its authorized activities. The money is not expended on behalf of
any candidate . . . But, says the plaintiff, the giving of a vote of prefer-
ence is in itself a thing of value. That may be true for it is certainly
sought after by candidates. It is not, however, a thing of value within the
meaning of the statute which relates only to things which have a value
measurable in money.50
The state judges seem to have believed that the objective of the legisla-
ture had been to prevent corporations, and possibly labor unions, from
using money to influence the political process by making direct gifts to
the parties and the candidates. In their opinion, this was the source of
electoral corruption as it allowed the corporations to buy special privi-
leges, and the parties and the candidate to build massive warchests to be
used for the purpose of buying votes and engaging in other pernicious
practices. Indirect support through educational efforts, however, was not
necessarily corrupting as the candidates and the parties merely received
intangible benefits from corporations and labor unions who were re-
quired to report these expenditures.51
These state court decisions pertaining to the rights of corporations
and labor unions to participate in the electoral process raise the question
of whether the decision in Gansley was an aberration or the norm. The
evidence available suggests that it was the latter. The position of the
courts was generally to defer to the judgment of the state legislatures by
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granting them the authority to correct abuses in the electoral process
related to the excessive use of money by these organizations through
whatever means they deemed necessary. In the case discussed above, the
court found that the legislature had sought to ban only for-profit
corporations from participating in elections, and refused to extend that
ban to non-profit ones as that was the duty of the legislature. Hence had
a state legislature prohibited all types of corporations from participating
in the electoral process, it is likely that the state court would have up-
held this as a legitimate act even if it interfered with the corporation’s
rights. They would have arguably understood the law as reflecting the
judgment of the people’s representatives as to what was required to allow
the citizens to meaningfully exercise their electoral liberties.
Public Funding
In 1909, Colorado became the only state in the early twentieth cen-
tury to adopt a law providing for the public funding of state general
election campaigns, which represented an extreme reaction to the prob-
lem of money in politics as it seems to been designed to eliminate all pri-
vate funds in electoral contests. This relatively unknown statute both at
the time it was passed and today gave the political parties a sum from
the public treasury equal to twenty-five cents for each vote cast for the
party’s candidate for governor in the last election. Furthermore, it
prohibited them from raising or using any additional monies from private
sources; required them to give a strict accounting of how the campaign
funds were spent; and stipulated that at least half of the money provided
to them by the state had be to given to the various party county commit-
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tees to support their campaigns. The law also prohibited candidates from
spending more than forty percent of the salary of the office they sought
on their campaigns. What is not clear, however, is where they would get
that money as the statute strictly prohibited corporations and individuals
from making any contributions to candidates in the general election. This
suggests that candidates would either have to be wealthy enough to run
their own campaigns, raise all their money in the primary election stage,
or rely on the political parties for their funds. Finally, the law prohibited
any organizations with the exception of parties and candidates from
spending money in political campaigns.52
Following the nomination of its candidates for the state general el-
ection in 1910, the Democratic Party sought to collect from the state gov-
ernment the public money it had been promised under the statute to run
its campaign. However, the state officials responsible for dispersing the
funds refused to release the money since they believed the law to be un-
constitutional. The Democrats then proceeded to file a suit in September
of 1910 with the state supreme court asking it to compel the state treas-
urer to give them the money they were lawfully entitled to receive.
Roughly one month later, the court held the public funding statute to be
unconstitutional, but “unfortunately handed down no written opinion,
and the arguments controlling its decisions are not on record.”53 An un-
derstanding of the issues involved in this case therefore requires an ex-
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amination of the briefs, which are remarkably short. This is probably due
to the limited time that the parties involved in this case had to prepare
them which prevented the development of extensive arguments as well as
the novelty of the law in question.54
The two briefs supporting the validity of the statute, those of the
attorney general and of the lawyers representing the Democratic Party,
largely focused upon technical constitutional questions, especially the
issue of whether the state legislature had the power to pass such a law in
the first place. Both briefs argued that there was nothing in the state
constitution that prohibited the legislature from enacting such a statute,
or from authorizing the expenditure of public money for such a purpose.
They also believed that the title of the act was not defective, i.e. it prop-
erly specified the contents of the law, and that it was not class legislation
prohibited by the state constitution. In support of the latter point, they
noted that there was no provision in the statute, which would prohibit a
new party from qualifying for public funding after the first election in
which it ran a candidate for governor. An additional issue addressed by
the attorney general pertained to whether the state officials had standing
to challenge the statute. He cited the established principle of constitu-
tional law that “only those persons whose rights are directly affected by
an act, and who have therefore some right to, or interest in, the defeat of
the same, can question its constitutionality.”55 As the state officials’
rights were not affected by the statute, they could not challenge the law
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on the ground that it violated the fundamental liberties of the citizens.
They were required to limit their challenge to the question of whether the
legislature had the authority to make such an appropriation.56
It was precisely that question, whether the statute violated the
fundamental rights of people, that was the focus of the amici curiae brief
written by four individuals: Charles S. Thomas, John A. Rush, Gail
Laughlin, and Harry B. Tedrow. Unfortunately, it was not possible to de-
termine who they were and their precise connection to this case. For
them, the “chief vice” of the law was its third section that crushed the
“free thought and independence” of the citizens by preventing them from
forming new parties through its prohibition on individual gifts to candi-
dates and other organizations. “This law might well be termed an act to
perpetuate old political parties and prevent the formation of new ones. A
new party may not even initiate a campaign and nominate a governor in
order to qualify itself for state funds without the commission of peniten-
tiary offenses by those, not candidates, who defray the expenses
thereof.”57 Rather than weakening parties as electoral laws throughout
the nation were doing, they believed the public funding act would
strengthen them by making them no longer reliant on the financial or
political support of the people for their continued existence. Parties
would be able to preserve themselves regardless of the merits of the
principles they put forth so long as their candidates were sufficiently
popular to garner a large percentage of the vote. Based on this under-
standing of the consequences of the law, the amici curiae also contended,
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although with little explanation, that it deprived citizens of their right to
constitute their government as they saw fit by placing them in the
“servitude of partisanship;” that it violated their right to a free and open
election; and that it deprived them of their right to freedom of speech by
prohibiting them from using their money to indirectly speak through
state party committees.58
The briefs therefore suggest that the primary issue in this case was
not the authority of the legislature to pass such a statute to correct the
grave evils that had arisen from the abuses connected to campaign
funds. Even the amici curiae suggest that such a law might be constitu-
tional if written differently. “It is not necessary in the particular instance
for this court to determine the constitutionality of a law bestowing funds
upon all political parties, regardless of size, age, or name. Such a law
would demand greater scrutiny than this one.”59 Louise Overacker has
argued that the decision to strike down the law was probably based upon
the fact that it was poorly drafted.60 While certainly a plausible explana-
tion, it is also possible based on the analysis presented above that the
court chose to void the law because it interfered far too much with the
most basic liberties of the citizens. As seen with the corrupt practices
acts, some courts were willing to question legislative judgments in regard
to electoral laws when they believed they were destructive, rather than
regulative of the rights of the citizens, as this statute potentially was
through its very broad ban on electoral activities. What can be said for
certain is that the problem with the Colorado public funding law in the
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court’s view was probably not with the legislature’s desire to correct the
evils of money in elections to protect the fundamental liberties of the citi-
zens, but rather with the draconian measure it adopted to accomplish
this objective.
Conclusion
At the same time as the state legislatures began to assert greater
authority over the electoral process in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the state courts were called upon to construe the
validity of the new campaign finance laws. Based upon the view of the
courts in this era that predominates in today’s literature, one would have
expected them to be major obstacles to these reforms since the statutes
in question directly affected property in the form of money and the power
of private organizations to control their internal affairs.
Yet, precisely the opposite happened. State judges proved to be
very supportive of the efforts of the state legislatures to build a more
powerful administrative state that had the capacity in the view of the re-
form liberals to preserve the fundamental right of the citizens to consent
to their government by ensuring the integrity of the electoral process.
Using the doctrine of the police power, the courts granted the state legis-
latures broad authority to regulate the conduct of the parties, candi-
dates, and citizens in elections. The only limitation at times placed upon
this power was that the state legislatures could not destroy those liber-
ties central to their participation in the electoral process through the
statutes it passed to prevent them from being abused. What constituted
a law that was destructive rather than regulative of these rights was
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often the most significant source of disagreement among the state courts,
especially in cases pertaining to corrupt practices acts and the right to
freedom of speech. However, no court seems to have attempted to sys-
tematically address this issue or develop a jurisprudence to govern its
decisions. This resulted in a diverse array of opinions and reasons for
sustaining or voiding these first campaign finance statutes that were
united only by the common willingness of the judges to defer to argu-
ments advanced by the state legislatures to support these statues based
upon the principles and ideas of the reform liberals.
Considered from the standpoint of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, however, the support given by the state judges to the
legislative effort to redefine the meaning of the people’s liberties was not
unexpected. Both of these institutions, which together were the primary
guardians of the citizens’ rights in this era, were arguably significantly
influenced by the arguments of the reform liberals in favor of these ex-
traordinary new laws. The reformers framed the issue of money in elec-
tions as a question pertaining not to property, but rather political moral-
ity, or the necessity of establishing a code of proper conduct in elections
to ensure government by consent. This belief is reflected in the opinions
of the state judges who repeatedly emphasized the arguments advanced
by the state legislators that it was the pernicious influence of money,
party leaders, and organized interests that was corrupting the republic
by destroying the civic virtue and political morality of the citizens, and
more importantly preventing the free expression of their will. The state
courts and legislators, like the reform liberals, seemed to believe that the
citizens had the virtue and morality required for self-government, and
would resume their civic duties if the electoral process was cleansed of
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these corrupting influences. And that this in turn would restore the
American republic by allowing a public-spirited citizenry to properly use
their electoral rights to make independent decisions based upon patriot-
ism, the issues and the principles of the day, and the merit and worth of
the candidates in selecting their representatives.
The longevity of the doctrines developed by the state courts to gov-
ern their rulings in regard to electoral laws was not only due to the influ-
ence of the reform liberals understanding of what was required to imple-
ment the principles of republican liberalism upon the state judges, and
their willingness to defer to the opinion of the state legislators regarding
the necessity of these laws. Equally important probably was the large gap
of time that occurred between this first wave of campaign finance legisla-
tion and judicial construction of it, which lasted roughly from 1890 to
1920, and the next wave in the 1970s. During the middle period, there
were extraordinarily few court cases pertaining to electoral law that were
brought before the state or federal courts. Why is not clear, but perhaps
it was because many had come to accept the answers given by the courts
and the legislatures to the fundamental questions pertaining to rights
and to republican government raised by these statutes. It was only after
the Watergate scandal raised renewed questions about the role of money
in politics that the courts and the legislatures would be forced to re-
evaluate their long established beliefs in regard to the regulation of the
electoral system; a process that occurred in a polity that had undergone
significant transformations, including a constitutional one, since the
early twentieth century.
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4 The Supreme Court and the Renaissance of
Pluralist Liberalism
For almost a century, the established doctrine of the state courts
was that the regulation of the use of money in elections was a reasonable
exercise of the state legislature’s police power, which served the public
interest in honest and fair elections that reflected the free and independ-
ent will of the people. This tenet of state constitutional law and the ar-
guments grounded in the reform liberal tradition that had been used to
justify it along with the deference that had earlier been shown to the
judgment of the state legislatures, however, was suddenly repudiated in
the early 1970s. In its place, a new doctrine was developed, which draw-
ing on the pluralist liberal tradition, emphasized the necessity of con-
straining the power of the state governments to intervene in the electoral
process. For the state courts, this meant more rigorously enforcing those
provisions of the federal and state bills of rights that were essential to the
ability of the citizens, parties, candidates, and others to freely participate
in the electoral process by questioning the arguments advanced by state
governments concerning the necessity of campaign finance regulations.
What caused this revolutionary shift in the judicial philosophy of
the state courts was not changes in the attitudes of the reformers toward
money. Throughout the twentieth century they continued to view strict
limitations and controls on the use of campaign funds that would func-
tion as a code of conduct to guide the actions of the citizens in the elec-
toral process as vital to preventing the corruption of the republic. Nor
was it due to efforts by the state judges to revise their established consti-
tutional doctrines. Rather, it arguably reflected the growing influence of
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the federal courts’ free speech jurisprudence upon state judges, espe-
cially that of the Supreme Court, as they replaced the state legislatures
and courts as the primary guardians of the people’s liberties. That juris-
prudence had its origins in the constitutional revolution of 1937, which
redefined the Court’s focus in the electoral arena from questions pertain-
ing to state power, particularly those dealing with federalism and race, to
those concerned with freedom of speech and its relation to campaign
activities.
From Legislative Deference to Constitutional Rights
Starting in the early 1970s, even before the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, the state courts became
much less supportive of legislative attempts to impose broad limitations
upon the use of money in elections. Such laws, many judges began to
argue in cases like Fortson v. Weeks and Bare v. Gorton, were of ques-
tionable validity as they prevented citizens from exercising the rights to
freedom of speech, of the press, and of association guaranteed by both
the states’ bills of rights and the First Amendment to the federal consti-
tution that were critical to the functioning of the electoral process. This
new position was exemplified by the Oregon Supreme Court in the case
of Deras v. Meyers (1975) in which the constitutionality of the provision
of the state’s then new corrupt practices act that limited contributions
and expenditures by citizens, parties, and candidates was challenged on
the grounds that it violated these critical liberties.
Conceding for the purposes of this case that limitation and control of
campaign expenditures is of great importance in the catalogue of our so-
cial and political needs, the good it proposes to accomplish must be
weighed against the danger which it generates in restraining our citizens
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from freely expressing their views on candidates for public office. In
weighing these competing interests, one must recognize the importance
of the electorate’s liberties of expression of opinion and assembly in the
overall system of government established by our state and federal consti-
tutions. These rights have been termed the cornerstone of our democracy
and so important as to require breathing space and protection even from
the chilling effect of overbroad and ambiguous statutory restrictions.1
Drawing not only on state constitutional law but also to an unprece-
dented extent on federal case law and the national Constitution, the state
courts established a new rule of judicial construction that required all
campaign finance statutes to be henceforth subject to strict scrutiny to
ensure that the state legislatures did not use their broad powers to de-
stroy those freedoms that were essential to the democratic process. Only
those laws whose provisions were narrowly drawn to target a specific evil,
a particular form of corruption rather than the use of money in elections
generally, and used the least restrictive means possible to achieve the
state’s compelling interest in maintaining a free and honest electoral
process would be upheld.2
In construing the first wave of campaign finance legislation in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the state judges had will-
ingly accepted the arguments of the reform liberals that restrictions,
such as those found in the Oregon corrupt practices acts of the 1970s,
were necessary to correct abuses in the electoral system that were pre-
venting the citizens from being able to “freely” express their will and
therefore consent to their government. They rejected constitutional chal-
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lenges to these statutes, and deferred to the wisdom of the state legisla-
tures in granting them authority to establish a moral code of conduct in
elections to ensure that the people made the right choices, and were
truly in control of their parties and leaders.
However, as the state courts examined the validity of the statutes
that were passed as part of the second great wave of campaign finance
legislation in the wake of the Watergate scandal, they repudiated their
previous understanding of campaign finance laws. In its place, state
judges developed a new conception of these statutes, based arguably in
part upon the pluralist liberalism tradition, that portrayed them as a po-
tential threat to the ability of the people to “freely” express their prefer-
ences by expanding the power of government over elections, and restrict-
ing the use of those fundamental freedoms that allowed them to partici-
pate in politics. Thus, the jurisprudence of the state courts in the latter
part of the twentieth century came to focus upon using constitutional
rights to restrict the power of the states to regulate money in politics;
rather than as in the past recognizing their broad authority under com-
mon law doctrines to enact such statutes to preserve the moral welfare of
the community.
Even as the jurisprudence of the state courts, and as will be seen
later in this chapter the federal ones as well, was undergoing this trans-
formation, the reformers of the latter half of the twentieth century con-
tinued to believe that restrictions on the use of money in elections were
vital to ensuring the purity of the electoral process and giving the people
the freedom to choose their leaders.
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The Reformers of the Latter Part of the Twentieth Century
As the Progressive movement, and more generally the reform im-
pulse of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, waned starting
in the 1920s, so did much of the force that had driven the early efforts to
regulate the use of money in politics. Between the passage of the first
great wave of campaign finance legislation described in chapter two and
the start of the next one in the 1970s, there would be no reform move-
ment or coalition of individuals, such as the Mugwumps or the Progres-
sives, that actively pursued new electoral reforms. Rather, this middle
era, dating roughly from the 1920s to the 1960s, would be characterized
by sporadic efforts by members of Congress to change the regulatory sys-
tem usually in response to what they perceived to be evidence of the
pernicious influence of money on the freedom of the people to make
“rational” and “untainted” decisions in elections. It was only towards the
end of this era that a new and diverse coalition of reformers emerged to
not only actively lobby for changes in the election system as the Progres-
sives and other reform liberals had done in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, but to also put forth a new understanding of cor-
ruption and its effect on government by consent.
The first scandal that prompted Congressional action to enact new
controls on the use of campaign funds arose in the early 1920s when
Harry Sinclair and his partners bribed Secretary of the Interior Albert
Fall to attain a lease on the federal naval oil reserve known as Teapot
Dome. Subsequently as revelations of this deal emerged, Sinclair made a
substantial contribution of at least $160,000 (about $1.1 million in 1996
dollars) to the Republican National Committee (RNC) to help it pay off
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debts from the 1920 presidential election. Even though the federal Pub-
licity Act of 1911 did not require post-election gifts to be reported, the
Republicans still went to great lengths to hide this donation by dividing it
among multiple contributors. When the extent of Sinclair’s largesse and
the efforts of the RNC to disguise it were revealed by a Congressional in-
vestigating committee, many assumed that Sinclair had sought to buy
protection for himself from further investigation and potential prosecu-
tion through his generous gift to the ruling party. “[T]he extraordinary
sum yielded up at that critical time by Sinclair was not altogether volun-
tarily donated, and that either hope or fear, if not gratitude, simulated
his generosity and accentuated his devotion to the principles of the Re-
publican Party. In the predicament in which he found himself at that
juncture he stood in dire need of friends at court.”3 Members of Con-
gress, such as Senators William Borah (R-ID), Gerald Nye (R-ND), and
Kenneth McKellar (D-TN) whose views of money in elections had been
influenced by the Progressives, criticized this sordid bargain as yet an-
other example of how secret campaign contributions, and money more
generally, corrupted the electoral process by allowing donors to buy fa-
vors from the government.4
And as it was precisely those types of deals that the corrupt prac-
tices and publicity acts had been designed to eliminate, the Teapot Dome
scandal indicated the need to tighten the restrictions on the use of
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money in elections. Led by Senator Borah and Representative John Cable
(R-OH), Congress eventually responded to this event by passing the Fed-
eral Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1925, which largely served to codify
all the piecemeal campaign finance statutes that had been passed earlier
in the twentieth century, and to make a few adjustments to the regula-
tory regime. The most significant was that the parties were now required
to report their receipts and expenditures in both election and non-elec-
tion years. Through continuous publicity, the proponents of regulation
believed it would be possible to once and for all eliminate large, corrupt-
ing gifts by threatening the party that accepted them not only with legal
sanctions, but also the possibility that the people would punish them at
the ballot box.5
The next threat to the integrity of the electoral process that drew
the attention of federal legislators, especially conservative ones like Sena-
tor Robert Taft (R-OH), was the emergence of a “new” special interest
group, labor unions. Starting in the late 1930s and early 1940s, unions
began to make substantial direct contributions to the parties and candi-
dates, especially the Democrats, and to finance other electoral activities,
such as voter registration drives. As early as 1937, the Longeran Com-
mittee, which the Senate had charged with investigating the expenses of
the 1936 presidential campaign, recommended that labor union contri-
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butions to candidates and parties be prohibited in federal elections. For
the committee and other Congressional proponents of such a measure,
these contributions, like corporate ones in the early twentieth century,
were corrupting and immoral as they allowed labor unions to “buy” legis-
lators and favorable policies, and forced dues paying union members to
support candidates and parties they opposed. Congress would eventually
act on this recommendation by passing in 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act to
extend the ban on corporate campaign gifts in federal elections to labor
unions.6
The events surrounding the passage of the only other significant
campaign finance statute prior to the 1960s, the second Hatch Act of
1940, suggest that it was perhaps an exception to the usual pattern of
this era in which scandal proceeded reform. Originally, the statute was
designed to extend the provisions of the Hatch Act of 1939, which pro-
hibited political activities by all federal employees not covered by the
Pendleton Act, to state and local officials who served in governmental de-
partments that received federal money. In an effort to prevent the pas-
sage of the law, opponents in the Senate and the House added in the
course of the debate over the bill two poison pills that they believed
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would kill it by dividing its supporters. These were amendments to the
FCPA that would limit the receipts and expenditures of political commit-
tees to $3 million and individual gifts to $5,000 per calendar year. State
and local committees were exempted from these limitations. To their sur-
prise, these amendments were accepted by other members of Congress
with virtually no debate, and became part of the final version of the bill
signed by President Roosevelt.7
These new restrictions on the use of campaign funds, however,
were quickly rendered ineffective by the parties, candidates, and others
who circumvented them by interpreting them not as aggregate limits as
Congress had probably intended, but rather ones that applied to each
individual committee. This led to the decentralization of the process of
raising and spending money among dozens, even hundreds of commit-
tees, to meet the skyrocketing costs of campaigns in the 1950s and
1960s as television and other innovations became integral parts of politi-
cal campaigns. Thus rather than preventing the corruption of the elec-
toral process, the new statute actually encouraged it by rendering the
publicity requirements of the FCPA useless, and making concealment of
campaign funds and evasion of the rules an accepted practice. By the
end of the 1960s, the campaign finance regulatory regime would be aptly
described by President Johnson as “more loophole than law.”8
Faced with the growing ineffectiveness of the statutes governing
the use of money in elections and evidence of its corrupting influence on
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the political process, members of Congress, presidents, policy experts,
the media, and public interest groups began to lobby more extensively for
more comprehensive reforms starting in the 1960s. Although they too
drew on the reform liberalism tradition in developing their policy recom-
mendations, they viewed money as perpetuating a different kind of cor-
ruption than the liberal reformers of the late nineteenth and first half of
the twentieth centuries. The latter emphasized its detrimental effect on
the ability of the citizens to make proper decisions by encouraging them
to act on selfish motives, such as partisanship, in deciding who their
representatives would be. While the new reform liberals, like the Popu-
lists earlier in the nineteenth century, were concerned with how the ris-
ing costs of campaigns were corrupting the electoral process by allowing
those with the economic resources required to participate, the wealthy
and organized interests, to have greater influence than the citizens who
the government was supposed to represent.
I am not, of course, merely concerned because campaigns cost so much
money. I am concerned about the vast majority of big donors who want
something in return for their money which has necessarily financed a
major part of a campaign of this proportion— contacts, jobs, loans,
privileges, legislation, and so on. I am concerned about able men who
either have no money of their own or cannot raise any appreciable
amount from friends and supporters. Such men, despite their virtues,
generally do not get selected as candidates for high office, or if nomi-
nated find themselves almost hopelessly handicapped in the race for
election. I am concerned about the party which lacks money to buy radio
and television time, print literature, put up billboards, or hire precinct
workers. However, excellent may be its cause or its candidates, its inabil-
ity to reach voters in these ways may insure its defeat.9
In their view, the extravagant amount of money required for modern
campaigns to pay for television ads and the use of other innovations vio-
                                                
9 Senator Paul H. Douglas, “The High Cost of Elections,” The New Republic, vol. 127 (22
December 1952), p. 8-9.
118
lated the fundamental tenet of republican liberalism that government
had to be based upon the consent of the people in two ways. First, it pre-
vented all citizens from participating equally in the electoral process, or
even worse excluded some groups altogether, and hence made impossible
a debate over the issues that considered all points of view. Only the un-
representative views of those with money, i.e. the campaign contributors,
were heard. Secondly, the people were denied the opportunity to consider
the claims of all candidates for office as some individuals were “priced
out” of the system. Those that did run represented in the view of the re-
formers not necessarily the interests of the people, but those of their
wealthy supporters. Thus, there was a fear that the government was be-
coming one not of the people, but rather one of the wealthy and organ-
ized interests.10
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Before the 1970s, Congress made few attempts to address this per-
ceived corruption of the electoral process. The most notable was Senator
Russell Long’s (D-LA) effort to revive the idea first proposed by President
Roosevelt in 1905 that the federal government should subsidize either
directly or indirectly political campaigns in order to equalize the re-
sources and opportunities available to the candidates, citizens, and par-
ties. Such a measure would have had the additional benefit of eliminat-
ing, or greatly reducing, the large gifts required to finance political cam-
paigns that were unduly influencing the decisions of the citizens and
those of their representatives. Although Senator Long managed to force
Congress to pass a law providing for the public funding of presidential
campaigns in 1966, it was repealed before it could take effect.11
The executive branch sought to contribute to the debate over how
to address the growing problem of money in elections through President
Kennedy’s Commission on Campaign Costs. Under the guidance of two
leading scholars in this policy area, Alexander Heard and Herbert Alex-
ander, it was directed to investigate how to improve the financing of
presidential campaigns. Among the commission’s suggestions were: the
implementation of tax incentives to encourage small gifts and reduce re-
liance on large donors; the creation of an effective publicity regime run
by an independent commission; the repeal of the existing limitations on
contributions and expenditures; and the strict enforcement of existing
laws. None of these recommendations were acted upon by Congress, and
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President Johnson dissolved the commission in 1963 after assuming of-
fice.12
Heard and Alexander were members of another constituency that
emerged to support the cause of campaign finance in the 1960s: policy
experts whose research was supported by numerous philanthropists and
organizations. One of the most significant was the Committee on Cam-
paign Contributions, later renamed the Citizen’s Research Foundation,
established in 1958 by former Rhode Island governor William Vanderbilt.
Some of its more notable members were economist Seymour Harris,
Eleanor Roosevelt, and Harvard University Law Professor Milton Katz.
Although the committee favored the enactment of an effective publicity
law by Congress, it did not devote its resources to lobbying the legisla-
ture directly. Rather, it choose to spend much of its resources supporting
Alexander Heard’s work to study existing campaign finance reports in
order to provide the public and members of Congress with unprece-
dented information on the costs of campaigns and how they were fi-
nanced.13
It therefore fell to the new public interest groups that emerged in
the 1970s, which were devoted to improving government by making it
more representative of the people through above all else ending the cor-
ruption of the electoral process, to actually lobby Congress for the pas-
sage of a bill to reform the nation’s system of electoral financing. The
most famous of these was Common Cause, which was founded in 1970
by President Johnson’s former Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
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fare John Gardner to be a Washington-based lobby for campaign finance
reform. Its activities, such as placing advertisements and op-eds in
newspapers or providing legislators with positions papers, were financed
through gifts solicited from its members who tended to be educated,
middle class professionals. One of the most important contributions
made by Common Cause in the struggle for campaign finance reform was
its use of the class action lawsuit to privately enforce the regulatory stat-
utes. In 1971, it filed a lawsuit in federal district court to enjoin the Re-
publican National Committee (RNC), the Democratic National Committee
(DNC), and the Conservative Party of New York from continuing their
practice of violating the campaign finance laws by creating multiple
committees to raise and spend more money for a single candidate than
was permitted by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the Hatch
Act of 1940. Later that year, the court ruled both that Common Cause
had the right to sue to enforce the law as Congress had provided no
mechanism for its enforcement, and granted its petition to issue an order
requiring that the parties and candidates strictly follow the campaign fi-
nance statutes in the upcoming election.14
All of the work undertaken by policy experts and the public inter-
est groups to provide information about electoral financing and to expose
corruption would have been far less effective if it was not for the renewed
interest of the media in the subject of campaign finance reform. In this
decade, professionally trained journalists began to actively make use of
the growing body of information on campaign finance practices to pres-
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sure politicians for changes in the electoral system through countless
articles and editorials. They also became more aggressive in their own
efforts to uncover and to report on political scandals that demonstrated
how money was undermining republican government. Thus, the 1960s
saw the emergence of a diverse coalition of reformers each of which con-
tributed in their own way to the effort to reform the use of money in elec-
tions. Most importantly, they played a critical role in keeping an issue
that at the time the general public cared little about on the national
agenda by constantly drawing the attention of members of Congress and
the people to the problems they believed were threatening the continued
vitality of democratic government.15
What all the data gathered by these various organizations and in-
dividuals showed, according to the reformers, was that the costs of cam-
paigns were escalating rapidly due to technological innovations, espe-
cially television. This in turn had led parties and candidates to rely in-
creasingly upon wealthy contributors and special interests for campaign
funds, which were now often raised virtually in secret due to the ineffec-
tiveness of the publicity, and more generally the campaign finance, laws.
Hence, this raised grave concerns for the reformers that the wealthy and
organized interests were using their economic resources to unduly
influence the political process. The increasing cost of running for office
also concerned members of Congress, since they feared not only that
they would be unable to raise sufficient funds to run their campaigns,
but more importantly that millionaire candidates might be able to defeat
them by using expensive media-based campaigns. In response to all of
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these concerns, Congress in December of 1971 enacted the first major
federal campaign finance statute since 1925, the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA) of 1971, to strengthen the publicity requirements for
political campaigns and to limit their expenditures on television and ra-
dio broadcasts in an effort to stem the corrupting influence of money on
politics. The statute, however, failed to provide what reformers arguably
felt was most needed to ensure an effective regulatory system: an inde-
pendent agency to monitor compliance with the law and to publicize in-
formation gathered about campaign finances practices.16
However, another important and often unrecognized motivation for
Congressional passage of the FECA of 1971 was probably the outcome of
the class action lawsuit filed by Common Cause regarding the enforce-
ment of the second Hatch Act’s limitations on contributions and expendi-
tures. This decision meant that parties and candidates could not use
multiple committees, as had become their custom, to raise more than $3
million nor could donors circumvent the contribution limit of $5,000 by
dividing their gifts among various committees. This literal interpretation
of the law’s limits meant that presidential, congressional, and other fed-
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eral candidates could spend no more than $9.4 million in 1996 dollars
on their 1972 campaigns, which would make it impossible to run a cam-
paign especially a presidential one. How drastic a reduction in campaign
funds this would have been for the parties and candidates is evidenced
by the fact that the Republicans with the exception of 1892 had never
raised and spent less than about $15 million in a presidential election in
1996 dollars for years in which their receipts and expenditures are avail-
able; while the last time the Democrats had spent so little money in a
campaign was in the 1924 presidential election.17 Thus, politicians in
the wake of this court ruling found themselves suddenly very interested
in reforming the electoral system to ensure they could run adequate
campaigns to preserve their political careers.
Just as the insurance company scandal in the early twentieth cen-
tury confirmed the fears of the early reform liberals that corporations
were buying undue influence in the federal government and generated
public support for reform, the Watergate scandal of the 1972 election
was this generation of reformers defining event. Using their newly estab-
lished right to privately enforce statutes, they actively monitored whether
federal and state candidates were complying with the provisions of the
FECA, and made active use of lawsuits and complaints to bring attention
to violations in an attempt to enforce the law. These efforts of the reform-
ers were vital in not only exposing the Nixon administration’s abuse of
power and its questionable fundraising tactics in the 1972 presidential
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election that were at the center of the Watergate scandal, but more im-
portantly provided unquestionable evidence to the public and to politi-
cians of the ineffectiveness of the existing laws and the necessity of sig-
nificant reforms to prevent money and corruption from further dominat-
ing the political and electoral systems. The information collected by the
reform coalition as well as growing public outrage over the abuses that
had been exposed led Congress in the wake of the Watergate scandal to
pass the FECA of 1974 to utterly revamp the nation’s campaign finance
regulatory structure. Two features of the statute that were especially no-
table were its provisions providing for the public funding of presidential
candidates and an independent commission to enforce the statute, both
of which had long been sought by reformers but never before enacted
into law.18
For both the early liberal reformers and the later ones, laws de-
signed to regulate the use of money in elections were merely the first step
in achieving broader reforms in the political process. They were meant to
allow citizens to once again be able to consent to their government by
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ensuring elections were conducted fairly and honestly to ensure their will
was represented in the decisions made by the government. This required
in their view that elections be decided not by money, but rather the peo-
ple who “having had a reasonably equal opportunity to hear all the can-
didates, then make a rational choice on the basis of their own policy
preferences and personal evaluations of the candidates. Intervening or-
ganizations or persons are suspect. They might obligate the candidates
with political debts or warp the judgment of the electorate thorough the
exercise of additional persuasive power.”19 What distinguishes these two
groups of reformers was who they were and their broader objectives.
The late nineteenth century reform liberals consisted of a variety of
groups and individuals, such as state legislatures, progressive journal-
ists, and advocacy groups, who through their individual, and at times
collective, efforts sought to draw attention to the need to regulate money
in politics. They were loosely bound together by the reforming impulse of
their era that manifested itself in Progressivism and other movements.
Their hope was to use the new electoral laws, as discussed in chapter
two, to create a code of conduct for the citizens in elections that would
restore the legitimacy of republican government by encouraging them to
act upon their civic virtue and political morality in making decisions per-
taining to the future of the polity. In their view, this would ensure that
the people would be able to select leaders who truly represented their
interests and cared for the welfare of the nation.
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In contrast, the reform liberals of the 1960s and 1970s consisted
of advocacy groups, policy experts, professional journalists, and to a
lesser extent members of legislative bodies. They too were largely bound
together only by their common desire to reform the electoral process to
end the corrupting influence of money. While never clearly stated, their
objective in passing campaign finance laws was also to improve represen-
tative government by establishing a new code of electoral conduct. How-
ever, its rules were not designed to encourage moral decisions, but rather
to create a more equitable electoral system that diminished the influence
of the wealthy and interest groups on the decisions of the people and
their legislators, and at the same time enhanced the ability of the citizens
to express their preferences or even run for office themselves. It accom-
plished these goals by providing them with the resources required to un-
dertake these tasks, and by establishing rules to give everyone a fair
chance to speak and to be heard. Only when everyone had relatively
equal political power would the government truly become capable of re-
sponding to the people’s interests and needs.
As in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were
some who questioned whether greater restrictions on the use of money in
elections were appropriate. They tended to be mainly scholars who wrote
in laws reviews, and used them as a forum in which to debate the merits
of such regulation with the reform liberals. This scholarly discussion fo-
cused not on the question of whether the laws would be effective in alter-
ing the behavior of the people as had been the case in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Rather, the criticisms and concerns of op-
ponents of campaign finance reform were now directed at the tendency of
such laws to violate or to interfere with the First Amendment rights to
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freedom of speech, of the press, and of association that were vital to
permitting corporations, labor unions, parties, candidates, and citizens
to participate in the electoral process.
In fact, it may be urged that political expenditures in a democratic soci-
ety serve to implement rather than to obstruct the electoral process. If
rational political decisions are to be made, the electorate must have ac-
cess to factual information and conflicting opinions from all groups . . .
But the furnishing of information is no longer the inexpensive undertak-
ing that it was in Thomas Jefferson’s day . . . With the advent of new
techniques and channels of communication, political costs have risen
steeply . . . To the extent that political expenditures are curtailed, the
education of the American electorate will suffer.20
In their view, the expenditure of money was not corrupting to the elec-
toral process. Rather, it was absolutely essential to enabling candidates
to inform voters about themselves and their policy positions; allowing
competing groups, including organized interests representing large num-
bers of citizens to be able to bring their viewpoints before the government
and the electorate to influence their decisions; and to ensuring that the
citizens were able to make truly informed decisions about who they de-
sired to represent them and what policies they preferred. While oppo-
nents conceded that the government could regulate the use of money in
campaigns, they argued that such restrictions should be minimal, and
targeted at specific evils rather than broad limitations that inhibited le-
gitimate debate about political affairs.21
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There are at least two possible explanations for why in the 1940s
efforts arose to question the merits of campaign finance legislation,
which reflected the reasoning of the pluralist liberalism tradition,
reemerged after being ignored and dismissed for much of the past cen-
tury. One is that it was at least in part a response to the nation’s recent
involvement in World War II, especially its exposure to totalitarian re-
gimes that ruthlessly suppressed any political dissent. And the other,
and probably more significant factor, is the early efforts of the United
States Supreme Court in this decade to shift the focus of its jurispru-
dence to using those freedoms it considered absolutely essential to the
functioning of democracy to limit the powers of Congress rather than
federalism as in the past.22 As the remainder of this chapter details, it
was the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence in regard to the elec-
toral process, especially in the latter part of the twentieth century, that
produced the dramatic changes in the views of the state courts in the
1970s concerning the constitutionality of the campaign finance laws
passed after the Watergate scandal.
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The Federal Courts and Campaign Finance
I. The Scope of Congressional Power Over Elections
In the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the central questions in regard to the electoral process that the Supreme
Court was called upon to adjudicate did not pertain to the effect of stat-
utes on the civil liberties of the citizens. Rather, they focused upon the
extent of Congress’ authority to regulate state elections which influenced
the selection of officers of the national government, especially primary
and presidential elections. Previous decisions of the Court had estab-
lished that the time, places, and manner clause of the national Constitu-
tion gave the states and Congress concurrent authority over state elec-
tions if members of the House of Representatives, the only national offi-
cers directly elected by the people in this era, were selected at the same
time as members of the state governments. This intervention into the af-
fairs of the states was justified in the view of the Court by the necessity
of preserving the national government and the republic itself by ensuring
the integrity of the electoral process. “If this government is anything more
than a mere aggregation of delegated agents of other states and govern-
ments, each of which is superior to the general government, it must have
the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends, from
violence and corruption. If it has not this power, it is left helpless before
the two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, open vio-
lence and insidious corruption.”23 Any conflict that arose between federal
and state laws would be resolved in favor of the former based upon the
Supremacy Clause of the national Constitution. In all other circum-
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stances, state officers were subject exclusively to the authority of the
state governments.24
As Congress began to regulate the use of money in elections, the
question arose as to whether it had the power to control the selection of
presidential and vice-presidential electors as they had been declared by
the Supreme Court to be state officers. Although it was generally believed
that the national legislature had the authority to pass corrupt practices
and publicity laws that applied to presidential elections based upon the
fact that they occurred at the same time as those for members of the
House of Representatives, the issue was not definitively settled until the
Court’s decision in Burroughs and Cannon v. United States in the mid-
1930s. Writing for the majority, Justice Sutherland ruled that Congress
must have the power to regulate the selection of these state officials as
denying it such authority would leave the national government powerless
to ensure its own self-preservation.
The President is vested with the executive power of the nation. The im-
portance of his election and the vital character of its relationship to an
effect upon the welfare and safety of the whole people cannot be too
strongly stated. To say that Congress is without power to pass appropri-
ate legislation to safeguard such an election from the improper use of
money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular
the power of self-preservation. Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that
power, as it possesses every other power essential to preserve the de-
partments and institutions of the general government from impairment
or destruction whether threatened by force or corruption.25
He further argued that such regulations did not interfere with the power
of the states to appoint these electors as they saw fit, and finally that
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only Congress could regulate committees seeking to influence presiden-
tial elections as they generally operated in more than one state.26 Thus,
the Court’s decision effectively established that Congress shared with the
states the responsibility for protecting the integrity of the electoral proc-
ess against fraud, intimidation, or any other form of corruption in elec-
tions involving the selection of both state and federal officers, but that it
had exclusive power to control the activities of interstate committees.
However, whether Congress could regulate intrastate committees
used by candidates in primary elections was unclear. This was a particu-
larly important constitutional question from the perspective of the
Southern states as the answer given by the Supreme Court would effect
their ability to continue to exclude blacks and poor whites from the po-
litical and electoral process. When the issue first came before the Su-
preme Court in the 1920 case of Newberry v. United States, Justice
McReynolds writing for the majority struck down the portion of the fed-
eral Publicity Act of 1910 that applied to primary elections on the
grounds that the states had exclusive authority over contests for the
party nomination and by implication intrastate committees. “We cannot
conclude that authority to control party primaries or conventions for
designating candidates was bestowed on Congress by the grant of power
to regulate the manner of holding elections . . . its exercise of authority
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would interfere with the purely domestic affairs of the state and infringe
upon liberties reserved to the people.”27
In an opinion by Chief Justice White, the four dissenters argued
that the majority in reaching its conclusion had not only interpreted the
powers of Congress too narrowly, but more importantly had failed to
consider the intimate relationship that had developed between the pri-
mary and the general elections. “In the last analysis the contention must
rest upon the proposition that there is such absolute want of relation be-
tween the power of government to regulate the right of the citizen to seek
a nomination for a public office and its authority to regulate the election
after nomination . . . The influence of who is nominated for elective office
upon the result of the election to fill that office is so known of all men
that the proposition may be left to destroy itself by its own statement.”28
Even if Congress lacked the power under the time, places, and manner
clause to regulate primary elections, these justices believed that the nec-
essary and proper clause provided ample authority for the passage of
such laws. To rule otherwise in their view meant exposing the process of
selecting the people’s representatives to all kinds of fraud and imperiled
the existence of the national government.29
Although the Court had appeared to reject in Newberry the notion
that the federal Constitution permitted any kind of interference with
state regulation of primary contests, it shortly thereafter in what became
known as the white primary cases seems to have begun to abandon this
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view. In Nixon v. Hendron (1927), Justice Holmes writing for an unani-
mous Court struck down a 1923 Texas law that barred blacks from vot-
ing in the Democratic primary. However, rather than relying on the Fif-
teenth Amendment to invalidate the law on the grounds that it effectively
disenfranchised blacks as victory in the primary meant certain election
in the South, Holmes chose instead to declare it unconstitutional on the
grounds that it discriminated against blacks and was therefore a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.30
The next case, Nixon v. Condon (1932), arose in response to Texas’
effort to preserve its disenfranchisement of blacks by granting the state
executive committee of the Democratic Party the authority to prescribe
voter qualifications, which promptly passed a resolution limiting voting
in primaries to only whites. Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo de-
clared that this action by the party also violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus was unconstitutional. He
found that the discrimination against blacks was state, not private, ac-
tion that could be reached by the Constitution as the executive party
committee had been invested with the authority to set qualifications for
party membership not by the party convention, but rather the state legis-
lature.31
In an opinion by Justice McReynolds, the dissenters made a final
attempt to defend the view that the parties were private voluntary asso-
ciations. They argued that the state executive party committee did have
the authority to speak for the organization, and that the statute in ques-
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tion merely recognized the inherent power of any voluntary association to
determine its membership. “Political parties are fruits of voluntary ac-
tion. Where there is no unlawful purpose, citizens may create them at
will and limit their membership as seems wise. The State may not inter-
fere. White men may organize; blacks may do likewise. A woman’s party
may exclude males. This much is essential to free government.”32 Hence
for them, the decision of the Democratic executive committee to exclude
blacks was a private action that could not be reached by the federal con-
stitution. This became the position of Justice Roberts writing for an
unanimous Court in Grovey v. Townsend (1935) as the discrimination
against blacks in the primaries arose in this case not through state ac-
tion since Texas had repealed all its primary laws, but rather private ac-
tion taken by the Democratic Party convention.33
Prior to the Court’s final two decisions concerning the validity of
the white primary, it had in United States v. Classic (1941) the opportu-
nity to reconsider the question of whether Congress had the authority to
regulate primary elections. Adopting the reasoning of the Newberry dis-
senters, the majority opinion by Justice Stone, and even that of the dis-
senters by Justice Douglas, upheld the authority of Congress to regulate
primary elections. “The words of Sections 2 and 4 of Article I, read in the
sense which is plainly permissible and in the light of the Constitutional
purpose require us to hold that a primary election which involves a nec-
essary step in the choice of candidate for election of representatives in
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Congress . . . is an election within the meaning of the Constitutional
provision and is subject to Congressional regulation as to the means of
holding it.”34 The Court further noted that such regulation was essential
to protecting the rights of voters, especially in states where winning the
primary election meant almost certain victory in the general contest.35
Thus, the justices effectively overruled their earlier decision in Newberry,
although this was never explicitly stated, and gave Congress concurrent
authority over all state elections and political committees that had the
potential to influence the selection of federal officers.
A further consequence of this ruling was that it effectively under-
mined the Court’s distinction between state and private action that had
been used to sustain the constitutionality of the white primary. In Smith
v. Allwright (1944), Justice Reed writing for the majority abandoned this
position, and instead argued based upon the Classic decision that politi-
cal parties and primary elections were both integral parts of the machin-
ery created by the state to carry out the electoral process. “We think that
this statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on
the general election ballot makes the party which is required to follow
these legislative directions an agency of the State in so far as it deter-
mines the participants in a primary election. The party takes its charac-
ter from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not
become matters of private law because they are performed by a political
party.”36 The implication of this new view of the primaries and parties
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was not only that the Court no longer considered the discrimination
against blacks to be of a private nature, but also that it could apply the
Fifteenth Amendment to end once and for all the white primary as nomi-
nation contests would now be considered a part of the electoral process,
and thus a state function reachable by the Constitution.37
The question of whether discrimination against blacks in the elec-
toral process was state or private action was only definitively settled,
however, in the last of the white primary cases Terry v. Adams (1953).
Eight justices reached the conclusion, although for very different rea-
sons, that the Jaybird Democratic Association, a self-governing, volun-
tary club solely for white voters in Fort Bend County, Texas, was per-
forming a public function by holding an unofficial primary to endorse
candidates for the Democratic Party primary. Hence, its activities could
be reached and prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment as they consti-
tuted state action. Justice Black joined by Douglas and Burton reached
this conclusion on the grounds that since the Jaybird Association’s in-
ception in 1889 virtually all victorious candidates in the Democratic
Party primary and general election had won this unofficial primary. Thus
in their view, the Jaybird primary represented an effort supported by the
state to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment, and deprive blacks of the
ability to influence the political affairs of the county. While Justice
Frankfurter argued that the participation of state election officials in the
unofficial primary, usually by voting in it, represented the acquiescence
of the state in an attempt to circumvent the Constitution by predetermin-
ing the results of the legal, state sponsored primary. And Justice Clark
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joined by Jackson, Reed, and Vinson believed that the Jaybird Demo-
cratic Association was an auxiliary organization of the state regulated
Democratic Party, and therefore was a public, not a private, organization
whose activities must comply with the Constitution. Only Justice Minton
dissented from the decision arguing that the Democratic Jaybird Asso-
ciation was merely a pressure group, which in no way received or sought
support from the state. Therefore, the Fifteenth Amendment was not
applicable to its unofficial primary as this was a private action under-
taken by individuals.38
For the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century and the first
part of the twentieth century, the central question in cases involving
electoral laws was not freedom of speech but rather federalism and racial
discrimination. Through their rulings, the justices established that Con-
gress could pass corrupt practices and publicity acts to preserve the in-
tegrity of the national government although it is not entirely clear what
clauses of the Constitution they viewed as giving it such authority. Their
opinions suggest that the three most likely sources of Congressional
power were: the interstate commerce clause (political committees operat-
ing in two or more states); the time, places, and manner clause, and the
necessary and proper clause. What the Court did establish beyond any
doubt is that Congress’ regulatory authority was limited by federalism as
it could only intervene in state elections if the use of money would in
some manner influence the selection of federal candidates or if the states
lacked the authority to regulate the actions of certain political commit-
tees.
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Racial discrimination was the other major theme of the Court’s
electoral decisions, and was inseparable from questions pertaining to
federalism and the nature of political parties. In responding to these is-
sues, the Court, like the state judges, increasingly came to recognize that
the electoral process was not a private function carried out by individuals
operating through parties and to a lesser extent pressure groups as it
arguably had been for much of the nineteenth century. It was now a
state function that required the establishment of constitutional stan-
dards to not only govern the extent of this regulatory authority, but also
to protect the rights of citizens, especially blacks, to freely participate in
the electoral process as it was the primary means through which they
gave their consent to the actions of the government. Who would be re-
sponsible for the development and the enforcement of these new stan-
dards was unclear at this time. However, after the constitutional revolu-
tion of 1937 as will be discussed more fully below, this duty increasingly
fell to the Supreme Court rather than to Congress or the state legisla-
tures as in the past. Hence, its efforts to bring the Southern states into
conformity with the guarantees of the Constitution in regard to the civil
and political rights of blacks, especially its two decisions in the 1940s,
are perhaps best understood as an early attempt to assert its role as the
final arbiter of the meaning of the fundamental law to enforce its defini-
tion of the rights of the citizens. Equally important these decisions
helped to establish the boundary between public and private actions in
the electoral arena, and hence began to delimit the scope of the state’s
power over parties, money, candidates, and other aspects of the electoral
process.
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II. Other Restrictions on Congressional Power Over Elections
There were extraordinarily few federal cases in the early twentieth
century, in fact probably only two, in which the federal courts were called
upon to construe campaign finance laws in response to a challenge that
they violated the federal Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech.
This probably stemmed from the fact that the states, not the federal gov-
ernment, were the primary guardians of the people’s liberties, and the
general hostility of the courts to such claims in this era as previously
noted.
The first was United States v. Curtis (1882) in which the defendant
argued that the 1876 ban on executive officials or government employees
not appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate
from giving or receiving contributions for political purposes from other
government employees violated the First Amendment. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Waite gave little attention to this argument in his
opinion merely noting that the law did not impose a total prohibition as it
still allowed these civil service workers to receive money from non-gov-
ernment officials or to give it to them. He upheld the statute as the latest
installment in a series of Congressional enactments passed under the
necessary and proper clause since 1789 that were designed  “to promote
efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain
proper discipline in the public service.”39 While the primary purpose of
the law in question was to prevent arbitrary dismissals from the service
for the failure to make a contribution, the Court noted that it served
other valuable purposes. These included improving the quality of the civil
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service by preventing the dismissal of good and honest men who refused
to pay assessments, and preventing the party in power from perpetuating
its hold on the government by using public funds to indirectly finance its
campaigns.40
The lone dissenter in this case, Justice Bradley, acknowledged that
Congress had the authority to prohibit the assessment of civil service
workers, and more generally to regulate the use of money in elections.
However, the method it chose to accomplish that end could not interfere
with the right of the citizens to actively participate in the electoral and
political process.
Among the necessary and proper means for promoting political views or
any other views are association and contribution of money for that pur-
pose both to aid discussion and to disseminate information and sound
doctrine . . . The freedom of speech and of the press and that of assem-
bling together to consult upon and discuss matters of public interest and
to join in petitioning for a redress of grievances are expressly secured by
the constitution. The spirit of this clause covers and embraces the right
of every citizen to engage in such discussions and to promote the views
of himself and his associates freely, without being trammeled by incon-
venient restrictions.41
Hence, the 1876 law in his opinion was unconstitutional since the means
Congress had chosen to achieve its goal of purifying elections prevented
citizens from exercising their fundamental rights.42 This argument was
unique for its time, and reflects the reasoning of the pluralist liberal tra-
dition that the Court would adopt almost a century later in construing
the validity of campaign finance laws.
The other case involving a First Amendment challenge to Congres-
sional authority to regulate money in elections was United States v.
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United States Brewers Association (1916) in which several corporations
were indicted for making contributions to congressional candidates in
contravention of the Tillman Act of 1907. Before a federal district court,
they argued that the indictments should be dismissed as Congress had
no power to pass such a law, and furthermore that it violated their right
to freedom of speech and of the press. The court rejected this argument
on the grounds that the statute in question in no way implicated these
rights, but rather was a judgment on the part of Congress as to the pro-
priety of such gifts.
[A]n election is intended to be the free and untrammeled choice of the
electors; that any interference with the right of the elector to make up his
mind how he will vote is as much as interference with his right to vote as
if prevented from depositing his ballot; that the concerted use of money
is one of the many dangerous agencies in corrupting the elector and de-
bauching the election; that any law the purpose of which is to enable a
free and intelligent choice, and an untrammeled expression of that
choice in the ballot box, is a regulation of the manner of holding the elec-
tions—the power of Congress to prohibit corporations of the state from
making money contributions in connection with any such election ap-
pears to follow as a natural and necessary consequence . . .  The section
itself neither prevents nor purports to prohibit, the freedom of speech or
of the press. Its purpose is to guard elections from corruption, and the
electorate from corrupting influences in arriving at their choice.”43
Like the state court in Gansley, the federal court viewed corporations as
artificial organizations who were organized for specific purposes defined
by Congress or the state legislatures. The right to participate in elections
was not among them, and furthermore the legislature had the authority
to bar their participation if in its judgment this would endanger the pu-
rity of the electoral process as Congress had done in this case. Hence,
the Tillman Act was an appropriate exercise of Congress’ power under
the time, places, and manner clause, especially given that only it could
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control contributions to federal candidates or to political committees
operating in more than one state.44
Thus, at neither level of government in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were constitutional rights, especially those per-
taining to freedom of speech, of the press, and of association, viewed by
the courts as limitations upon the power of the legislatures to regulate
the electoral process. Although there were extraordinarily few federal
cases pertaining to this issue, the national courts, like the state ones,
seem to have deferred to the judgment of Congress regarding the neces-
sity of these regulations. Their willingness to do so at a time when they
were otherwise trying to restrict the national legislature’s power over the
economy and private actors may have been due to either the fact that
they viewed these statutes to be ones pertaining to the political system
and hence their necessity was properly left to the judgment of the legisla-
ture; or were influenced by the arguments of the reform liberals to some
extent; or perhaps some combination of the two.
III. Labor Unions and the Taft-Hartley Act
The next opportunity the Supreme Court had to consider a First
Amendment challenge to a campaign finance law came more than fifty
years after its decision in Curtis. In the 1948 case of United States v. CIO,
the Congress of Industrial Organizations argued that its indictment for
violating the Taft-Hartley Act’s prohibition on the use of labor monies in
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federal elections should be dismissed. The CIO, which had been charged
with violating the law for publishing a political editorial in its newspaper
concerning a congressional candidate that was then distributed to its
members and to the general public, contended that the law was an un-
constitutional infringement upon its First Amendment rights. Arguing
that it was the duty of the Court to avoid if at all possible declaring a
statute unconstitutional, Justice Reed writing for the majority quashed
the indictment. He did so on the ground that Congress could never have
intended to include the activities alleged in it within the scope of the
statue’s prohibition as the legislature “did not want to pass any legisla-
tion that would threaten inferences with the privileges of speech or press
or that would undertake to supersede the Constitution.”45 To hold other-
wise, the justices felt would raise grave doubts as to the validity of the
law. Nor did such activities in their view undermine the other purpose of
the statute, which was to protect the rights of dissenting union members
and corporate stockholders. These individuals were well aware, the jus-
tices argued, that the regular publication of periodicals advocating can-
didates and policies were normal organizational activities.46
For many people, including the dissenting justices, the majority
had avoided the constitutional issue by simply rewriting the law. In an
opinion by Justice Rutledge, the dissenters argued that the statute had
been intended to prohibit all political activity by labor unions and corpo-
rations, and that such a patently unconstitutional law should be struck
down. “A statute which, in the claimed interest of free and honest elec-
                                                
45 United States vs. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U. S. 106 (1948), 120.
46 United States vs. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 108-112, 115-124; Epstein,
21-23; Tanenhaus, 456-459; Clover, 567; Mager, 347-348; Lane, 730-731.
145
tions, curtails the very freedoms that make possible exercise of the fran-
chise by an informed and thinking electorate, and does this by indis-
criminate blanketing of every expenditure made in connection with an
election, serving as a prior restraint upon expression not in fact forbid-
den as well as upon what is, cannot be squared with the First Amend-
ment.”47 Adopting the same position as Justice Bradley in Curtis, they
acknowledged that Congress had the authority to pass laws designed to
prevent the corruption of the electoral process, but that the means cho-
sen to accomplish this objective had to be narrowly drawn to avoid violat-
ing the fundamental rights of groups and individuals.48
Over the next decade, the question of whether the ban on labor
union contributions and expenditures in federal elections was constitu-
tional remained squarely before the federal courts. In United States v.
Painters Local, a union challenged its conviction for using monies from its
general treasury to pay for radio and television broadcasts in support of
congressional candidates partly on First Amendment grounds. In over-
turning the conviction, the federal district court argued that as in the
CIO case the expenditures had been designed to allow the union to com-
municate with its members. As the union had no newspaper of its own “a
publication in the daily press or by radio was as natural a way of com-
municating its views to its members as by a newspaper of its own.”49
And the expenditure of this money did not in the view of the court violate
the rights of minority members as it been duly approved by a meeting of
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all union members. The court refused to address the constitutional issue
merely noting that as these activities were similar to those in CIO, they
too must be outside the ban if the law was to be upheld. Similarly, an-
other federal district court in United States v. Construction General
avoided addressing the question of whether the law violated the rights of
a labor union to freedom of speech and of the press in overturning its
conviction for political activities that appeared targeted at a particular
congressional candidate. The judge simply noted that Congress could not
have intended to prohibit patriotic activities, such as registering voters
and getting out the vote, through the Taft-Hartley Act’s ban.50
The controversy returned to the Supreme Court in the 1957 case of
United States v. UAW-CIO in which a union challenged its indictment un-
der the law for financing television broadcasts advocating the election of
certain congressional candidates as violating its First Amendment liber-
ties. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter distinguished this case
from CIO on the grounds that the expenditures were targeted at the gen-
eral public rather than just members of the union. “Thus unlike the un-
ion-sponsored political broadcast in this case, the communication for
which the defendants were indicated in CIO was neither directed nor de-
livered to the public at large. The organization merely distributed its
house organ to its own people. The evil at which Congress has struck in
§313 is the use of corporate or union dues to influence the public at
large to vote for a particular candidate or particular party.”51 However,
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he did not dispose of the case by ruling on whether this was a valid ex-
ercise of Congress’ power given the restrictions of the First Amendment,
but rather remanded it for trial as the union would have to be convicted
of violating the law before it had standing to challenge its
constitutionality.52
As in the CIO case, the dissenters in an opinion by Justice Douglas
criticized the majority for failing to perform their duty, and strike down a
statute that clearly infringed upon the fundamental right of labor unions
and others to freedom of speech.
Until today political speech has never been considered a crime. The mak-
ing of a political speech up to now has always been one of the preferred
rights protected by the First Amendment. It usually costs money to
communicate an idea to a large audience . . . Nor can the fact that it
costs money to make a speech—whether it be hiring a hall or purchasing
time on the air—make the speech any the less an exercise of First
Amendment rights. Yet this statute, as construed and applied in this in-
dictment, makes criminal any ‘expenditure’ by a union for the purpose of
expressing its views on the issues of an election and the candidates.53
In their view, the right to free speech in elections was so vital to the
functioning of the democratic process that any Congressional regulation
of it was suspect. Only a law that was precisely targeted at the evil of
money in elections and chose the least restrictive means to deal with that
problem should survive judicial scrutiny.54
These decisions of the federal courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, in the 1940s and the 1950s reflect a profound transformation in
the understanding of who was to be responsible for securing the liberties
of the citizens as well as in how they were to be protected. Whereas in
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the past the federal courts had generally deferred to the judgment of
Congress when questions arose over how best to protect the rights of the
people, they now began to more actively assert their authority to decide if
the national legislature had acted appropriately. Furthermore, their de-
cisions were increasingly based upon the federal Bill of Rights, which
foreclosed any additional debate within the political process over these
liberties, and made the courts, not Congress, the final arbiter of their
meaning.55
The source of this change was arguably the constitutional revolu-
tion of 1937, which marked the end of the Court’s efforts to restrain
Congressional power to intervene in the economy and society. And the
beginning of its attempts, as famously stated in footnote four of the Caro-
line Products decision, to protect the civil and political rights of the citi-
zens, especially those of minorities or that pertained to the political proc-
ess, against the broad powers of the federal government. This was to be
accomplished by enforcing the provisions of the Bill of Rights, and sub-
jecting statutes affecting these individuals or processes to greater judicial
scrutiny. The scope of this judicial revolution, however, was still very
limited in the mid-twentieth century for three reasons. First, the states
remained the guardians of most of the fundamental liberties of the citi-
zens. Second, state legislatures continued to be primarily responsible for
defining how those rights would be protected. And third, the state courts
still relied upon common law doctrines in reaching their decisions.56
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Still, this transformation of the Court’s jurisprudence was arguably
significant as it marked the beginning of the end of the hegemony that
the reform liberals had enjoyed in the area of electoral regulation since
the turn of the twentieth century. Up until this time, the unwillingness of
federal and state courts to question the judgment of the legislatures, as
well as the lack of strong support for a competing interpretation of the
fundamental principle of government by consent that was found in re-
publican liberalism, had allowed them the freedom to define why and
how the use of money in elections was problematic, and impose their
solutions to this issue on the country. With its incorporation into the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the alternative understanding of
government by consent grounded in pluralist liberalism, which had al-
ways existed in some form, found new support and legitimacy. Following
Madison’s argument against the Sedition Acts, those who followed the
reasoning of this variant of liberalism argued that the people could only
truly consent to their government if they were given the freedom to act
upon their own preferences subject only to minimal governmental
restraints. It placed its emphasis therefore on using rights to restrain the
government and to allow the people to act as they pleased; in contrast to
the reform liberalism tradition that believed rights could only be properly
exercised within the context of a clearly established code of conduct to
ensure they were used to make moral or fair decisions.
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IV. The States and the Federal Bill of Rights
It was not until the era of the Warren Court in the 1960s that the
electoral law jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, and more fundamen-
tally its new understanding of its role to safeguard the people’s liberties,
would have an impact upon the state legislatures and courts. Two sets of
decisions of the Court in this decade related to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would have significant implications for how federal and state courts
would construe any new campaign finance statutes. The first were those
concerning the federal Bill of Rights and the Due Process Clause, par-
ticularly freedom of speech; and the second pertained to its decisions re-
garding the equal protection clause and the political process.
Although the Court as early as 1897 in the case of Chicago B & Q
R. R. v. Chicago had begun to apply the provisions of the federal Bill of
Rights to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the doctrine of incorporation was only sporadically used in
the Court’s jurisprudence until the 1960s. During that decade, the War-
ren Court through its rulings completed the process of establishing that
the limitations placed by the Bill of Rights upon the national government
were equally applicable to the state governments as part of its effort to
provide broader protection for the liberties of the citizens by constraining
the power of government at all levels.
Over the past two decades, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States have returned to the fundamental promises wrought by
the blood of those who fought our War between the States, promises
which were thereafter embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment—that the
citizens of all our states are also and no less citizens of our United
States, that this birthright guarantees our federal constitutional liberties
against encroachment by governmental action at any level of our federal
system, and that each of us is entitled to due process of law and equal
protection of the laws from our state governments no less than our na-
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tional one . . . state courts no less than federal are and ought to be
guardians of our liberties.57
In the Court’s view, its intrusion into the affairs of the states was justi-
fied by the failure of the state courts to protect the rights of their citizens
from pervasive invasions by the state legislatures and executives. Per-
haps one of the significant consequences of this doctrine was that it
eradicated federalism, which had served as a means of giving the states
the freedom to experiment with different policies and standards than
those of the national government. By extending the protections of the Bill
of Rights to the citizens of the states, the Supreme Court assumed re-
sponsibility for creating uniform standards to govern the actions of the
state and federal legislatures and courts to ensure that the rights of the
citizens were properly protected from unwarranted governmental en-
croachments.58
Few rights were more precious and fundamental, or more threat-
ened by arbitrary governmental action, for the Warren Court than those
guaranteed by the First Amendment. In several of their opinions, the
justices repeatedly emphasized that it was these liberties that made pos-
sible democratic government by allowing the citizens to influence the
electoral and political process by expressing and debating their views on
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the critical issues of the day and the candidates. Perhaps one of the best
expressions of this view can be found in Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) in
which Justice Brennan writing for the majority reiterated the principle
established in New York v. Sullivan (1964) that citizens should be able to
freely criticize their public officials without fear of being prosecuted for
libel if they made misleading statements.
For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the essence of self-government. The First and Fourteenth Amendments
embody our ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that
it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.’59
Since freedom of speech, of the press, and of association were in the view
of the Court so fundamental to ensuring the openness and responsive-
ness of the political system, the justices were willing to tolerate only the
most minimal interference with them by the state and federal govern-
ments. Any statute that chilled these rights by threatening individuals
with punishment if they exercised them was struck down as unconstitu-
tional since it interfered with the robust debate required for democratic
government. Only those laws that respected the First Amendment rights
of the citizens by leaving them breathing space, i.e. narrowly drawn laws
that precisely targeted the evil the legislature sought to address through
the least restrictive means available, would be upheld by the Court.60
This belief of the justices that the First Amendment liberties were
so vital to the electoral process that few, if any restrictions, could be im-
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posed on them first directly affected state campaign finance laws in the
1966 case of Mills v. Alabama. The Alabama Supreme Court had upheld
the conviction of a newspaper editor who had violated the state’s corrupt
practices law by publishing an editorial on election day urging the people
to vote for particular candidates and measures. Following decades of
precedent, the state court had rejected the contention that the law vio-
lated the state constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech and of the
press on the grounds that it was a reasonable exercise of the state’s po-
lice power. Writing for the majority, Justice Black overruled the state
court’s decision, and struck down that provision of the corrupt practices
act as violating the First Amendment of the federal Constitution by deny-
ing the citizens of the state the ability to exercise those rights that were
fundamental to their ability to participate in the electoral process.
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major pur-
pose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of govern-
mental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, struc-
tures and forms of government, the manner in which government is op-
erated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political
processes. The Constitution specifically selected the press, which in-
cludes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble
leaflets and circulars, to play an important role in the discussion of pub-
lic affairs. Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful
antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a con-
stitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people re-
sponsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve . . . The Ala-
bama Corrupt Practices Act by providing criminal penalties for publish-
ing editorials such as the one here silences the press at a time when it
can be most effective. It is difficult to conceive of a more obvious and fla-
grant abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the
press.61
Even the concurring and dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and
Harlan respectively, which focused on the issue of the propriety of the
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Court rendering a decision before the state court had reached a final
judgment, believed the law to be unconstitutional.62 Thus, all the jus-
tices agreed that the state statute was invalid and differed only on the
question of whether federalism required them to temporarily defer to the
authority of the state courts. The Court’s resounding answer was that
the protection of the fundamental rights of the citizens trumped any con-
cerns about state sovereignty.
The other major component of the Warren Court’s jurisprudence
that had the potential to influence judicial views of campaign finance
legislation at both the state and the federal level were its decisions in re-
gard to equality in the political process. Its position upon this issue was
aptly summarized in the case of Reynolds v. Sims (1964), which dealt
with the question of whether the plan enacted by the state of Alabama to
redistrict its legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren ar-
gued that the right to vote was arguably the most fundamental right in a
democratic society as it was the primary means by which citizens could
influence their government and protect their other rights.
But representative government is in essence self-government through the
medium of elected representatives of the people, and each and every citi-
zen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the po-
litical processes of his State’s legislative bodies. Most citizens can
achieve this participation only as qualified voters through the election of
legislators to represent them. Full and effective participation by all citi-
zens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an
equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legisla-
ture.63
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The right of the citizens to such participation, according to the Court,
was protected by the Equal Protection Clause, which required that all
citizens not only be equally represented, but also have their votes
counted equally with those of all other citizens who chose members of
the legislature. Anything that interfered with the establishment of this
standard of equality would be treated by the Court as arbitrary and in-
vidious discrimination that would be struck down as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.64
Based upon this standard of absolute egalitarianism, the justices
both before and after Reynolds struck down state measures they believed
diluted this fundamental right of the citizens. Among the more famous
decisions were: Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds that prohibited popu-
lation disparities and the use of geographical subdivisions to create state
legislative districts; Westberry v. Sanders (1964), which extended the lat-
ter principle to the establishment of federal congressional districts; Gary
v. Sanders (1963), which invalidated a system of counting votes in Geor-
gia that gave more weight to votes cast in rural counties; and Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections that banned measures, such as the poll tax,
that prevented citizens from voting, and hence having their votes counted
equally, solely based on their economic status.65
What precisely the impact of the Warren Court’s developing juris-
prudence on freedom of speech and equality would be on campaign fi-
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nance legislation remained unclear at this time. It never had the oppor-
tunity to pass upon the constitutionality of this kind of legislation, espe-
cially the state corrupt practices acts that brought into conflict its goals
of promoting equality and freedom of speech (Mills concerned solely a
specific provision of such a law, not the entire law and its underlying
principles). On the one hand, it seemed that the Court was amply pre-
pared to support the goal of the reform liberals to create a more just and
fair representative process by equalizing the resources available to the
citizens, and diminishing the influence of money. This would be a logical
extension of the principle developed in its equal protection clause cases:
one man, one vote, one dollar. On the other hand, however, the achieve-
ment of this goal would require it to abandon both its suspicion of
governmental power and its unwillingness to uphold significant restric-
tions upon the right to free speech that it believed hampered the public
discussion of political affairs that was vital to the democratic process.
Hence, in addressing any case relating to campaign finance both
the federal and state courts would now be faced with the problem of how
to reconcile, if possible, the reform and pluralist strains of liberalism.
According to the Warren Court, each made an important contribution to
a representative government created by the consent of the people. Reform
liberalism suggested the need for the adoption of community standards
that would ensure government by consent by equalizing relative political
power to ensure the citizens were properly represented and able to influ-
ence the political process through their ballots. The achievement of such
a state could mean among other things severely restricting the use of
money in elections, and the use of particular liberties. While pluralist
liberalism’s emphasis on freedom from governmental restraints was es-
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sential to preventing governmental intervention with the free discussion
of public affairs, and the right to criticize one’s representatives that al-
lowed the people to best express their preferences.
The Judicial Revolution of the 1970s
A full discussion of the new constitutional era that emerged in the
1970s and the response of the Supreme Court to the dilemma presented
by the Warren Court’s jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this study. A
glimpse into its impact on the jurisprudence of the state and federal
courts can be seen, however, through a series of cases that arose in Mas-
sachusetts concerning the right of corporations to make expenditures in
support of or in opposition to ballot initiatives. At this time, state law al-
lowed corporations to make contributions or expenditures in elections if
a referendum question “materially” affected their property or business
interests. In 1972, the legislature amended this provision by stipulating
that no question presented “to the voters concerning the taxation of in-
come, property, or individual transactions shall be deemed to materially
affect the property, business or assets of the corporation.”66
In First National Bank v. Attorney General I (1972), the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court ruled that the amendment to the law was an un-
constitutional infringement upon the corporations’ right to freedom of
speech and of the press. “Although a corporation’s expression on political
issues is subject to some restraint, we hold that in the absence of a com-
pelling State [sic] interest showing that any amount of corporate expres-
sion, however small, on election questions results in undue influence
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over the electoral process, corporations may not be totally prohibited
from expressing their views on issues that materially affect them.”67 In
its view, the sole purpose of the legislature in passing the statute had
been to exclude corporations from the debate over the upcoming referen-
dum concerning the implementation of a graduated income tax on both
individuals and other entities, such as businesses. Without such a pro-
vision, corporations would have had the right to participate under Mas-
sachusetts law in the election as a change in the tax structure would ma-
terially affect their property and business interests.68
A few years later, the state legislature again sought to modify the
statute regulating corporate participation in referendum elections. This
time the revised law stated that no question “submitted to the voters
solely concerning the taxation of the income, property, or transactions of
individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business, or
assets of the corporations.”69 In First National Bank v. Attorney General II
(1977), the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the contention that
this amendment to the law violated the corporation’s right to freedom of
speech under the federal and state constitutions. “It seems clear to [us]
that a corporation does not have the same First Amendment rights to
free speech as those of a natural person, but whether its rights are des-
ignated ‘liberty’ rights or ‘property’ rights, a corporation’s property and
business interests are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.”70
As the corporation’s speech and other activities were entitled to constitu-
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tional protection only to the extent they related directly to their business
interests, the legislature was justified in passing a law to exclude them
from participating in a referendum election that concerned individuals
and that had no material impact on their property. Furthermore, the
court argued that corporations could still participate in such elections
through the distribution of in house publications, statements to the
press, or any other method that did not involve the expenditure of corpo-
rate funds.71
While in the past the decision of a state supreme court on the con-
stitutionality of a campaign finance law would have been final, the ex-
panded influence and role of the federal courts in defending the liberties
of the citizens in the latter part of the twentieth century now provided a
venue in which the opinions of these highest courts could be challenged.
Consequently, the losers in the Massachusetts case, the corporations,
subsequently appealed the ruling against them to the United States Su-
preme Court, which overturned the judgment of the state court in the
case of First National Bank v. Bellotti (1978).
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell rejected the reasoning of
the state court that the liberty granted to corporations differed from that
given to natural persons. He further noted that the kind of speech at
stake in this case, that pertaining to the discussion of political and
public affairs, was precisely the kind that the First Amendment and the
Due Process Clause had been designed to protect.
It is the type of speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,
and this no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather
than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its ca-
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pacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source . . . the liberty of speech and of the press which the First Amend-
ment guarantees against abridgment by the federal government is within
the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by state action.72
Having determined that corporate speech was accorded the full protec-
tion of the First Amendment, Justice Powell then turned to an examina-
tion of whether the state had a compelling reason to interfere with these
fundamental rights that would compel the Court to uphold the statute.
Massachusetts had argued that the law was justified on two grounds: 1)
the necessity of preventing the corruption of the electoral process, and 2)
protecting the rights of shareholders who disagreed with the views of
management on political and social issues. Neither reason was convinc-
ing to the Court, which dismissed the first by noting that unlike in parti-
san elections no evidence existed that the expenditure of corporate funds
on statewide ballot initiative elections resulted in corruption. And the
second was rejected on the grounds that the statute seemed to protect
shareholders’ rights only in the context of referendum elections. It failed,
for instance, to prevent corporations from forcing their views on them
when they engaged in lobbying. Thus, the Court ruled that the law was
an unconstitutional infringement of the corporation’s First Amendment
rights and therefore void.73
Joining an opinion by Justice White, Justice Brennan dissented
from the majority opinion arguing that the First Amendment had been
intended to promote and to protect public discussion about political af-
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fairs solely among individual citizens.74 It had never been intended that a
similar level of protection would be accorded to efforts by corporations to
influence the political and the electoral process.
Any communication of ideas, and consequently any expenditure of funds
which makes the communication of ideas possible, it can be argued, fur-
thers the purposes of the First Amendment. This proposition does not
establish, however, that the right of the general public to receive com-
munications financed by means of corporate expenditures is of the same
dimension as that to hear other forms of expression. In the first place . . .
corporate expenditures designed to further political causes lack the con-
nection with individual self-expression which is one of the principal jus-
tifications for the constitutional protection of speech provided by the
First Amendment. Ideas which are not the product of individual choice
are entitled to less First Amendment protection. Secondly, the restriction
of corporate speech concerned with political matters impinges much less
severely upon the availability of ideas to the general public than do re-
strictions upon individual speech. Even the complete curtailment of cor-
porate communications concerning political or ideological questions not
integral to day-to-day business functions would leave individuals . . . free
to communicate their thoughts. Moreover, it is unlikely that any signifi-
cant communication would be lost by such a prohibition.75
Furthermore, the state had demonstrated in the dissenters’ view that it
had compelling reasons to pass such a law. Namely, the necessity of pre-
venting these artificial entities from using their massive wealth to unduly
influence the electoral process and to force their political and social views
upon their shareholders. If corporations wished to participate in referen-
dum elections not pertaining directly to their material business interests,
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they could still do so by relying upon individuals associated with the
company.76
It is interesting to note that in this case, the liberal justices aban-
doned their earlier willingness seen in the cases pertaining to labor un-
ions to uphold a broad interpretation of the First Amendment similar to
that put forth by Justice Bradley in the late nineteenth century. Unlike
their conservative colleagues, they refused to accept the idea that corpo-
rate speech was just as valuable and worthy of protection as speech by
individuals or other organizations. The differing conclusions reached by
the liberal justices in these cases during the latter part of the twentieth
century can perhaps be explained by their belief that there were funda-
mental differences between corporations and labor unions as the latter
had long argued. “[C]orporations are state-created entities deriving funds
from widespread ownership and business interests; they are not associa-
tions of individuals formed to promote common group interests through
social, educational, political and other means.”77 Thus in the view of the
justices, labor unions were not economic organizations designed to
amass wealth, but rather another means by which citizens joined to-
gether to collectively express their views upon the issues of the day.
Echoing the reasoning of the state courts in Gansley and other decisions
pertaining to corporate funds in the nineteenth century, these justices
continued to believe that artificial entities designed to achieve economic
purposes, i.e. corporations, had a very limited right to participate in poli-
tics.
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Thus for the liberal justices, the right to equally participate in the
electoral process and to speak freely belonged solely to individuals or or-
ganizations they created to represent themselves in the electoral process.
It did not belong to those who like corporations had the potential to
transform their economic power into excessive political influence to the
determent of the citizens. Hence, their solution to the dilemma posed by
the Warren Court’s jurisprudence was to exclude the “powerful” from the
protections offered by the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in favor of empowering the citizens
who they believed would otherwise be marginalized and unable to influ-
ence their own government through the electoral process. Arguably
therefore, these justices ultimately came to favor the agenda of the re-
form liberals as they sought to have the state control who could partici-
pate and under what circumstances in elections rather than leaving
those choices to be determined by the actions and preferences of indi-
viduals and others operating within the confines of the political system.
Conclusion
In the 1960s and 1970s, the changes in electoral law that had
been precipitated by the constitutional revolution of 1937 reached their
culmination when the Supreme Court’s understanding of the courts and
the bills of rights as the primary guardians of the citizens’ liberties was
made applicable to the state legislatures and courts. This new constitu-
tional era differed from the previous one in at least three important ways
that would shape the new statutes passed in the wake of the Watergate
scandal to regulate the use of money in politics. First, the federal courts
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and the state courts, which increasingly operated under the direction of
the former, were now seeking to limit, not expand as in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, the power of their respective gov-
ernments by enforcing the limitations of the national and state bills of
rights. They were especially concerned it seems to protect the First
Amendment rights of individuals, and to a certain extent that of other
organizations as seen above, to freedom of speech and of the press that
were critical to their ability to participate in the electoral process.78
Second, the decisions of the courts were no longer based primarily
upon common law doctrines, but instead on the state and federal consti-
tutions as they were no longer willing to trust the political system to pro-
tect the people’s liberties.79 The former practice had made rights
malleable by allowing the state legislatures, the people, and the courts to
engage in an ongoing debate over how best to preserve, or to implement,
them as they had done in the early twentieth century when considering
new regulations to control money in politics. As courts came to increas-
ingly base their rulings on constitutional provisions, the second
generation of reform liberals found it much more difficult to implement
statutes that eliminated corruption, i.e. inequality of resources and op-
portunities to participate in the political process that affected the politi-
cal power of the citizens, as rights had static definitions. Their only op-
tions were to either to design laws that accorded with judicial under-
standings of these liberties and respected the limitations placed upon
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their ability to regulate them, or engage in the difficult task of convincing
the Court to alter its existing interpretation of the Constitution.
And third, although the Supreme Court has assumed
responsibility for determining whether campaign finance, and electoral
laws more generally, violated the liberties of the citizens, it has not suc-
cessfully reconciled the tension that developed between pluralist and re-
form liberalism under the Warren Court. The state courts in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not have to contend with
this problem as they unequivocally chose to support the arguments ad-
vanced by the state legislatures and reform liberals. This allowed for the
development of relatively clear doctrines to govern the actions of legisla-
tures and their own decisions. In contrast, the modern era has been
characterized by the failure of the Court to adequately delineate the
limits of the regulatory authority of the legislatures as it struggles to re-
solve the tension between pluralist liberalism’s demand for minimal
government regulation with reform liberalism’s desire to create a “better”
electoral process through governmental regulation. At times the Court
has favored freedom of speech as in First National Bank and Buckley v.
Valeo (1976) by striking down campaign finance laws; while in other in-
stances, such as McConnell v. FEC (2002), granting the government
broad power to control the use of money in elections even if it interferes
with fundamental rights. It is this continuing struggle both within the
Court and in the broader political system between opponents and propo-
nents of regulation that defines the campaign finance debate today. Par-
ticularly, the question of to what extent legislative power should be used,
if at all, to protect the rights of the citizens in order to fulfill republican
liberalism’s promise of a government by consent.
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5 Money, Politics, and Democracy
From the early days of Massachusetts Bay to the triumphs of prohibi-
tions and beyond, one American reaction to the discovery of evil in the
Church or State has always been to proclaim, “There ought to be a law
against it.”1
The debate over campaign finance from its early days in the nine-
teenth century to the present has centered around the issue of what is
required to fulfill the principle of government by consent that is part of
republican liberalism. Pluralist and reform liberals have proposed radi-
cally different answers to this question based upon their particular un-
derstandings of government, rights, and the character of the people and
society.
For pluralist liberalism, government by consent has meant, as
Madison argued, the freedom of the people in elections to act upon their
own preferences, whether they be selfish or patriotic, in deciding which
candidates and parties they will support. It views the electoral process as
the means by which the people can gain information about their govern-
ment and those seeking public office by engaging in a public debate with
others over the merits and demerits of particular policies and candidates.
The proper role of the state, in its view, is to restrain those individuals
who harm the right of others to express their preferences by engaging in
illegal activities, such as fraud or intimidation.
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century, it was this under-
standing of consent that governed the actions of the states and the fed-
eral government taken to regulate the elections. The latter could do little
                                                
1 H. G. Nicholas, “Political Parties and the Law in the United States,” Political Studies,
vol. 2, no. 3 (Oct. 1954): 260.
167
more than pass statutes regulating the worst abuses in elections such as
bribery and fraud due to the constitutional restraints upon its powers.
While the states had broader authority to control the electoral process,
they too chose only to pass statutes to control outright criminal activi-
ties, and gave the parties broad latitude to conduct political campaigns
as they believed appropriate. Although never explicitly stated, the reti-
cence of the states to impose stricter controls on campaigns may have
been due to the accepted understanding of the time that parties were
private associations through which the citizens expressed their political
views, and debated the conduct of the government and their representa-
tives. To interfere with these organizations therefore meant violating the
natural right of the citizens to inquire about politics and society en-
shrined in the state and federal Bill of Rights in the form of the rights to
freedom of speech, of the press, and of association, and more fundamen-
tally their duty to elect members of the federal and state governments.
Reform liberalism also views elections as the primary means by
which the people can gain information and engage in debate with their
fellow citizens about governmental policy and the worthiness of the can-
didates seeking their suffrages. Where they differ from their pluralist
counterparts is in their belief that this discussion, and more importantly
the decisions that emerge from it, must conform and be guided by a so-
cially developed and enforced code of conduct to ensure that the out-
comes are beneficial to all and the state itself. It is the responsibility of
the state therefore to not only prevent criminal practices, such as brib-
ery, but also to determine what activities will be permitted in elections
based upon whether they help citizens fulfill their duty to select the best,
or most representative, government possible.
168
This understanding of government by consent first began to mani-
fest itself and challenge the pluralist one after the Civil War when various
groups of reformers began to criticize the changing character of the
American polity and its people as it developed into a modern and indus-
trialized nation. The most important of these were Progressives whose
objective in creating an electoral code of conduct was to restore the civic
virtue and political morality of the citizens required to make proper po-
litical decisions, which had been corrupted by the industrialization and
urbanization of the nation. The first campaign finance laws were an inte-
gral part of this project as they were designed to redeem the people from
their “bondage” to the “sinful” influence of money and political parties
that had led them to favor selfish and partisan motives rather than the
national interest in making political decisions. By eliminating these “evil”
influences, these reform liberals hoped to make elections dispassionate
events in which a rational, virtuous, and moral people acquired knowl-
edge about the issues and candidates, debated their merits, and reached
a consensus as to which candidates or policies would best serve the ad-
vancement of the democratic ideal. And this in turn would improve the
quality of the national and state governments as the men elected would
be motivated solely by their desire to serve the people and the nation
rather than the selfish and petty interests of the corporations and party
bosses.
Although the political science literature traditionally portrays the
courts in this era as hostile to the regulation of economic or private
power, state judges in the period from the 1890s to the 1920s showed
great deference to the judgment of the legislatures concerning the neces-
sity of these laws by upholding them as a legitimate exercise of their po-
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lice power. They with few exceptions accepted the arguments of the state
legislatures, often based upon those of the reform liberals, of the neces-
sity of restoring the virtue and morality of the people by reducing the im-
portance of money and party bosses in elections.
What differentiated the state courts in this era was how they an-
swered particular questions pertaining to the different kinds of laws.
Their answers to them often determined the scope of legislative power
over the electoral process. This was especially true for primary and cor-
rupt practices acts. For the former, the state courts were divided, espe-
cially after the turn of the twentieth century, over whether such elections
fell within the purview of the state constitutions or not, and hence if the
legislature’s power to regulate such contests was subject to constitu-
tional restrictions. While in the case of corrupt practices acts, the central
question for the courts became not whether money was property as they
viewed these statutes as political ones designed to correct certain abuses
in the electoral process. Instead, it was whether the legislature was sim-
ply regulating the rights of the citizens to freedom of speech, of the press,
and of association, or actually destroying them by silencing a whole class
of citizens. The latter was unacceptable in the view of state judges, and
laws were struck down on a few occasions for being too extreme. Even
with these restrictions, the power given by the courts to the state legisla-
tures to regulate elections in the early twentieth was very broad to enable
them to fulfill their duty of protecting the liberties of the citizens.
The Progressive understanding of government by consent sup-
ported by nineteenth century and early twentieth century reform liberals
and state judges was eventually displaced by that of a second generation
of reform liberals that emerged in the 1960s. They too sought to establish
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a code of electoral conduct, but its objectives were informed by a very
different understanding of corruption. To them, the problem with the use
of money in elections was not per se the motives that drove the citizens
to make their decisions. Rather, it was the inequalities in resources and
opportunities for participation in politics that prevented citizens from
being able to influence government policy and legislators to the same ex-
tent as the wealthy and organized interests. Campaign finance laws were
meant to address this imbalance of power in part by preventing the latter
from transforming their economic resources into excessive political
influence. These statutes were also meant to ensure that the citizens
acquired all the information required for them to make an informed de-
cision about governmental policies and who their representatives would
be by providing them with equal resources and opportunities to partici-
pate in the political process. By giving all the people the ability to express
their views and engage in the great debate called politics, the second
generation of reform liberals sought to create a government that was just
and fair, i.e. one that would be truly representative of the citizens, and
able to address their needs and interests.
However, unlike in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, the state courts were far less willing to show deference to the judg-
ment of the state legislatures. They now began to strike down entire
statutes, or portions of them, on the basis of the state and federal consti-
tutions, and more importantly precedents established by the national
courts, particularly the Supreme Court. Although this shift in responsi-
bility for protecting the rights of the citizens from the state courts and
legislatures to the federal courts began with the constitutional revolution
of 1937 when the focus of the Court’s electoral jurisprudence began to
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shift from questions pertaining to federalism, state power, and race to
those pertaining in part to freedom of speech in the electoral arena, it
reached its culmination only during the era of the Warren Court in the
1960s. The doctrines developed by the Court during that decade in re-
gard to freedom of speech and equality in the political process would be-
come especially important in shaping the subsequent development of
campaign finance policy. They would serve first of all to frustrate the sec-
ond generation of reform liberals’ desire to equalize the relative political
power of the citizens by providing especial protection for certain liberties
including freedom of speech. And secondly, they would increasingly come
into conflict with each other as the Court grappled more directly with the
issue of campaign finance in the 1970s with the central issue becoming,
especially for the more liberal justices, which activities and individuals or
groups deserved to be protected by the Constitution.
The broad differences that exist between how pluralist and reform
liberalism conceptualize the idea of government by consent, particularly
their views of the state’s role in regulating the electoral process, makes it
impossible to reconcile them to create a single, widely accepted under-
standing of this tenet of republican liberalism. One is therefore left with
the question of which interpretation, if any, of this principle that has
been proposed in the course of the century long debate over campaign
finance truly fulfills it.
The Art and Science of Politics
The understandings of the American political system that the
founders, Progressives, and modern liberals derived from republican,
172
pluralist, and reform liberalism are all examples of what Michael Oake-
shott calls the politics of rationalism. This refers to the desire to create a
regime not based upon custom or tradition, but instead on the basis of
abstract principles arrived at through human reasoning.2 What makes
the founders’ conception of government and of the electoral process
grounded in republican and pluralist liberalism more acceptable than
those of the Progressives and modern liberals is that they did not seek to
transform human nature and society in utopian ways. Rather, they en-
acted what Martin Diamond has called a revolution of sober expectations
by creating a regime that sought to give equal political rights to all, and
that allowed human ambitions, interests, and passions to flourish.
In his essay “Rationalism in Politics,” Oakeshott describes a ra-
tionalist as an individual characterized by three habits of thought or ac-
tion. First, he rejects any reliance upon authority, tradition, or experi-
ence, and instead depends in each situation on reason to be the infallible
guide that directs his actions and forms his beliefs. Second, his mind has
been trained to be a “finely-tempered, neutral instrument” that questions
and evaluates everything using reason, including deeply held customs
and beliefs, to determine their worth and truth as well as the appropri-
ateness of his actions. And third, he believes that all men are intellectu-
ally equal, i.e. they are all capable of using their reason appropriately,
and hence cannot fail to reach the same opinions and conclusions as
himself.3
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In politics, the rationalist therefore finds no value in existing tradi-
tions or political, social, and economic institutions. Rather, he considers
it his duty to question the validity of these arrangements using his rea-
son, and to replace them as necessary with ideologies and governing
structures that better suit the circumstances and desires of society at
that particular moment. This is what Oakeshott calls the politics of the
felt need, which treats political life as a series of problems that the ra-
tionalist is to resolve through the application of his reason unhindered
by any past decisions, customs, or institutions.
The conduct of affairs for the rationalist is a matter of solving problems,
and in this no man can hope to be successful whose reason has become
inflexible by surrender to habit or is clouded by the fumes of tradition. In
this activity the character which the Rationalist [sic] claims for himself is
the character of the engineer, whose mind (it is supposed) is controlled
throughout by the appropriate technique and whose first step is to dis-
miss from his attention everything not directly related to his specific in-
tentions. This assimilation of politics to engineering is indeed, what may
be called the myth of rationalist politics.4
Furthermore, the rationalist is confident that reason will always be able
to find an answer to a problem even if he cannot, and that it will be the
perfect one that suits all circumstances. This is referred to as the politics
of perfection by Oakeshott, and naturally leads in his opinion to the poli-
tics of uniformity, which holds that whatever solution is adopted will be
equally applicable to all members of society. There is no need for a vari-
ety of answers as all individuals share the same rational preferences and
opinions.5 Thus, rationalism in short conceives of political activity “as
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the imposition of a uniform condition of perfection upon human con-
duct.”6
For Oakeshott, the fundamental flaw of rationalist politics is that it
forgets that all arts and sciences depend upon the use of both practical
and technical knowledge, especially politics which takes human beings
as its material. The latter is knowledge that can be distilled into precise
maxims or rules that can be learned, remembered, and applied; while the
former refers to knowledge that is derived from tradition or the actual
practice of an art or science. It is an imprecise knowledge that cannot be
formulated into specific guidelines and learned, but rather must be im-
parted and acquired by an individual through the actual performance of
the activity and by an apprenticeship in which he observes one who is
familiar with it. Together, the two kinds of knowledge tell an individual
not merely what to do to complete a particular task, but more impor-
tantly how to perform those actions.7
Rationalism is based upon an outright rejection of practical knowl-
edge as either negligible or false knowledge since it is based upon cus-
tom, and hence is uncertain or a matter of opinion. For the rationalist,
the only true knowledge is that of technique which tells an individual all
he must know, and is better learned by those whose minds are empty or
have been purged of all previous beliefs. The problem with this theory, as
Oakeshott argues, is that no individual can ever begin learning an activ-
ity from a point of ignorance as he always will be influenced by what he
already knows, i.e. his practical knowledge.8
                                                
6 Oakeshott, 6.
7 Oakeshott, 7-13, 22-23, 31-32.
8 Oakeshott, 11-13.
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The variations of reform liberalism put forth by the Progressives
and modern liberals are arguably classic examples of rationalism in poli-
tics. While it is true that their desire to reform the political and electoral
system came from practical knowledge gained from observing how the
use of money in elections was corrupting the republic by promoting self-
ish desires or inequality, the principles that underlay their vision of de-
mocracy described in the first chapter and that were used to justify the
restrictions of the use of money in elections, were all arguably derived
solely from reason.
For the Progressives, the problem was how to restore moral order
in the electoral process to allow the right men to be elected so that the
nation could be guided toward the fulfillment of the vaguely defined goal
known as the democratic moral idea. The campaign finance laws they
advocated as a solution to this problem were premised upon their ra-
tionalist beliefs that all men were intellectually equal, and had the capac-
ity to be moral, virtuous, and rational citizens who acted in the best in-
terest of the republic. They believed that by using these statutes to sup-
press the selfish aspects of human nature that had degraded the repub-
lic, it would be possible to teach, or in the worst case force, the people to
act upon their highest motivations in making political decisions.
Rawls’ principles of justice that underlie his constitutional order
are formed in a setting devoid of any external influences, and hence are
solely the product of abstract human reasoning. Implementing them re-
quires in part that the glaring discrepancies in power and wealth that
prevent the citizens being able to equally influence their own government
be eliminated through the passage of campaign finance laws. Although
Rawls and modern reform liberals advocate such statutes for different
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reasons than the Progressives, they too rely upon a rationalist vision of
human nature. They presume that all men are intellectually equal and
rational, and will therefore seek to participate in the electoral process if
given a chance. And furthermore, that the behavior of the citizens can be
shaped to allow them to act and to make decisions that accord with the
higher purposes of government and society even if this requires the sup-
pression of human passions and interests.
Perhaps the most significant problem with the reform liberals reli-
ance upon technical knowledge and reason and neglect of practical
knowledge is that it leads them to advocate the creation of regimes that
ignore the realities of human nature. Both Rawls and the Progressives,
for example, assume that it is possible for the citizens either to empty
their minds of all preconceptions, ambitions, and interests, or ignore
them in making political or electoral decisions. But, is it not inevitable
that practical knowledge, especially people’s beliefs, prejudices, partisan
inclinations, and numerous other factors, will influence these decisions
as is well documented in the literature related to voting?9
Furthermore, such knowledge if it can be repressed would require
the state to eliminate the diversity of opinion that is an integral part of
human nature. “The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature
of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of
                                                
9 See Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1960); Donald Green et al., Partisan Hearts and Minds (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2002); Bruce E. Keith et al., The Myth of the Independent Voter (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992); Raymond E. Wolfinger & Steven J. Rosenstone,
Who Votes? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); and Morris P. Fiorina,
Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press,
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activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society.”10 In
fact, one of the understated and perhaps most disturbing implications of
these two conceptions of reform liberalism is that they would require an
extremely intrusive state to maintain what they believe to be equality and
justice, and to reshape the nature of the citizens to teach them to make
what they consider to be proper decisions, i.e. those that accord with
reason. In all probability, they would be laws similar to Colorado’s public
funding law of 1909 and Wisconsin’s corrupt practices act of 1916, dis-
cussed in chapter three, to control who could participate in elections,
what activities were permissible, and to limit to the extent feasible the
use of private money.
A state with these kinds of statutes seems more like a totalitarian
one rather than a democratic one as such laws impose significant re-
strictions on the liberty required for citizen participation in the political
process. Perhaps most importantly, they interfere with the “natural” right
of the citizens to inquiry about society and politics by requiring them to
exercise their rights of freedom of speech, of the press, and of association
in predetermined ways or to ask only certain kinds of questions. In short,
they allow the government to shape the views of the people by restricting
the information available to them rather than allowing the citizens to
freely consider the issues and reach their own conclusions about politics
and society.
The founders also eschewed any reliance on practical knowledge,
especially that derived from the older political traditions associated with
                                                
10 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed.
Clinton Rossiter (New York: Mentor, 1961), 47.
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European government, and sought to create a regime based upon a new
science of politics that derived its abstract principles from nature
through the use of human reason. However, in contrast to the Progres-
sives and modern liberals, the purpose of this regime was the modest one
of creating a state that guaranteed all men equal political or civil liberty,
and at the same time accepted that it was impossible to change their de-
praved nature, particularly the fact that they acted most commonly out
of passion and self-interest. Any attempt to change human nature in
their view would destroy the very liberty that they were seeking to pre-
serve.11
Another important distinction between the founders’ conception of
liberalism and those put forth by the Progressives and modern liberals is
that the former was founded as previously noted upon a system of nega-
tive liberties. Rights were understood to be restraints upon the power of
the government instead of a series of obligations and duties that the gov-
ernment and the citizens had to each other as part of fulfilling the over-
arching purpose of the regime. Furthermore, the founders made no effort
to coerce the citizens into accepting particular social and political beliefs.
These two features of the regime left the people free to think and to chose
what principles and leaders they wanted to support, and made possible
the formation of those secondary associations, civil and political ones,
that Alexis de Tocqueville in the nineteenth century and Michael Oake-
                                                
11 Oakeshott, 26-28; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,
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shott in the twentieth century believed were essential to the maintenance
of republican government. In their opinion, these associations prevented
the state from becoming despotic by diffusing its power throughout soci-
ety, and teaching citizens how to rely upon each other to oppose intru-
sions by the state into their freedoms as well as improving their ability to
contemplate for themselves the affairs of the state.12
Thus, what sets the conception of government of the founders
grounded upon pluralist and republic liberalism above those proposed by
the Progressives and modern liberals is that it sought to allow human
proclivities to flourish within a scheme of ordered liberty. This not only
guarded against the abuse of governmental power, but also allowed the
parties to draw the citizens into the political process by appealing to their
self-interest. As Richard Bensel’s work discussed in chapter two makes
clear, political parties encouraged participation in politics not only by
simplifying the choices the people had to make in elections, educating
them about the issues and candidates, and making an effort to show how
their private interest was connected to the public one, but also using
what now are considered controversial tactics. These include rewarding
the citizens for their support, obstructing those who wished to vote, or
raising campaign funds in secret from special interests.13 All of these
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practices in the nineteenth century, however, were arguably viewed by
citizens as a normal and acceptable part of the electoral process.
It was the elites of the latter part of the nineteenth century who
came to view them as illegitimate as they did not foster the kind of delib-
eration they believed essential to republican government. Nor did they
think, unlike the founders, that the restraints and mechanisms of the
Constitution would be able to constrain the ambitions of the citizens and
politicians nor redirect them to the benefit of the public. Thus while the
founders’ governmental system may not in the end have promoted public
deliberation, it was able to promote citizen participation by leaving suffi-
cient liberty for the people to be drawn into the political process in vari-
ous ways, and consequently to become to a certain extent engaged in the
inquiry about politics and society that was essential to the maintenance
of a democratic system.
Implications for Campaign Finance
Hence, it is the understanding of the electoral process grounded in
pluralist liberalism that best fulfills the requirement of republican lib-
eralism that government be based upon the consent of the people. It
provides the citizens with the maximum amount of liberty possible to de-
bate the merits and demerits of the candidates and issues; to criticize the
conduct of the government and their representatives; and above all else
to make whatever decisions they please using this information regardless
of whether they are in the view of the reformers made from proper mo-
                                                                                                                                                
Spending: The Reformers’ Paradox,” 59 American Bar Association Journal 1148 (1973):
1153.
181
tives, rational and disinterested ones, or improper motives, self-inter-
ested and partisan ones.14 It also recognizes that money in the political
process is good for democracy, not inherently corrupting, as it provides
the resources that make it possible for the parties, candidates, and citi-
zens to communicate with each other. Finally, pluralist liberalism ac-
cepts that there will inevitably be inequalities in who is able to speak and
more generally participate in the electoral process, but does not view it as
a source of concern. As Oakeshott argues, most people have “nothing to
say; the lives of most men do not revolve around a felt necessity to
speak.”15 And one might add no inclination to run for public office.
Thus, the electoral process should not be based upon the unreal-
istic expectations found in reform liberalism that all citizens desire to
participate in the electoral process, will abide by the code of conduct es-
tablished by the state, and are capable of engaging in rational debate
with each other without the assistance of mediating institutions. Rather
it should be understood that these kinds of institutions, especially politi-
cal parties, are precisely those that encourage citizens to become in-
volved in elections by giving them the ability to express their preferences
in regard to particular policies or candidates whether it be by simply be-
coming a member of them or supporting them with their votes and dol-
lars.
Based on these premises, this work concludes like past scholars,
such as Louise Overacker and James Pollock, that the best campaign fi-
nance regulatory regime will be one that places its emphasis upon pub-
                                                
14 Daniel R. Ortiz, “The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform,” 50 Stanford
Law Review 893 (Feb. 1998): 901-905, 913-914.
15 Oakeshott, 43.
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licity laws as a means of controlling the use of money in elections. How-
ever, unlike them, it believes that these kinds of statutes combined with
those prohibiting bribery, fraud, and other well-recognized electoral
crimes are sufficient to regulate money in the electoral and political proc-
ess.16 Such a system leaves the citizens, parties, and candidates free to
speak, to spend money, and to join associations to influence the deci-
sions of their fellow citizens or to proclaim their belief in particular prin-
ciples, policies, or candidates. At the same time, it provides accountabil-
ity for how money is used in the electoral process by making possible the
enforcement of the criminal laws, and allowing voters to know who is
seeking their votes directly through campaigning or indirectly through
campaign contributions.
Other measures such as public funding, prohibitions on the par-
ticipation of particular interests, such as corporations and labor unions,
and general limitations on the use of money in elections are more harm-
ful than good for a republican government, and hence should be rejected
as viable options for controlling campaign funds. While they are all pur-
portedly meant to eliminate corruption, this work has shown that they
have another, decidedly anti-democratic function: to shape the electoral
process in a fashion as to ensure that citizens make what the policy-
makers or reformers believe to be the right decisions about the future of
the polity and select the right candidates as their leaders. This is ac-
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complished by discriminating against those interests that are perceived
to be “corrupting” or “harmful” to democracy and favoring those that are
believed to be beneficial. For the Mugwumps, Progressives, and other
nineteenth century reform liberals, this meant passing civil service re-
form and campaign finance laws to remove the “mere politicians” from
power and replace them with true statesmen; for modern reform liberals
the goal is to replace legislators too indebted to the wealthy and organ-
ized interests with those willing to consider the interests of the citizens or
more likely, the groups claiming to represent them; and Southern Demo-
cratic whites at the turn of the twentieth century created a system to fa-
vor themselves at the cost of blacks and poor whites. In reality therefore,
these laws prevent the citizens from hearing all points of view, and deny
them the right to make a truly informed and free decision about which
candidates, policies, associations, and principles they wish to support.
A further defect of these statutes is that they have historically been
abject failures in establishing a code of conduct in elections that will
guide the decisions of the people in elections. If anything, they have con-
tributed to a depression in citizen participation in the electoral system by
eliminating opportunities for them to engage in certain activities, such as
giving contributions to parties and to candidates in cases where cam-
paigns are publicly funded. And also making it more difficult for them to
give money or express their support for a party or a candidate through
the Byzantine bureaucratic requirements they must know and obey to do
so. Most citizens simply lack the resources, time and knowledge, re-
quired to learn and comply with these requirements. Wisconsin’s 1916
statute banning the use of money by individuals to electioneer outside of
their own counties is a good example. As noted in chapter 3, the law was
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so thorough that the simple act of mailing a letter expressing his support
for a candidate might get a citizen unaware of it arrested. The develop-
ment of such complex regulatory system makes anyone who wants to be
involved in politics need a lawyer, and hence significant economic re-
sources, if they desire to influence the political process.
Nor have campaign finance law been successfully in achieving an-
other common goal of the reform liberals: to control the flow of money
into the political system through publicity statutes and those restricting
the use of campaign funds. In reality, these laws have more often than
not had precisely the opposite effect: they have only succeeded in en-
hancing the possibility for corruption by diverting money into hidden
channels. Mistakenly believing that campaign costs are too high due to
their failure to consider the impact of inflation and other factors on poli-
tics, reformers have repeatedly sought to remove or to reduce the sources
of money available to the parties or the candidates. This in turn has left
them with the choice of losing an election due to a lack of money, discov-
ering new sources of funding, or finding a means of circumventing the
law. Historically, parties and candidates have chosen the latter two
measures, which has reduced the ability of the publicity requirements to
track how money is used in the political system through the constant
creation of new channels into which campaign funds can flow. Perhaps
the most significant consequence of these statutes is that they under-
mine confidence in the rule of law that is central to the functioning of a
republican government through the perception that the statutes are un-
enforceable and that violating the law carries no consequences.
The history of limitations imposed on political campaigns by the
second Hatch Act of 1940 illustrates all of these problems. Its inflexible
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and unrealistic limits quickly threatened to become a liability to politi-
cians in an era when television and other innovations were demanding
the use of ever large amounts of money on campaigns. Therefore, the
parties flagrantly violated the spirit of the law by creating multiple com-
mittees to raise money making it impossible to track who was giving;
what funds were transferred between committees; or even how much
money was really being raised and spent since not all committees com-
plied with the publicity requirements. And the lack of enforcement argu-
ably created cynicism among the public about campaign finance laws in
general since the politicians treated them with such contempt.
Thus, the merits of a regulatory regime that relies primary on pub-
licity to regulate the use of money in elections is in part that it rejects the
lofty and impossible goals, such as elevating the moral and intellectual
condition of the citizens or completely purifying politics of all corruption,
that have so often characterized the goals of reform liberals. Further-
more, the history recounted in this study suggests that of all the meas-
ures attempted in the United States to regulate money in politics, this
one alone might have the greatest chance of success if properly imple-
mented. A more thorough study of the finances of the parties and candi-
dates in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would be required
to properly evaluate the potential impact of such a regime.
However, it seems likely that a regulatory system premised on dis-
closure can arguably be effective if it provides serious penalties for failing
to file reports or for falsifying data, such as those that were incorporated
into the 1883 British Corrupt Practices Act. These included jail, fines,
and most importantly, the possibility of the election being nullified and
the candidate being barred from ever holding office or voting again.
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Whether citizens use the information revealed by publicity in deciding
who to support will be up to them. After all, the ultimate purpose of a
disclosure regime is to ensure that the government is truly formed by the
consent of the people thorough an electoral process that is fair and hon-
est to the greatest possible, and within which all have an equal opportu-
nity to participate by expressing their preferences, whether it be by
making a contribution, spending money, speaking to influence one’s fel-
low citizens, or simply joining an association of like-minded citizens, re-
gardless of their personal motivations.
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